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In 2008 the Dutch shipbuilding industry launched ‘Integral Cooperation’, a large-scale and 
government-sponsored improvement program. This program originated from the sector’s 
belief that the quality of their interorganizational collaboration practices was suboptimal. In 
short, the main problem was that specialization had led to fragmentation in the value chain, 
conflicting interests among collaboration partners, and opportunism, all of which impeded 
project-based collaboration and related outcomes. 
Between October 2011 and June 2013 we closely examined the production of two 
organizationally and technically complex vessels produced in the Netherlands. The main goal 
of our examination was to acquire a better understanding of the interorganizational 
collaboration practices between the participating organizations (i.e., one shipyard and eight 
subcontractors) in these two shipbuilding projects. Specifically, we looked at the flexibility 
behaviors displayed by the project participants (Chapter 2 in this dissertation) and we studied 
how and why learning across the two projects did or did not occur (Chapter 3 in this 
dissertation). Additionally, at the industry level we examined changes and stabilities in 
collaboration practices and demands between 1950 and 2010 (Chapter 1 in this dissertation). 
Combining the results from these empirical undertakings, we propose a number of 
recommendations to improve the quality of collaboration in shipbuilding projects in specific 
and in multi-organizational projects in general. 
A major recommendation is to strive for repeated collaboration with the same partners. For 
the shipyard and subcontractors under study, this repeated collaboration is routine but it is not 
a widespread phenomenon in Dutch shipbuilding. When partners share a history of 
collaboration and expect to work together in the future, they will be less inclined to focus 
predominantly on their own interests during collaboration than when such ‘shadows of the 
past and future’ are absent. Instead, they will be motivated to not only take into account their 
own interests but also the interests of their partners and thus the overall project interest. Also, 
repeated collaboration enables participants to develop collaboration routines so that 
collaboration can become more effective and efficient. For example, partners know what they 
can expect from each other and can anticipate their partners’ behavior in advance. Next to 




A possible downside of this recommendation is that when subcontractors get the idea that 
they will be selected by the shipyard on future projects anyhow, they will no longer fully try 
to make the best of collaboration because they are more or less assured of future work. In 
other words, in the absence of the incentive to be a good partner, partners can become focused 
more on pursuing self-interests than on overall project interests. Another downside of long-
term collaboration between organizations we found is that organizations may stop looking for 
alternative ways of collaboration simply because they are used to a certain way of work and 
do not have the believe that these alternatives can actually improve collaboration. We find 
that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible to break away from historically developed 
routines, even although these routines lead to sub-optimal collaboration. In trying to change 
present behavior then, one should always to a certain extent take into account and deal with 
what happened in the past. 
Another recommendation for higher management is to assure that for each single project the 
coordination capacity (i.e., the number of individuals specifically employed to manage and 
organize the efforts of the various organizations and individuals) is sufficient. An increase of 
coordination capacity initially increases costs but overall costs are likely to be lower due to 
among other things better communication, fewer misunderstandings and earlier detection of 
possible showstoppers. The challenge lies in finding the right balance: a too low coordination 
capacity will make project participants unaware of what is going in other parts of the projects, 
while a too high coordination capacity will make it unclear where one has to find information 
or who possesses the ‘right’ information. 
Related to this, a third recommendation is that organizations should try to find a balance 
between formal and informal collaboration. Informal collaboration (e.g., not writing down all 
agreements but relying mainly on oral discussions and mutual adjustments) can increase the 
speed of collaboration but carries the danger that things get forgotten or that conflicts arise 
about earlier agreements. The weaknesses of informal collaboration are the strengths of 
formal collaboration. Formal collaboration minimizes the risk that there is conflict about 
agreements but can make collaboration a slow and bureaucratic process. The optimal level of 
formal and informal collaboration is likely to differ for each interorganizational project, but is 
at least partly dependent on prior relations among organizations and expectations of future 
interaction among them. In the presence of prior ties and expected future ties, we would 
encourage project participants to rely more on informal collaboration than on formal 
collaboration, and vice versa. 
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Finally we want to emphasize the importance of communication. A dominant cause of failure 
mentioned in many research reports on a multitude of collaboration settings is the lack of 
communication. In settings in which multiple organizations and individuals are heavily 
dependent on each other such as in shipbuilding projects, communication is key. Open and 
constant communication is critical to bring the project to a successful end. Repeated 
collaboration as suggested above improves communication as trust and coordination routines 
can be developed over multiple collaborations. An optimal coordination capacity can further 
aid in smoothening communication, as can early involvement of key partners. 
In sum, repeated collaboration, sufficient coordination capacity, a balance between formal and 
informal collaboration, and open communication are all instruments to improve 
interorganizational collaboration. Nevertheless, even when these instruments are 
implemented, successful collaboration can be hampered by the inherently conflicting interests 
partners may have in each single project. Repeated collaboration can partly cover for this, but 
not sufficiently. A formidable challenge that remains then is to find ways to further align 








In 2008 the Dutch shipbuilding industry launched a large-scale and government-sponsored 
improvement program called ‘Integral Cooperation’. Two of the leading Dutch shipyards and 
various subcontractors participated in the program. It originated from the sector’s 
acknowledgement that the quality of interorganizational collaboration practices in the sector 
was suboptimal. In short, the main problem was that specialization had led to fragmentation in 
the value chain and conflicting interests among collaboration partners, which impeded 
project-based collaboration and related outcomes. The overall goal of the program was to 
improve interorganizational collaboration in order to stay ahead of international competition 
and to secure the continuity of the Dutch maritime cluster. 
A group of researchers of Tilburg University participated in the program, studying 
contemporary collaboration practices in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. Collaboration in the 
sector is organized in multi-organizational projects. These projects are temporary settings in 
which multiple organizations – typically one shipyard acting as the lead organization and 
various subcontractors – work together for a predefined period of time to produce complex 
vessels. Because of their temporary nature, such collaboration settings can be regarded as 
‘temporary organizations’. Despite an increasing prevalence of temporary organizations it has 
been observed that many questions concerning the functioning and outcomes of temporary 
organizations remain unanswered. 
These observations form the rationale for this dissertation, which examines collaboration 
practices in and across multi-organizational shipbuilding projects from the perspective of 
temporary organizations. 
1.1 Temporary organizations: What’s new? 
Nowadays many organizations are facing rapidly changing environmental conditions like 
increasing levels of technological and market uncertainty (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). As 
one of the ways to deal with these conditions, in several industries organizations more and 
more turn to multiple external partners for the production of their complex products and 
services (Bakker et al., 2011a; Gil, Pinto, & Smyth, 2011; Hobday, 2000; Martinsuo & Ahola, 
2010; Maurer, 2010, Ruuska et al., 2013). These multi-organizational collaborations are often 
of a temporary nature, causing scholars to describe them as temporary organizations. In 
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temporary organizations, the duration of collaboration is “explicitly and ex ante fixed either 
by a specific date or by the attainment of a predefined task or condition” (Janowicz-Panjaitan, 
Cambré, & Kenis, 2009, p. 2, emphasis in original). This temporary nature is considered the 
central and unique feature of temporary organizations (Grabher, 2002a; Söderlund, 2004) and 
sets them apart from more commonly examined interorganizational collaborations like 
alliances and joint ventures, which are ‘built to last’ (Greve et al., 2010). Temporary 
organizations (TOs from here on) are increasingly prevalent (Bakker et al., 2011a; Kenis, 
Janowicz-Panjaitan, & Cambré, 2009; Malone & Laubacher, 1998), but they are not new 
phenomena. The presence of TOs has been observed and acknowledged in a myriad of 
industries, including construction (Eccles, 1981), film (Bechky, 2006), theatre (Goodman & 
Goodman, 1976), biotechnology (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), shipbuilding (Ahola 
et al., 2008) and advertising (Grabher, 2002b), among others. Half a century ago Miles (1964) 
was one of the first to discuss social and work life in terms of temporary systems like 
conferences, juries, military battles and psychotherapeutic settings. He argued that the central 
characteristic of these systems was that in the foreseeable future they would cease to exist.  
While initially the number of scholarly works on TOs grew steadily, this number has grown 
exponentially over the past 25 years (Bakker, 2010). A central tenet of these works is that the 
temporary involvement of multiple, interdependent organizations brings benefits to 
participating organizations but at the same time poses formidable challenges to collaboration 
in and across TOs (Dille & Söderlund, 2011; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). Still there 
remains room to explore the functioning and outcomes of TOs. This may be because only 
quite recently the assumption that TOs are a crucial form of contemporary organizing, and 
thus require academic attention, has become widespread (Grabher, 2002a; Sydow, Lindkvist, 
& DeFillippi, 2004). To answer the question in the heading of this section: TOs are not new 
phenomena, but the academic attention devoted to the studying of TOs is (Bakker et al., 
2011a; Grabher, 2002a). 
Before turning to the theoretical and practical problems addressed by this dissertation, it is 
deemed useful to provide some demarcations. The focus of this dissertation is on 
collaboration practices in and across interorganizational TOs. We
1
 define collaboration 
practices as TO participants’ routine actions for coordinating activities and relations (Kostova 
& Roth, 2002; Windeler & Sydow, 2001). In this dissertation these behaviors are next to 
                                                   
1
 I like to think of this dissertation as a collective effort of my supervisors and myself, therefore I 
prefer to speak in plural, except in this footnote. 
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coordination related to among others trusting behaviors among TO participants, the flexibility 
displayed towards each other, and (interorganizational) learning processes. Interorganizational 
TOs are defined as goal-directed temporary systems of at least three legally autonomous but 
functionally interdependent organizations with different skills and expertise who collaborate 
to accomplish complex tasks in an ex ante defined limited amount of time (Hobday, 2000; 
Janowicz-Panjaitan et al., 2009; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Schwab & Miner, 2008; Sydow 
& Staber, 2002). This implies that intraorganizational TOs are excluded. TOs are of an 
intraorganizational nature when occurring within a single, non-temporary organization 
(Packendorff, 1995). The focus of this dissertation however is on interorganizational TOs 
which are, in comparison to intraorganizational TOs, significantly understudied (Janowicz-
Panjaitan et al., 2009; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). Interorganizational TOs comprised of 
only two organizations are excluded as well. TOs commonly seem to be populated by a 
multitude of organizations instead of only two (Oerlemans, de Kok, & de Jong, 2009). 
Literature assumes that the dynamics of collaboration between three or more organizations are 
fundamentally different, for instance because they are characterized by generalized instead of 
direct social exchange (Das & Teng, 2002). 
1.2 Research problem 
The central theoretical problem addressed in this dissertation concerns the isolation-
embeddedness debate in the TO literature. This debate concerns the idea that TOs 
simultaneously are isolated from and dependent on their environment (Janowicz-Panjaitan et 
al., 2009). On the one hand the isolation of TOs from their environment has been argued to 
stimulate goal accomplishment (Miles, 1964). According to this view, collaboration practices 
in and across TOs are unique, and dependent on the individual TO in question (Löwendahl, 
1995; Pinto & Prescott, 1990). On the other hand, it has been argued that TOs are embedded 
in wider social and historical contexts and dependent on these contexts to accomplish their 
tasks (Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 2004a). According to this view, TOs are no stand-alone, 
isolated organizational phenomena. Instead, their functioning should be understood in relation 
to their environment, and collaboration practices are influenced by forces operating outside of 
the TO. These contrasting views raise the question which factors contribute to our 
understanding of collaboration practices in and across TOs. 
The central practical problem concerns the widely observed general difficulty of temporary 
multi-organizational collaboration. In general collaboration practices are often characterized 
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by slow and painful processes such as partners behaving opportunistically and inefficiency 
(Dille & Söderlund, 2011; Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 
2011), both impeding the quality of collaboration. In the Dutch shipbuilding industry, similar 
problems occur. Four specific collaboration problems in Dutch shipbuilding projects concern: 
(1) the inability to come to more efficient interorganizational collaboration, despite several 
decades of experience with producing complex vessels through multi-organizational projects; 
(2) the inflexibility displayed by project participants during project execution as they seem to 
pursue mainly self-interests (see also Ruuska et al., 2013); (3) the inability to learn across 
projects, resulting in repeated mistakes and increases in failure costs; and (4) difficulties with 
coordinating the actions and efforts of interdependent participants while also preventing 
opportunism. Following up on the theoretical problem, we are interested in the factors that 
explain these practical collaboration problems, and whether these factors are related to 
specific TO characteristics, the environment of TOs, or both. 
The theoretical and practical problems discussed above show that there are many facets to 
temporary interorganizational collaboration. This dissertation opens the black box of 
collaboration practices in and across TOs and simultaneously connects this box with its wider 
environment. These considerations result in the general research goal and research question 
below. 
1.3 Research goal and research question 
The goal of this dissertation is to explore collaboration practices in and across temporary 
organizations and to contribute to the debate on temporary organizations’ isolation from 
versus dependence on their wider contexts. We answer the following overall research 
question: 





                                                   
2
 We aim to develop parsimonious models, i.e. models with only a limited number of variables which 
have high explanatory power. In order to identify these ‘critical’ factors, we focus on those variables 




The collaboration problems discussed above give rise to four research sub-questions. These 
research questions form the focus of the chapters in this dissertation. While the first research 
question adopts a macro perspective, looking at collaboration practices at the industry level, 
the other three research questions adopt a micro perspective, zooming in on collaboration 
practices in and across specific TOs.  
First, which factors explain collaboration inertia in a TO-based industry over time? It has been 
proposed that collaboration practices should be understood not in isolation but in the context 
of historical developments (Engwall, 2003). Yet current TO literature does not provide us 
with satisfying answers as it focuses predominantly on singular projects (Engwall, 2003), 
thereby neglecting the possibility that contemporary collaboration practices are reproduced 
over time, across a series of TOs (Windeler & Sydow, 2001). It seems much can be gained 
from exploring history-related explanations of collaboration inertia.  
Second, which factors explain (in)flexibility in social interaction in TOs? TOs are commonly 
praised for providing flexibility across particular instances of collaboration (Bechky, 2006). 
This flexibility concerns the freedom of lead organizations to rotate the involvement of 
multiple skilled organizations as new TOs are initiated (Hobday, 2000). But this does not 
necessarily result in flexibility in TOs. Why do TO participants sometimes show flexibility, 
i.e. adjust their operational plans and behaviors to accommodate the needs of other 
participants (Heide & Miner, 1992), while on other occasions they show inflexibility by 
focusing on pursuing (solely) their own interests? Are these drivers related to the specificities 
of the current TO, or to the social contexts in which the TO operates? A detailed analysis of 
flexibility within TOs is currently lacking so that our knowledge is limited (Ivens, 2005: 
Bakker, 2010). Therefore there is an opportunity to explore the factors that determine 
flexibility and inflexibility in TOs. 
Third, why does learning across two specific, subsequent TOs fail or succeed? TOs provide 
ample learning opportunities as participants bring in specific knowledge and expertise, but the 
created knowledge may disperse once TO participants disband after task completion (Bakker 
et al., 2011b). Next to TOs’ limited duration, time pressure is often mentioned as a crucial 
barrier to cross-TO learning (Scarbrough et al., 2004). However, time pressure could be of 
limited influence when subsequent TOs are populated by the same set of organizations and 
individuals, who can then function as a project memory (Grabher, 2004b). Also, the limited 
duration of TOs seems to be less of a problem once knowledge is codified and made available 
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to others in subsequent TOs (Zollo & Winter, 2002). This suggests that we need alternative 
explanations for the failure, or success, of cross-TO learning. These explanations may 
transcend TO-specific explanations of time pressure and limited duration by taking into 
account the wider social context in which TOs are embedded. 
Fourth, in which way does the interorganizational and interpersonal nature of repeated 
collaboration influence coordination and opportunism in TOs? A growing body of literature 
holds that shadows of the past and of the future improve coordination and put a hold on 
opportunism, respectively (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Skilton & Dooley, 2010). Prior ties 
make TO participants aware of each other’s roles and procedures, which facilitates 
coordination (Eccles, 1981; Gulati, 1995). Expectations of future interaction generate a sense 
of obligation, making it less likely that TO participants engage in opportunistic behavior in 
current interactions (Jones et al., 1997). However, most of this literature ignores the difference 
between interorganizational ties on the one hand and interpersonal ties on the other. Exploring 
the difference between these two types of ties and their effects on coordination and 
opportunism is likely to provide new and interesting insights in the complexity of temporary 
multi-organizational collaboration. 
We answer the various research questions from a relational and temporary perspective. The 
relational perspective (Dyer & Singh, 1998) emphasizes the importance of interorganizational 
linkages. According to this perspective, these linkages are an organization’s critical resources 
and help understand organizational behavior. Following this perspective, the chapters in this 
dissertation focus on the collaboration, or interaction, between organizations participating in 
TOs. Additionally, in line with our intention to view interorganizational collaboration from a 
temporary perspective, in answering the research questions we pay specific attention to the 
role of time and time limits (cf. Ancona et al., 2001). This seems particularly useful due to the 
lack of consensus on what is generally considered the central characteristic of TOs, being 
limited in time, and how this influences collaboration practices in and across TOs (Bakker, 
2010; Janowicz-Panjaitan et al., 2009). We do not theorize in detail on the role of time, but 
rather use time as an analytical lens by looking at the organizational implications of the time 






The three empirical chapters in this dissertation (Chapter 2, 3, and 4) are based on in-depth, 
qualitative case studies (Yin, 2003). Case studies are particularly well-suited to explore 
relatively underexplored territory and to develop theory around it (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
reported case studies describe the dynamics present both in and across TOs and contribute to 
theory building around the functioning and outcomes of TOs. The quantitative details of the 
case studies can be found in Table 1.1. 
Chapter 2 describes the development of collaboration practices in the Dutch shipbuilding 
industry between 1950 and 2010. Collaboration practices, as well as collaboration demands, 
have changed considerably over this period. To map these changes, we conducted two 
interview rounds. In the first round, between April and July 2010, we interviewed active 
shipbuilders. With active shipbuilders we mean shipyard and subcontractor employees who 
were at that time actively employed in the industry, and who also participated in the 
industry’s improvement program. These semi-structured interviews gave an indication of 
contemporary practices and demands in the industry. In the second round, between July 2011 
and September 2012, we interviewed retired shipbuilders, i.e. those who were formerly 
employed in the industry. These interviews painted a story of historical collaboration practices 
and demands. We combined the results of the two interview rounds. This enabled us to 
identify changes and stabilities in collaboration practices and demands, and to discover path-
dependent explanations for the current suboptimal collaboration practices in the industry. 
While Chapter 2 takes a macro-perspective, focusing on collaboration practices and demands 
at the industry level, the other two empirical chapters employ a micro-perspective, examining 
collaboration practices in specific TOs. Chapter 3 explores collaboration practices in a single 
TO, focusing on flexibility behaviors displayed by its participants. The data collection process 
combined observing the TO participants during weekly project meetings and, on the basis of 
these observations, conducting semi-structured interviews with the participants as well as 
their managers (who did not participate in the project meetings). Between October 2011 and 
June 2012 we observed TO participants during 22 project meetings, resulting in 
approximately 1,000 observation units. The interviews were held between November 2011 
and October 2012.  
Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3, examining the extent to which the organizations and 
individuals managed to transfer lessons learned across TOs. Chapter 4 also relies on the 
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combination of observations of TO participants’ behavior during project meetings and semi-
structured interviews. Between November 2012 and July 2013 we observed behavior during 
20 project meetings. This resulted in approximately 700 observation units. The interviews 
were held in April and May 2013. 
TABLE 1.1 



















28 50 minutes 
Observations 22 project meetings 75 minutes 
Chapter 4: 
Better understanding 




13 40 minutes 
Observations 20 project meetings 60 minutes 
 
The collected data is analyzed in an iterative way, meaning that we continuously switch 
between collection and analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The analysis 
follows the so-called ‘Gioia-method’ (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2004; Harrison & Corley, 2011). 
This is a common method used to execute and present qualitative research (Langley & 
Abdallah, 2011). The method starts with open coding, i.e. the identification of initial concepts 
within the data by using language used by the respondents. The next step involves searching 
for relations among these initial concepts, which are then collapsed into second-order themes. 
Finally, similar themes are gathered into overarching dimensions. 
A major challenge in doing case study research is convincing readers of the credibility, or 
trustworthiness, of the claims that are made (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
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2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The strength of the Gioia-method is that it shows how we as 
researchers arrive at theoretical claims which closely match the collected data. We provide in 
each empirical chapter the so-called data structure, which gives an upfront visualization of 
how the first-order concepts, second-order themes, and aggregate dimensions are related. We 
present tables with respondents’ quotes to further substantiate our findings. Also, we 
triangulate the data (Eisenhardt, 1989), not only by combining observations and interviews 
but also by discussing findings with our respondents, fellow researchers, shipbuilding 
executives and consultants. 
1.5 Dissertation structure 
The dissertation continues with the three empirical chapters on the subjects of collaboration 
inertia, flexibility, and learning, respectively. Partly building on the results of these empirical 
chapters, next follows a conceptual discussion on the difference between interorganizational 
and interpersonal ties. Finally, the concluding chapter integrates the findings from the other 







2. Continuity and change in interorganizational project practices: The Dutch 
shipbuilding industry 1950-20103 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) set the interorganizational project apart from other forms of 
interorganizational coordination by identifying the temporary nature as its key distinction. 
This temporary nature is assumed to impact on the processes, practices, and behaviors taking 
place in these projects. We define interorganizational projects (henceforth IO projects) as 
three or more organizational actors from distinct organizations working jointly to create a 
tangible product/service in a limited period of time (based on Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008).
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Interorganizational collaboration is often characterized by slow and painful processes and 
leads to mixed results, a phenomenon Huxham (2003, p. 401) terms “collaborative inertia”. 
Dille and Söderlund (2011) adhere to this viewpoint, stating that interorganizational projects 
“are usually plagued by challenges in terms of both cooperation and coordination and replete 
with delays” (p. 481). Several studies show that such frictions even lead to failures (Polidoro 
et al., 2011). 
In contemporary Dutch shipbuilding industry, shipyards, subcontractors, and suppliers 
collaborate in IO projects to produce complex vessels. Recently, industry actors 
acknowledged that contemporary interorganizational practices (e.g. with regard to 
communication and knowledge sharing) in Dutch shipbuilding projects are problematic and 
do not fit well with contemporary interorganizational project demands (related to increased 
specialization and outsourcing). In this chapter we define IO project practices as project 
participants’ routine actions for coordinating activities and relations (Kostova & Roth, 2002; 
March & Simon, 1958; Windeler & Sydow, 2001), whereas project demands are seen as 
                                                   
3
 A modified version of this chapter appeared as: Levering, R. C., Ligthart, H. D., Noorderhaven, N. 
G., & Oerlemans, L. A. G. (2013). Continuity and change in interorganizational practices: The Dutch 
shipbuilding industry 1950-2010. International Journal of Project Management, 31, 735-747. Because 
IJOPM is a project management journal, in this chapter we speak of interorganizational projects 
instead of interorganizational TOs. 
 
4
 Note that our focus is explicitly on multiple organizations, i.e. three or more, while the definition of 
Jones & Lichtenstein also encompasses collaboration between two organizations. 
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environmental conditions (cf. Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) that render certain collaboration 
practices more or less effective. Environmental, here, refers to the environment in which the 
project is embedded, for instance competition and technological development. When IO 
project practices do not match with project demands (i.e., environmental conditions), misfit 
occurs, and efficiency might suffer (Tushman & Nadler, 1978). To deal with problems caused 
by the experienced misfit, in 2008 two of the leading Dutch shipyards, together with a number 
of their subcontractors, started a large-scale program to improve the quality of 
interorganizational project practices. The program is part of a larger maritime innovation 
agenda which is supported by the Dutch ministry of economic affairs. The participants 
formulated their problems in their initial program report as follows: 
“Specialization has led to fragmentation. Conflicting interests are a logical consequence and 
not infrequently impede collaboration. (…) But also assembling the necessary amount of 
knowledge, information and different disciplines, along with the fact that more than 70 per 
cent of the ship construction is delivered from outside the shipyard within a very tight 
schedule can sometimes cause great problems” (Integral Collaboration report, 2008). 
According to the program director of the improvement program, problems encountered within 
IO shipbuilding projects due to misfit are for instance: information exchange difficulties 
between organizations involved in the project, subjective (sub-optimal) purchasing decisions 
in buyer-supplier relationships, and a failure to capitalize on available expertise in the pre-
project phase. These problems result in higher communication, learning and production costs, 
and longer delivery times of shipbuilding projects and as such hamper the competitive 
position of the Dutch shipbuilding industry on the global shipbuilding market. The 
participants in the maritime improvement program in The Netherlands responded to the 
experienced problems by setting goals that should make the industry more competitive and 
decrease the misfit between the project practices and demands. Under the umbrella of the 
overall goal of improved collaboration, the program aims at, among others, reducing failure 
costs, increasing employee motivation, and improving knowledge storage and exchange. The 
participants in the program state that “an improvement in collaboration is needed in order to 
overcome the separation between the different phases in the construction process, between 
disciplines, and for joint risk management towards the customer.”
5
 
                                                   
5
 Taken from the improvement program website, www.integraalsamenwerken.nl, 2012 
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However, the causes of the misfit between IO project practices and demands remain unclear. 
Recent work in the field of project management proposes that current project practices and 
misfits should be understood in the context of historical developments (e.g., Engwall, 2003). 
Still, research on collaboration in IO projects typically does not put observed contemporary 
practices and demands in a historical perspective, thus neglecting the possibility that project 
practices may be reproduced from one temporary interorganizational project to another 
(Windeler & Sydow, 2001), rather than reflecting adaptation to present circumstances and 
demands. If the historical dimension is left out of consideration, the implicit assumption is 
that IO project practices are only and immediately influenced by the current set of demands. 
This type of analysis neglects organizational inertia and path dependency (Sydow, Schreyögg, 
& Koch, 2009). Motivated by a strong belief in the importance of project history, scholars 
have recently called for the development of a history of projects (e.g., Jones & Khanna, 2006; 
Usdiken & Kieser, 2004). Responding to this call, we adopt a historical perspective in our 
examination of IO project practices in Dutch shipbuilding. A historical perspective, as 
propagated in the ‘historic turn’ in organization studies (Clark & Rowlinson, 2004), enables 
researchers to capture how project practices are over time influenced by changing forces in 
the environment, which is considered essential as environments, firm strategies, and 
organizations themselves change (Jones & Khanna, 2006). Also, it allows for the exploration 
of path-dependent aspects of project practices. 
The main thrust of the present chapter is that the misfit between contemporary IO project 
practices and demands in the Dutch shipbuilding industry is in part caused by historical 
conditions. Project practices would follow external project demands in the absence of 
historically determined path dependency. Currently, some of the IO project practices are in a 
misfit with the contemporary IO project demands. For some practices we observe a lock-in, 
i.e., these practices have remained unaltered in spite of changes in project demands. Other 
practices did change, however, their adaptation to changing project demands followed a path-
dependent process, in which possible alternatives that might have led to better fit were 
neglected. 
2.2 Aim and outline 
The goal of this chapter is to examine how the observed misfit between IO project practices 
and demands in contemporary Dutch shipbuilding projects are partly rooted in the past and 
consequently are the result of path dependencies and lock-ins. We answer the following 
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research question: How did interorganizational project practices and demands in the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry develop between 1950 and 2010 and to what extent do these 
developments help us understand the current misfit between project practices and demands? 
Our study on historical interorganizational collaboration aims to shed light on the historical 
roots of contemporary project practices. By doing so, it aids project managers and 
practitioners in better understanding the relationship between their project surroundings and 
their interior project management processes. Such an understanding will be supportive for 
managerial action since project management remains a difficult effort with many projects 
failing to meet their objectives within time and budget (White & Fortune, 2002). Answering 
to the call by Sydow et al. (2009), this chapter supplements the literature on path dependency 
literature by applying its insights to an interorganizational collaboration context. We show 
that although self-reinforcing mechanisms causing path dependency can be separated 
analytically, in the context of our study these mechanisms are strongly intertwined. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the theoretical section contingency theory is used to 
theorize on the notion of fit between IO project practices and demands. We complement the 
idea of fit, or, in our study, of misfit, with a historical view on lock-in effects and path 
dependency. In the empirical part of this chapter we first describe the major developments in 
project demands on interorganizational collaboration between shipyards and subcontractors in 
Dutch shipbuilding during the past half century. After that, a description of changes in IO 
project practices is presented in order to arrive at the main aim of this chapter: understanding 
if lock-in effects are at work and how they can partly explain the current misfit between IO 
practices and demands. For reasons of clarity, it should be noted that we do assume neither a 
fit nor a misfit in the Dutch shipbuilding industry in earlier times. Rather, the focus lies at 
understanding the current misfit. For that purpose, the developments in IO project demands 
and practices are described after which misfits due to path dependency and lock-in effects can 
be identified. 
2.3 Theoretical background: Misfit, path dependency and lock-in 
The concept of fit is central to structural contingency theory and has received much scholarly 
attention (Siggelkow, 2001; van de Ven, 1979). A basic assumption of structural contingency 
is that the internal organization, in order to be effective, must be aligned with its external 
environment (Drazin & van de Ven, 1985). Elements of the external environment include for 
example the level of competition and (technological) uncertainty (Eskerod, 1996; Jensen, 
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Johansson, & Löfström, 2006). The fit between internal organization and environment is 
usually described as external fit (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). The present study concentrates 
on the (mis)fit between interorganizational project practices and the environment in which the 
project is embedded. If these practices do not match with environmental demands, 
problematic misfit occurs, and for example efficiency suffers (Tushman & Nadler, 1978). 
Practices, including project practices, tend to have a taken-for-granted, institutionalized nature 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), which somewhat contradicts the view of IO projects as “a panacea 
against strategic persistence and structural inertia” (Sydow, 2009, p. 123). With regard to the 
environment of IO projects, it is worth noting that it is rarely stable (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; 
Duncan, 1972). This implies that over time an initial fit can become a misfit when 
environmental demands change and practices do not change accordingly (Gresov, 1989). Such 
fit-destroying environmental changes should induce project participants to change their 
practices to bring them in line again with the new environmental demands (Siggelkow, 2001). 
However, attempts of organizations to restructure practices to regain fit are not always 
effective (Mintzberg, 1978; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) so that misfit remains. 
In trying to explain misfit, scholars increasingly point to the role of history (e.g., Sydow et al., 
2009). If we assume that history at least partially influences current misfit, the path-
dependence concept appears a fruitful theoretical starting point (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011). 
Applying only a contingency perspective – from which the concept of fit originates – would 
be of limited value. Contingency theory has been criticized for being inherently static and a-
historical, failing to take into account the effects of past organizational behavior on current 
practices and (mis)fit (Donaldson, 1987; Shenhar & Dvir, 1996). Path dependency explicitly 
considers imprinting effects of the past on current behavior (Beckman & Burton, 2008). Path 
dependency is a broad concept indicating that prior organizational actions or behavior close 
down possible future paths of actions or behaviors (Jones & Khanna, 2006). Path dependency 
is related to – but not the same as – other theoretical mechanisms that connect the past and the 
present and which state that ‘history matters’ (Nooteboom, 1997), like institutional 
persistence and structural inertia.
6
 Institutions for example have a tendency to evolve 
incrementally rather than radically, making it more likely that today's practices are very 
similar to yesterday's practices (Scott, 1995). Institutionalized practices consist of rules and 
resources that are produced and reproduced over time (Dille & Söderlund, 2011), shaping 
                                                   
6
 For a more detailed overview of how path dependency differs from other history-matters notions, see 
Vergne and Durand (2010, p. 742). 
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how organizational members perceive the environment and guiding organizational behavior 
(Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000). 
Although the concept of path dependency is quoted frequently, its meaning and logic often 
remain vague and ambiguous (Schreyögg, Sydow, & Holtmann, 2011). To deal with this 
issue, any theoretical or empirical contribution to the literature on path dependency should 
start with a proper definition of the concept (Vergne & Durand, 2010). In order to separate 
path dependency from other notions of history matters, we use a rather narrow definition, one 
that makes a distinction between the outcome of path dependency (so-called lock-ins) and the 
mechanism realizing that outcome (self-reinforcement).We define path dependency of 
practices as a process causing practices to be self-reinforcing, resulting in lock-in in the 
absence of exogenous shocks (based on Vergne & Durand, 2010). This definition is in line 
with Sydow et al. (2009), who claim that path dependency is first of all a process consisting of 
three developmental phases. In phase 1 – the Pre-formation phase – the range of practices 
from which participants can choose is broad. However, at so-called ‘critical junctures’ 
(Collier & Collier, 1991), an adopted practice triggers a self-reinforcing process which 
demarcates the start of phase 2, the Formation phase. In this phase a dominant pattern of 
practices is likely to emerge, making it increasingly difficult to reverse the initial pattern of 
practices. During the transition from phase 2 to phase 3 – the lock-in phase – options become 
even more constrained, leading to a situation in which practices become fixed and gain a 
deterministic character: lock-in occurs. A lock-in situation is characterized by a state of 
stability with low incentives for internal change (Vergne & Durand, 2010). In the context of 
interorganizational projects – because of their complexity and ambiguity – it seems better 
though to speak of quasi lock-in: a predominant set of practices which leaves some room for 
further development, but only in a direction commensurate with the self-reinforcement 
(Sydow et al., 2009). (Quasi) lock-in does not automatically result in inefficiency, but 
inherently over time practices are likely to become less efficient in the face of new, more 
efficient alternatives or changing internal or external demands (Sydow et al., 2009). To speak 
of quasi lock-in implies that lock-in is not absolute, but rather that one can distinguish 
between strong and weak lock-in situations. 
In order to evaluate whether a misfit between IO project practices and demands really is the 
consequence of path dependency and subsequent lock-ins, a closer look at the mechanisms 
leading to lock-in is useful. Sydow et al. (2009) introduce four self-reinforcing mechanisms 
which are at the heart of path dependency: coordination effects, complementarity effects, 
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learning effects, and adaptive expectation effects. Each mechanism, or any combination of the 
four, can lead to the creation of a path which is increasingly irreversible and eventually leads 
to a (quasi) lock-in situation. The notion of coordination effects builds on the idea that it pays 
off to follow routines and adopt practices that are widely shared and used by others. 
Coordination effects are the consequence of shared rule-guided behaviors. The more actors 
adopt a specific set of practices, the more efficient interaction between them becomes. 
Behavior of actors can thus be anticipated and reactions can be considered in advance. 
Through these benefits of continuous replication, practices are likely to become fixed. 
Standardized and routine practices enhance efficient coordination when multiple 
organizations perform interdependent tasks under strong time pressure (Kadefors, 1995). The 
coordination effect shows resemblance with the network effect (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). 
With regard to complementarity effects, interaction between separate but interrelated practices 
creates synergy (Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). The benefits of repeatedly combining interrelated 
practices do not simply add up, but create an additional surplus. When practices are 
interconnected in a way that makes it unattractive to deviate from them, these practices are 
likely to become fixed (Leonard-Barton, 1995). Sydow (2009) for example shows that 
organizations in the German TV industry find it difficult to alter the type of programs they 
produce, because then they would not only have to change their routines but also their 
relations (which have a stable, permanent character). Another example of the interrelatedness 
of practices is addressed in the study of Faems et al. (2008) on the interdependence between 
contracts and trust in project governance. Coordination and complementarity effects often 
reinforce learning effects (Sydow et al., 2009). 
The notion of learning effects revolves around the tendency of organizations to develop more 
efficient ways of working when practices are repeated. This makes it less appealing and more 
costly to switch to other ways of working despite the potential value of doing so. For 
example, organizations are less likely to turn to new partners if relationships with current 
partners are successful (Windeler & Sydow, 2001). Again, practices are likely to become 
fixed. 
Finally, adaptive expectation effects can be the result of convergence towards expectations of 
others (Sydow et al., 2009). From an organizational perspective, while seeking legitimacy, 
organizational members are more willing to adopt certain practices when they expect others to 
follow these practices, too. These self-reinforcing adaptive expectations create self-fulfilling 
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prophecies in organizations. Szulanski (1996) for example shows that organizations, in trying 
to end up on the winners' side, copy practices because they expect others to do the same. 
The theoretical arguments discussed above have been applied mainly to single organizations. 
In the present study they are applied in an interorganizational project context. When IO 
project practices do not fit the context in which they take place, project practices are less 
efficient than when practices and environmental demands do match. But even when 
organizations experience a mismatch between practices and demands, they may be unwilling 
or unable to change their practices because of self-reinforcing mechanisms. Following the 
theoretical arguments discussed above, organizations are less likely to change their project 
practices if a) practices have become routine among a set of actors and as such enhance the 
efficiency of collaboration (coordination effect), b) a set of practices is deeply intertwined, 
making it unattractive to deviate from any single established practice (complementarity 
effect), c) if – driven by efficiency reasons – the motivation to incrementally improve a given 
set of practices is higher than the motivation to look for new, radical alternatives (learning 
effect), leading to sub-optimalization, or d) if actors expect from one another that they 
collaborate according to well-established practices, and act on the basis of these expectations 
(adaptive expectation effect). Following this logic, path breaking will require an interruption 
of these mechanisms and the restoration of choice with regard to alternative practices. 
Altogether, from a historical perspective, path dependency and subsequent lock-ins may 
explain at least partially misfit between contemporary IO project practices and project 
demands. 
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1 Research design and setting 
This chapter is an in-depth qualitative study that adopts an approach based on the ‘Gioia 
template’ (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Langley & Abdallah, 2011). Such an approach is considered 
useful for exploring relatively uncharted territory like the history of IO project practices in 
Dutch shipbuilding. A virtue of this type of research is that it explicitly takes into account the 
possibility that current practices are rooted in history, i.e., are ‘institutionalized’ to the extent 
that their use is rarely questioned. This approach is useful because of its focus on 
“understanding the changes people are both instigating and dealing with, and how those 
meanings evolve” (Langley & Abdallah, 2011, p. 213). 
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Following Yin (2003) we choose the Dutch shipbuilding industry as a ‘revelatory’ case that 
offers high potential for gaining a better understanding of the understudied phenomenon of 
project history. The Dutch shipbuilding industry is deemed revelatory because of its long 
tradition in interorganizational project-based production, the high technical and organizational 
complexity of their projects and the important contextual changes which took place over time 
in this industry. Interorganizational collaboration in shipbuilding is complex due to, among 
others, multi-partner involvement and pressures of time and place. We focus on the period 
1950 – 2010 because during this period collaboration demands have changed considerably 
under the influence of increasing competitive pressure from low-cost countries. In addition, 
focusing on earlier periods would not allow for the use of oral resources. We limit our study 
of the Dutch shipbuilding industry to the subsectors involved in the improvement program: 
offshore, navy, ocean shipping, dredging and maritime subcontractors, and excluded inland 
shipping, fishing, harbors and aquatic sport. 
2.4.2. Data collection and analysis 
Our data consists of interviews with active and retired employees of shipyards and their 
subcontractors. The importance of oral sources to gain a valid understanding of practices is 
considerable since practices are rarely written down. During the period April – July 2010 
fifteen interviews were conducted with respondents who were at that moment actively 
involved in the Dutch shipbuilding industry and who participated in the industry improvement 
program. These interviews serve as the primary source for providing the picture of current IO 
project practices in Dutch shipbuilding. During the period July – October 2011 and August – 
September 2012 nine interviews were conducted with respondents formerly employed in the 
industry, and one with a maritime researcher. Together, these twenty-five interviews with 
employees and former employees of shipyards and their subcontractors provide information 
on historical and contemporary IO project practices and demands. They also provide 
understanding of whether or not IO project practices and demands have changed over time 
and, in case of change, why and how these changes have taken place. For the interviews with 
retired shipbuilders we relied on purposeful sampling followed by a snowball technique, 
asking each informant for his recommendations as to who could best explicate the processes 
of interest (cf. Corley & Gioia, 2004). Interviews lasted on average 60 minutes and were all 
audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Respondents were or had been employed by both 
shipyards and subcontracting firms. All interviews were semi-structured and relied on an 
interview protocol focusing on key events and issues within the Dutch shipbuilding industry. 
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To minimize respondent bias, during the interviews, we did not impose constructs or theories 
on respondents as some sort of preferred explanation for understanding their experiences (cf. 
Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012). Recall bias was at a minimum since most of the retired 
respondents were still active in some way or another in the current Dutch shipbuilding 
industry, for example through branch organizations or charity. 
We analyze the data using constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which means that 
the analyzing process begins during and also influences the next stages of data collection. As 
mentioned before, we follow Corley and Gioia (2004) in their approach of coding. Sporadic 
differences in coding between the researchers were resolved through discussion. During the 
execution of the research, we identified initial constructs in the data from our interviews and 
grouped them together into empirical observations. From this open coding we started to 
construct second-order themes between these concepts which were historical and 
contemporary IO project practices and demands. After this categorization into our objects 
under study, we were able, firstly, to describe how IO project demands in the Dutch 
shipbuilding have developed in the time period 1950 – 2010. And secondly, we were able to 
take stock of the practices in Dutch shipbuilding that either changed or remained the same 
over time. In the next step we identified IO project practices as path-dependent when, firstly, 
they were in a misfit with the current set of IO project demands and, secondly, we were able 
to identify (combinations of) the four self-reinforcing mechanisms as described in the 
theoretical section. The focus on misfitted practices is driven by the notion that inefficiency is 
a feature of path dependency (Sydow et al., 2009). Misfit was identified based on the 
experienced problems and the goals of the maritime improvement program. We searched for 
the self-reinforcing mechanisms as antecedents of lock-in.  
An overview of our central findings can be found in the data structure (Figure 2.1), in which 
the various identified constructs are linked to each other (cf. Corley & Gioia, 2004). The 
process of analysis was iterative in nature until we had a clear understanding of the 
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In order to describe the developments in IO project practices and demands in the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry between 1950 and 2010, we first describe changes in both IO project 
practices and demands by putting their historical and contemporary accounts next to each 
other (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). These accounts are based on interviews with respondents both 
actively and formerly employed in the industry. Based on these accounts we discuss which of 
the current project practices are in misfit with the current project demands. Next, we discuss 
the path-dependent aspects of these IO project practices, making use of quotes from both the 
retired and still active shipbuilders. In Appendix A we present evidence supporting our 
interpretations of project practices and demands. 
2.5.1 Development of IO project demands in the Dutch shipbuilding industry 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the economy of the Netherlands was gradually improving. After 
WWII, there was a recovery period during which there were plenty of orders for shipyards 
and high profit margins. The volume and number of ships constructed increased but the 
technical development lagged behind relative to international standards. One of the retired 
shipbuilders stated that this was illustrated by the relatively late transition from the traditional 
riveting of steel plates (a construction method at which two workers hammer both ends of a 
steel pin until it is rounded) to the general use of welding (the process of amalgamating two 
steel plates into one by melting the two pieces and adding a filler material). Firms other than 
the shipyards taking part in projects mostly acted as suppliers rather than co-makers. In other 
words, they supplied pre-specified parts or components but they did not perform much work 
on the ship itself. Consequently, the interdependence between firms was relatively low. 
However, the present-day situation is characterized by a strong increase in the outsourcing of 
work to specialized subcontractors due to the fact that vessels have become technologically 
more complex and knowledge intensive. This results in high interdependence between 
organizations during the production process. As the retired shipbuilders stated, this was not 
the case around the period 1950–1970. The type of vessels built at that time had relatively low 
levels of technical complexity. As a result, there was hardly a need for the shipyard to in-
source technical know-how. The ethos of the industry revolved around building ships rather 
than manufacturing capital goods. This was mainly attributed to market conditions in which 
the Dutch shipbuilding industry produced relatively simple, large vessels like tankers and bulk 
carriers. The production time of ships was relatively long, resulting in low time pressure. 
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Nowadays, shipbuilding is characterized by a modern industrial orientation, i.e. 
standardization and fine-tuning of the production cycle which is illustrated by the adoption of 
section-wise construction and the use of computer-aided design. This change in orientation 
started roughly from the 1980s onwards. Time pressure on project completion increased due 
to the shortening of production cycles and profit margins decreased under the influence of 
global competition, which was spurred by the rise of Asian economies like Japan back then 
followed by South Korea and China today. This trend forced the Dutch shipbuilding industry 
to re-focus on niche markets and direct its efforts to specialization and innovation. In 
comparison to European competitors, the Dutch shipbuilding industry has been able to 
maintain its position. However, as described in a British research report, the position of the 
Dutch shipbuilding industry remained precarious: 
“The Netherlands nearly lost its shipbuilding industry in the late 1980s but appears to have 
fully recovered in the 1990s, though it saw a sharp drop-off in sales in 2003. The Dutch 
market was in 2005 roughly where it was in the late 1970s.” (RAND Corporation, 2005) 
The shipbuilding industry was and is highly sensitive to cyclical economic fluctuations due to 
its dependence for project orders on shipping companies and ship owners. Both active and 
retired shipbuilders indicated that this is the case. This market condition does not seem to 
have changed over the years. 
Summarizing, we observe a coherent set of IO project demands which have undergone major 
changes over the past few decades. Both organizational and technological complexity of IO 
projects have increased because of an increase in the number of project partners involved and 
the interdependency among them, technological developments and more intense time pressure 
on the production of vessels. Because of these factors, which are amplified by a decrease in 
profit margins and a continuous sensitivity of the sector to economic fluctuations, the current 





Overview of IO project demands in the Dutch shipbuilding industry 
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2.5.2 Development of IO project practices in the Dutch shipbuilding industry 
In the 1960s and 1970s shipyards used to perform most of the work in-house. As a result, 
there was less urgency to coordinate and monitor other firms. Shipyards used to employ 
everyone: they had their own painters, their own scaffold builders, their own carpenters, and 
so on. They outsourced very little. Over time, the outsourcing of project work to 
subcontractors has increased significantly, driven by the need for cost reduction caused by the 
project demand of price competition on the global shipbuilding market. Outsourcing was a 
response to the demands of shorter production cycles, increased time pressure, greater 
technical complexity, while it also provided shipyards with greater flexibility. However, while 
outsourcing more and more work, the shipyards have clung to their orchestrating role in the 
process. The shipyards have always been and still are the central actors in a project. They 
coordinate and monitor the activities of subcontractors, communicate exclusively with the end 
customer where formal issues are concerned, and also bear most of the risk on the project. It is 
this unbalanced risk-taking that is the major source of problems between shipyards and 
subcontractors, as put by one of the retired shipbuilders: 
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“When the yard's project manager and the subcontractor's project manager share the 
responsibility, you can get improvement. But that discussion never came to a good end. 
Nobody wanted to make concessions. Then it stops. As long as responsibility resides with one 
party, that party will take the decisions, because he is responsible for profit and loss.” 
(Retired shipbuilder) 
Early in the second half of the twentieth century, IO project practices in the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry were characterized by flexible contract application and by coordinating 
relations primarily based on trust. People from the shipyards and subcontractors saw each 
other in the church on Sunday, so trust developed there. The contract was a document, you 
needed to have it, but it was only for emergencies. They did not use it in every-day practice. 
However, this changed notably over time because, for example, having more subcontractors 
impeded the development of personal relationships with everyone. Nowadays, contracts are 
more detailed and broader in scope. Shipyards and subcontractors nowadays tend to write 
extensive and elaborated contracts and apply them in a rigid manner. This has led to lower 
trust levels between shipyards and subcontractors. 
Another finding is the decay of the common pride that formerly characterized the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry. Some of the contemporary actors expressed enduring pride in their 
work which is mainly displayed in an attitude in which the overall project success takes pride 
of place. Others however emphasize self-interest, either financial or otherwise, even if at the 
expense of the project. Pursuing one's self-interest is illustrated by the following quote: 
“People are more and more looking up their own alley. This part is finished within the 
allocated hours so I am done with it. If I have to step it up to make it more efficient 
somewhere else, I will put in more hours and I am evaluated by that so I rather don't.” 
(Technical manager Shipyard) 
Notwithstanding the practice of prioritizing one's self-interest, there is also still emphasis on 
informal personal and organizational networks in which participants involved in the IO 
project enhance their communications, direct their efforts and observe their attitudes. This IO 
project practice of operating through informal personal and organizational networks does not 
seem to have changed dramatically over time. In current shipbuilding projects that operate in 
a flexible and informal way, respondents indicate that the pleasant and successful 
collaboration is a consequence of the long-lasting relationships between yards and suppliers. 
However, this is no longer a widespread practice in the industry. 
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Summarizing, we observe that some practices have changed during the past five decades 
whereas other practices have remained relatively stable. A major change is that shipyards 
nowadays outsource significantly more of the work to subcontractors. In addition, IO project 
practices have shifted from a more informal way of organizing work and coordinating 
relations to a more formal manner of collaboration, with a stronger emphasis on contracts. 
Examples of practices that have remained more or less the same over the past decades are the 
central role of the shipyard, the skewed financial responsibility for projects, and the 
importance of informal networks. 
 
TABLE 2.2 
Overview of IO project practices in the Dutch shipbuilding industry 
Historical practices Contemporary practices 
Shipyard conducts most of the work in-
house (work distribution shipyard – 
subcontractor: 70-30) 
Shipyard outsources much of the work 
(work distribution shipyard – 
subcontractor: 30-70) 
Shipyard acting as lead organization Shipyard acting as lead organization 
No risk sharing, financial responsibility 
at the shipyard 
No risk sharing, financial responsibility 
at the shipyard 
Emphasizing informal contracting Emphasizing formal contracting 
Trust-based coordination Less trust-based coordination 
Emphasizing common pride 
Emphasizing (financial) self-interest by 
some participants, lasting pride by 
others 
Problem solving at higher (managerial) 
levels 
Problem solving at higher (managerial) 
levels 
Importance of networks (personal and 
organizational level) 






2.5.3 Contemporary IO project practices and misfit 
Although some IO project practices have changed over the years, these changes did not 
always increase the fit with the changing demands set by the task environment. Furthermore, 
there are also practices that remained the same over the period of 1950–2010, either causing a 
misfit or allowing an already existing misfit to continue. Based on the practices considered 
appropriate by the project participants in the improvement program mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, we consider four contemporary practices to be at a misfit with the current set of IO 
project demands. First, the complete financial responsibility at the account of the shipyard, 
which remained the same over time, does not fit with the current project demands of higher 
interdependence between project participants, the consequent need for increased knowledge 
sharing, and lower profit margins in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. The current set of IO 
project demands calls for a more shared risk distribution, or, in the words of one of the 
respondents in this study: 
“The more product complexity increases, and the available time decreases, the more you have 
to move towards collaboration in which risks are shared. The same goes for financial risks. 
That is a learning process for both parties. It also means there has to be trust, you let them 
look behind the scenes, and people have to dare. And I have to admit it is laborious.” 
(Commercial director Shipyard) 
Second, the shipyard's role as lead organization in the IO project, which remained the same 
over time, does not fit with the increased number of partners involved in a project and the 
higher technical complexity of vessels. These contemporary demands make it difficult for one 
single firm to coordinate the entire project and bring together all the required technical know-
how. This is formulated by the program director of the maritime improvement program as 
follows:  
“We used to know that a guy was pulling cables on a project but we didn't know exactly how 
he was doing besides his remark: ‘it is going okay’. When you have more specific information 
on that, you can take better decisions.” (Program director Integrated Partnership)  
Third, the stronger emphasis on self-interest, which increased over time at the expense of the 
common pride in shipbuilding projects, is at a misfit with the increased competitive pressure 
from Asia, in combination with the modern industrial orientation on producing turn-key 
maritime products appropriate for the complex products in which the Dutch shipbuilding 
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industry now specializes. These demands necessitate a holistic project-oriented attitude of all 
partners involved in order to achieve the goal of a stronger competitive position of the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilding projects can benefit from participants that align their self-
interest more with the broader interorganizational project than their organization-wide 
interest. One of the respondents stated: 
“I used to check all the drawings but eventually I thought: this is not my job, I don't get paid 
for this. So now we use more materials, it increases the cost price” (Contract manager 
Subcontractor) 
Finally, the stronger reliance on formal contracting is assumed to be at a misfit with the 
demands of higher time pressure and shorter production cycles in shipbuilding projects. More 
formalized contracting makes it difficult to quickly react to changing project conditions and 
efficiently deal with the increased time pressure and shorter production cycles. One of the 
retired employees in our study formulated the problematic nature of this practice as follows: 
“Currently, I see how lawyers get bogged down in contracts, how they are nitpicking each 
other. That is nothing but distraction from the real goal: to build a ship together.” (Retired 
shipbuilder) 
The above shows that some current IO project practices in the Dutch shipbuilding industry do 
not fit well with current IO project demands. In the following we try to show that this misfit is 
at least partially the result from path dependency by zooming in on the self-reinforcing 
mechanisms explained in the theoretical section of this chapter. 
2.5.4 Self-reinforcing mechanisms in IO project practices 
We will assume path dependency only to be probable when there is a misfit between current 
IO project practices and project demands. This is in line with the assumption that path 
dependency inherently leads to inefficiency, or sub-optimalization. In the preceding text we 
have identified a current misfit between IO project demands and the following IO project 
practices: a) the shipyard bears the major risks and full responsibility towards the end 
customer for delivering the vessel on time and according to specifications; b) the shipyard 
acts as the lead organization; c) shipyards and subcontractors pursue predominantly their own 
(financial) interests; and d) shipyards and subcontractors contract in a formal, rigid way. 
While the former two practices have remained stable over the past 60 years, the latter two 
have changed substantially during this period.  
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The criterion we use to identify practices as actually being path-dependent is whether one of 
the self-reinforcing mechanisms, or a combination of these mechanisms, has plausibly 
influenced the development or stagnation of project practices. We distinguish between two 
possibilities: a) we observe a change in project practices over time which is not in line with 
the evolution of project demands, or b) we see stagnation of a project practice in spite of a 
lack of fit with historical and/or contemporary project demands. In the first instance we see 
the development to the situation of lock-in, in the second case the lock-in was already present. 
If we consider the first ineffective practice (shipyard bearing full risk and responsibility), our 
findings indicate that project demands have changed over time while this practice has not 
changed accordingly. In a situation where subcontractors represent about 70% of the total 
costs of producing a vessel, it seems justified for subcontractors to bear at least part of the risk 
and responsibility. However, the current practice can be understood from a path dependency 
point of view. Because the shipyard has always carried full financial responsibility it has 
learned to take on that role efficiently. If subcontractors would take a share in that 
responsibility, they would have to develop new skills (e.g., communication and negotiation 
with the end customer, monitoring the actions and efforts of other subcontractors, skills 
related to funding the project and dealing with financial risks) in order to carry out that new 
role: 
“In the pricing of the project you have to take into account that things can go wrong. […] The 
subcontractor is not used to that; yeah, their own small responsibility but never as part of the 
bigger process.” (Retired shipbuilder) 
Shipyards and subcontractors have learned to play their own specific role efficiently, and 
changing these roles would require non-trivial adaptation problems. This suggests that both 
coordination and learning effects are at work in causing this practice to be persistent over 
time. Because the practice has remained stable over the past 60 years, reinforcement has 
continued over a long time period, resulting in a strong lock-in which is very difficult to 
break. 
Another, related, IO project practice that has not changed over time is the shipyard acting as 
the lead organization. This practice can be interpreted as reinforcing due to coordination and 
learning effects on the one hand and adaptive expectation effects on the other hand. The 
coordination and learning effect reside in the division of roles in which the shipyard acts as 
the leading organization, a constellation of roles that is perceived by both shipyards and 
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subcontractors as normal and efficient. Because the shipyard is the leading party during every 
project, they have mastered a certain efficiency and standardization regarding the 
coordination of collaboration. Similarly, subcontractors have become proficient in their role 
of being responsible for their specific contribution. The adaptive expectation effect lies in the 
persistent division of roles due to which project participants expect this same division of roles 
to occur in new projects. A subcontractor participating in a new project would automatically 
assume the shipyard to be in the lead, and they would expect the shipyard and other 
subcontractors to have the same assumption. Again – similar to the practice of the shipyard 
bearing full risk and responsibility – this practice has reinforced itself over a long time period 
and has become strongly institutionalized:  
“The discussion of the subcontractors becoming more central started somewhere in '85. 
Whenever the subject was discussed everyone backed out at the end of the day and said: No, 
let's stick to the old way.”  (Retired shipbuilder) 
The combination of the shipyard bearing all the risk and financial responsibility and acting as 
lead organization constitutes a complementarity effect: the interrelatedness of these practices 
makes it problematic to deviate from either one. For parties that bear financial risk, it seems 
logical to take on a leading role, as the retired shipbuilders pointed out. A subcontractor may 
feel no urgency to become more central if he has no financial responsibility, and may be 
reluctant to take responsibility if not given the central power and authority to manage the 
collaboration process. Due to this complementarity effect, this set of practices has become 
fixed. While each practice on its own is self-reinforcing, the interrelatedness of the practices 
strengthens these self-reinforcing effects, resulting in a very strong lock-in.  
Next we discuss the two practices that have changed over time and which we consider 
ineffective given the current project demands. The current trend that both shipyards and 
subcontractors mainly pursue their own interests intuitively conflicts with the current demand 
stemming from the organizations' increasing mutual dependency. Comparing this present-day 
situation with the situation a few decades ago, it appears that in the old situation the range of 
options was broader than in the current situation. While earlier shipyards and subcontractors 
could choose between pursuing self-interest on the one hand and working for a common cause 
on the other hand, the current situation seems to predispose them to neglect the greater cause 
and pursue first and foremost their (financial) self-interest. Our results indicate that this 
process is at least partially triggered by adaptive expectations. Because of the involvement of 
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multiple, legally independent organizations – that implicitly or explicitly have separate and 
conflicting financial interests – the common expectation has become that organizations will 
give priority to protecting these interests. When organizations expect their partners to act in a 
self-interest seeking manner, they are more likely to display the same behavior, which will be 
observed by the others, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. This vicious circle leads to a 
situation where behaving opportunistically is considered the only appropriate course of action, 
so that lock-in occurs: 
“A shipyard that accepts a price for a vessel, that's often under pressure, will try to get that 
money back from the subcontractors. Well, that's contrary to the idea of co-makership, which 
is the motto. That was a hundred years ago a problem, it was fifty years ago a problem and 
it's still a problem.” (Retired shipbuilder) 
“That guy [shipyard employee] has been molded that way over twenty, thirty years. You 
cannot change him anymore, that's a non-starter. He has been trained to exploit 
subcontractors, and that is what he will be doing for the rest of his career.” (Contract 
manager Subcontractor) 
Related to this IO project practice is the practice of formal contracting. While earlier 
interaction between shipyards and subcontractors was of a more informal nature, the current 
situation is characterized by more formal ways of interaction, including formal contracting. 
Our interviews indicate that this practice has co-evolved with the practice of pursuing self-
interest. If organizations expect others to behave opportunistically, they will try to safeguard 
their own interests. This can be accomplished by writing extensive, detailed contracts in 
which roles and responsibilities of each partner are made explicit. The interrelatedness of 
these two practices suggests that complementarity effects play a role in reinforcing a process 
in which options have narrowed down, eventually leading to a lock-in situation. This lock-in 
situation is characterized by organizations pursuing mainly self-interests, and relying on 
formal contracting to safeguard against opportunistic partner behavior. 
“Practice has changed from having a common goal towards crafting contracts with hidden 
meanings which I can use to my own advantage.” (Retired shipbuilder) 
In sum, our results suggest that the current misfitted practices can at least partially be 
explained by path-dependent processes. Shipyards bear full risk and responsibility and act as 
lead organization because over time they have learned to perform this task efficiently, which 
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fosters coordination of and communication between shipyards and subcontractors during the 
process of building complex vessels. Shifting responsibility towards subcontractors would 
require substantial investments to master new, unfamiliar skills both on the account of the 
shipyards and the subcontractors. Shipyards and subcontractors pursue self-interest and rely 
on formal contracting because they believe that the others follow this strategy as well, 
creating a vicious circle in which these practices reinforce one another to the point that other 
options are considered inefficient. 
2.6 Conclusion and discussion 
The starting point of this chapter is the acknowledgement by industry actors in Dutch 
shipbuilding that contemporary IO project practices do not fit contemporary IO project 
demands. In this chapter we have explored path-dependent explanations for this misfit. 
Focusing on the practices that do not fit contemporary demands, we have identified continuity 
in some practices and change in others. Both persistent and changed practices seem to be 
influenced by combinations of self-reinforcing mechanisms. The practices of shipyards being 
the lead organizations and bearing most of the risks have remained stable over time because 
of coordination, learning, and complementarity effects. The changed practices of pursuing 
mainly self-interests and formal contracting seem to be the result of adaptive expectations and 
complementarity effects. All in all, our analysis suggests that the misfit has at least partially 
been shaped by historical developments.  
To understand the misfit between demands and practices in Dutch shipbuilding projects, we 
complemented contingency theory with the path dependency perspective to avoid the static 
and a-historical stance of the former theory. In doing so, we advance the field in several ways. 
First, we empirically identify theoretically proposed mechanisms (Sydow et al., 2009) which 
trigger path dependency. Most empirical research on path dependency tends to examine path 
dependency in the sense of ‘history matters’ only, without entering into details on self-
reinforcing mechanisms (Vergne & Durand, 2010). Our findings suggest that indeed the 
proposed mechanisms play a significant role in explaining lock-in situations and subsequent 
misfit in an IO project context. In addition, we suggest a refinement of the proposed 
mechanisms by taking into account that the mechanisms operate not in isolation but in an 
interrelated manner. It seems precisely to be this interrelatedness between the mechanisms of 
path dependency that makes misfit so difficult to remedy in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. 
Thus, similar to interrelated practices, interrelated mechanisms form a configuration which 
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creates complementarity effects. Second, our study demonstrates that path dependency can 
lead to incremental or creeping change. As we have shown, some IO project practices have 
changed over time in a direction counter to what one would expect given the contemporary 
environmental demands. During this process, the availability of alternative practices has 
decreased, ultimately leading to a lock-in situation. This process – which we label path-
dependent adaptation – is counter to contingency theory's assumption that organizations 
change their practices on short notice to bring them in line with changing environmental 
demands. So while contingency theory assumes organizations to change practices to regain 
fit, path dependency helps explain why organizations sometimes change their practices in the 
‘wrong’ direction, thereby creating or sustaining misfit. Third, we extend path dependency 
literature by applying its insights to the context of IO projects. Most research on path 
dependency pertains to organizations rather than goal-directed networks of organizations, but 
we show that insights on path dependency can be generalized to this context as well. Our 
fourth and final contribution is a critical note on path dependency models that describe path 
dependency as a three-stage process (e.g., Sydow et al., 2009, p. 692). Such models may be 
less suited to explain situations of early lock-ins. Some IO project practices in Dutch 
shipbuilding have remained unaltered over time, suggesting that the available range of 
alternative practices has been limited since the beginning. This seems to call into question the 
idea of ‘critical junctures’, the moments at which practices become subject to self-reinforcing 
mechanisms. Though these models aid in explaining why these practices have not changed 
over time, they fail to explain how early lock-in situations are reached. Explanations other 
than path dependency may be needed here. 
2.7 Implications and directions for future research 
Based on our findings we suggest two practical implications for project managers, in specific 
change agents (e.g., Seo & Creed, 2002), seeking to change practices. First, they should be 
well aware of historical influences on contemporary practices. Historical influences hamper 
their ability to break away from these practices because they follow a more or less pre-
determined path. To change these practices would require path breaking. The idea of path 
breaking however is somewhat self-contradictory since path dependency is a process in which 
organizations or industries face difficulties in changing their practices successfully. A 
minimum condition would be the development of alternative practices, and the interruption of 
the discussed self-reinforcing mechanisms. An approach to deliberately break paths might be 
critical reflection on taken-for-granted practices, for example via assumption surfacing 
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(Kettinger, Teng, & Guha, 1997). On top of that change agents should consider the 
development of superior alternative practices (cf. Arthur, 1994). Second, change agents 
should be aware of the interrelatedness of practices as well as of the path dependency 
mechanisms underlying their persistence. Interrelatedness of practices implies that one cannot 
change one practice without influencing the other. To successfully change practices then 
requires a configurational or holistic approach (e.g., Clarke, 1999). Such an approach would 
consider the complexity and interrelatedness of practices and develop initiatives aimed at 
changing sets of practices rather than single ones. Interrelatedness of path dependency 
mechanisms implies that multiple causes for a lack of adaptation to project demands must be 
addressed simultaneously. For instance, to change the practice of the shipyard bearing all the 
risk in a project, the suppliers involved should learn to master this role, but the mutual tacit 
assumptions concerning the roles of shipyard and suppliers should also be addressed. The 
difficulty to achieve all these changes simultaneously may well explain why improvement 
initiatives like the one mentioned in the introduction to this chapter have a high risk of failure. 
There are some limitations to our study which suggest opportunities for future research. The 
most salient limitation is of a methodological nature. In trying to discover path-dependent 
explanations for the current misfit, we have relied on subjective, oral sources. This method 
makes it difficult to objectively establish if the current misfit is indeed the result of path 
dependency, and to ascertain which situations qualify as lock-ins. In response to this issue 
experimental studies as proposed by Vergne and Durand (2010) could be performed, but these 
would in turn be limited in their ability to incorporate historical aspects, especially at the 
industry level, like in the shipbuilding sector that formed the context of our study. A related 
issue concerns our single-method approach, which limits the possibility to triangulate data. 
The use of documents and archival data could provide additional insights. As IO project 
practices, especially informal ones, are rarely written down such an archival approach in our 
view should be combined with oral history. Another limitation concerns respondents' recall 
bias, to the extent that they may better recall positive events than negative ones, creating an 
inaccurate picture of historical practices and demands and their development. However, 
respondents did not give the impression to believe that everything was better in the old days, 
and in some cases concluded that the current problems are no different from the problems 60 
years ago. In addition, many of the retired shipbuilders we interviewed are still active in 
industry associations, enabling them to reflect on both historical and contemporary practices 
and demands. Considering these various limitations, future research could benefit from 
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developing more objective measures of the self-reinforcing mechanisms, and from applying a 

















3. Not so temporary after all: An empirical exploration of flexibility behaviors 
in a temporary organization and the influence of time 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Interorganizational temporary organizations (TOs) are typically assumed to offer flexibility 
(Bechky, 2006; Whitley, 2006) as they bring together, on a temporary basis, a variety of 
skilled organizations and individuals to realize complex products and services (Jones & 
Lichtenstein, 2008). The temporary mobilization of multiple expert organizations offers 
organizations flexibility across TOs: when new TOs are initiated, lead organizations can 
select partner organizations who they perceive to be best suited to perform the task at hand 
(Hobday, 2000), and these partner organizations can adapt their involvement in different TOs 
to their capacities. Yet, we know surprisingly little of flexibility within TOs, defined in this 
chapter as the extent to which TO participants adjust their operational plans and behaviors in 
response to requests from other TO participants (cf. Heide & Miner, 1992; Lusch & Brown, 
1996). The flexibility of lead organizations to configure TOs to their evolving needs over time 
(i.e., strategic flexibility) does not necessarily result in flexible behavior within TOs (i.e., 
operational flexibility). This flexibility at the operational level is essential to assure that the 
end product is finished on time and in accordance with customer requirements (Kreiner, 1995; 
Sydow & Staber, 2002), and is considered an important interorganizational resource (Young, 
Sapienza, & Baumer, 2003). TO participants are called upon to be flexible when facing 
unpredictable environments, incomplete plans, and unforeseen contingencies (Badenfelt, 
2011; Kadefors, 1995; Pich, Loch, & de Meyer, 2002). But flexibility within TOs cannot be 
taken for granted because it typically comes with costs and lower operational efficiency, 
while it can also lead to stress among participants (Fredericks, 2005; Golden & Powell, 2000; 
Ivens, 2005; Olsson, 2006). Therefore, TO participants need to find a balance between on the 
one hand protecting their own interests, and on the other hand accommodating the needs of 
others as well as the needs of the TO as a whole. How TO participants balance these (maybe 
conflicting) interests is likely to be influenced by what is considered the central and unique 
characteristic of TOs: their limited duration, or temporariness (Kenis et al., 2009). On the one 
hand, the limited duration of TOs can induce participants to display ‘end-game behavior’ 
(Selten & Stoecker, 1986), which involves non-cooperative behavior like for example 
inflexibility. On the other hand, because of TOs’ impending termination, participants can 
become immersed in the task at hand and behave flexibly in order to accomplish that task 
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(Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). The effect of time and time limits on TO participants’ behavior 
thus remains ambiguous (Bakker, 2010). 
A detailed analysis of flexibility and time within temporary organizations is currently lacking 
(Bakker, 2010; Ivens, 2005). The majority of flexibility research examines flexibility in an 
intraorganizational context like manufacturing (e.g., Sethi & Sethi, 1990) or on a strategic 
level (e.g., Sanchez, 2007). Furthermore, flexibility is often one variable among many others 
but not the focal concept (e.g., Noordewier, John, & Nevin, 1990). The concept of time is 
generally considered a central element of organizational life (Ancona et al., 2001; Lee & 
Liebenau, 1999). But the influence of time and TOs’ limited duration on TO processes and 
outcomes so far received only scant attention and the studies that do touch upon this subject 
are predominantly of a conceptual nature (Bakker, 2010).
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Recently scholars have called for more elaborate research on flexibility and time in 
interorganizational collaboration (Bakker, 2010; Vlaar, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). 
We aim to open the black box of flexibility within TOs, with a specific focus on the role of 
time (cf. Ancona et al., 2001). Digging deeper into the concept of flexibility within TOs, 
several questions arise. What types of flexibility requests do TO participants make? How do 
TO participants respond to these requests, and what are the drivers behind these responses? In 
addition, taking into account the role of time, do requests and responses change over the 
course of a TO? And specifically, what is the influence of a TO’s ex ante defined ending point 
on the flexibility displayed by its participants? We try to answer these questions via an 
empirical exploration of a shipbuilding project, in which functionally interdependent 
organizations collaborate on a temporary basis to produce a technologically and 
organizationally complex vessel. Given our goal of developing a deeper understanding of how 
time and flexibility play out within such a TO, we adopt a qualitative single-case study design 
(Yin, 2003). This allows for an in-depth analysis of requests, responses, drivers of responses, 
and the role of time through a combination of analyses of interviews and observations. From a 
theoretical point of view, this chapter sheds light on the influence of time on collaboration 
processes within TOs. Such a ‘temporal lens’ provides an important framework for explaining 
and understanding (inter)organizational behavior (Ancona et al., 2001). From a practical point 
                                                   
7
 In his review of literature on temporary organizational forms in the period 1964-2008, Bakker (2010) 
found ten studies focusing on the effect of TOs’ ex ante defined termination on TO processes and 
outcomes, of which eight were conceptual. 
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of view, this chapter provides TO participants with insights into how to optimize operational 
flexibility. Flexibility optimalization in turn can increase trust and commitment among 
participants (Ivens, 2005) as well as TO performance (Walker & Shen, 2002). Our findings 
show that operational flexibility is a multi-dimensional construct and influenced by various 
time orientations of TO participants, who can simultaneously focus on the past, present, and 
future. This in turn suggests a reconsideration of the importance of TOs’ ex ante defined 
termination point, generally regarded as their central and unique attribute. 
The outline of the remainder of the chapter is as follows. First we discuss the literature on 
flexibility and time in the context of TOs to indicate what we know and what remains to be 
explored concerning the subject. As we aim to contribute to theory building, the theoretical 
section provides the necessary background of our study rather than that it leads to a set of 
testable hypotheses. Next, we describe the methodological approach, followed by a 
description of our empirical findings. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical 
implications and formulate conclusions. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
3.2.1 Temporary organizations and flexibility 
The increasing prevalence of TOs has been accompanied by an exponentially growing body 
of research on TOs over the past few decades (Bakker, 2010), of which some is directed to the 
flexibility of TOs. Generally TOs are considered to offer flexibility in the sense that they 
temporarily mobilize the resources of various external organizations and disband once the 
product or service is delivered (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998; Maurer, 2010). Lead organizations 
create and recreate new organizational structures around the demands of each TO, and 
because the TO is a temporary organizational form, over time organizing through TOs is 
inherently flexible and reconfigurable (Bechky, 2006; Hobday, 2000). This refers to strategic 
flexibility at the level of the sector or parent organizations. However, it does not address 
flexibility at the operational level within a specific TO. Operational flexibility can be 
considered a dimension of the quality of interorganizational collaboration (Heide & Miner, 
1992). It is important for dealing with incomplete plans and unforeseen contingencies, and 
ultimately for realizing the objectives of individual TOs (Sydow & Staber, 2002). Within 
TOs, the involvement of multiple organizations and their interdependence pose considerable 
challenges for the coordination of tasks and relations (Jones et al., 1997; Knoben & Gössling, 
2009). In trying to overcome these challenges, organizations can rely on several coordination 
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mechanisms such as contracts, planning instruments, and procedures (Dekker, 2004; 
Grandori, 1997; Vlaar et al., 2007). But due to the instability and unpredictability of the 
environments in which some TOs operate (Kadefors, 1995), future aspects of work can never 
be fully predicted or described (Badenfelt, 2011).  
Furthermore, even if initial plans were complete, unforeseen contingencies (like for example 
changing user demands) could render these plans unfeasible (Pich et al., 2002). Consequently, 
within TOs, participants are often called upon to be flexible at an operational level. Yet, 
flexibility cannot be taken for granted because it has its downsides as well (Fredericks, 2005). 
Responding to a partner’s request for flexibility can negatively influence own operational 
efficiency or effectiveness (Ivens, 2005; Olsson, 2006). Also, flexibility can lead to stress 
among participants and a lack of focus (Golden & Powell, 2000). Flexibility within TOs thus 
requires balancing own interests and the interests of others and of the TO as a whole.
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Because of the scarcity of literature on flexibility within TOs, in defining flexibility at an 
operational level we have to rely on other sources. Marketing literature commonly portrays 
flexibility as an interorganizational norm serving as a general protection mechanism against 
opportunistic behavior (Heide & John, 1992), and defines it as the degree to which partners 
adjust their own behavior to accommodate the needs of others (Heide & Miner, 1992). For the 
purpose of this chapter, we build on this definition in defining operational flexibility: the 
extent to which TO participants alter their behavior in response to requests from other TO 
participants. Given that time, task, and team are central elements in TOs (Bakker, 2010; 
Lundin & Söderholm, 1995), requests for flexibility at an operational level may pertain to 
among others the timing of activities, the number and quality of tasks performed, and the 
number of people involved. However, to our knowledge there are no studies which 
systematically categorize types of flexibility requests or responses within TOs at an 
operational level. Such a categorization can provide detailed insights into the dynamics of 
temporary interorganizational collaboration, and is useful to the extent that responses may 
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 This flexibility at an operational level differs from the more commonly researched topic of 
contractual flexibility (e.g., Young et al., 2003), which is predominantly occupied with flexibility at a 
strategic level and parties’ willingness to modify contracts in the course of changing environmental 
conditions and unforeseen contingencies (Reuer & Ariño, 2007). Our focus in contrast is on flexibility 
at an operational level, among other things because behavior occurring within interorganizational 




vary with the type of request made. The range of responses to requests can be broader than 
simply positive or negative. In her paper on organizational responses to institutional 
pressures, Oliver (1991) identifies five types of responses, ranging from passive compliance 
to active resistance. Applying this work to the context of interorganizational collaboration, 
Lui and Ngo (2005) distinguish between five types of responses to requests: acquiescence 
(complying with the request), compromise (complying with the request while trying to seek a 
concession), avoidance (disregarding a request while concealing this), defiance (refusing a 
request while openly communicating this to the requestor), and manipulation (trying to 
influence the requestor and/or the request). This typology suggests that responses to 
operational flexibility requests can be more nuanced than simply positive or negative. 
In trying to enhance our knowledge on operational flexibility requests and responses within 
TOs, we seek to answer the following research questions: 
 Which types of operational flexibility requests do participants in TOs make? 
 What are typical responses to requests for operational flexibility in TOs? 
 
3.2.2 Time and flexibility 
Time and its dimensions are by definition crucial elements in TOs. All TOs have in common 
that they have an ex ante defined termination point, at which they cease to exist (Kenis et al., 
2009). The time span between TO initiation and TO termination can vary widely across TOs: 
while some TOs exist for only a couple of weeks, others may live on for more than fifteen 
years (Kerzner, 1994; Shenhar, 2001). Although collaboration within TOs of short duration is 
likely to be different from collaboration within TOs of longer duration, the distinguishing 
factor of TOs is not duration, but limited duration, i.e. the ex-ante defined ending point which 
is known to all TO participants. Time within TOs is thus limited from the start, and this fact is 
argued to have an effect on TO participants’ behavior. The ex-ante defined termination point 
often creates a productive sense of urgency among TO participants (Jones & Lichtenstein, 
2008). This time urgency results in task prioritization and the scheduling of tasks within the 
available time (Conte, Landy, & Mathieu, 1995). It can make TO participants become 
immersed in the task at hand (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). To the extent that TO participants 
consider flexibility important for the realization of tasks, one may expect that the TO’s 
impending termination point as well as in-between deadlines induce them to behave in a 
flexible manner. Impending termination however can also have the opposite effect, especially 
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when participants display ‘end-game behavior’ (Selten & Stoecker, 1986). The rationale 
behind this is that when collaboration is known to end in the foreseeable future, TO 
participants will focus more strongly on their self-interests, e.g. by being inflexible so that 
they can avoid additional expenses resulting from complying with flexibility requests. Yet, 
although TOs are by definition temporary, relations between TO participants can recur and 
endure across TOs (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008), creating shadows of the past and future and 
giving collaboration a more permanent character (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). A shadow of 
the future can increase TO participants’ willingness to make short-term sacrifices, e.g. when 
responding positively to partner requests, in order to realize long-term benefits (Axelrod, 
1984; Klein-Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005). A shadow of the past can also 
increase flexibility, especially if prior collaboration between TO participants has led to the 
development of interorganizational trust (Gulati, 1995). The effect of TOs’ ex ante defined 
termination point on operational flexibility displayed by its participants may then be 
moderated by shadows of the past and future. Overall, still, the drivers of flexibility within 
TOs including the effects of time remain unclear at best (Bakker, 2010). Therefore, we also 
try to answer the following, third, research question: 
 What are drivers of operational flexibility within TOs, and what is the impact of time? 
 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Research context 
Our research was conducted in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilding is a complex 
industry in terms of technology and organization (Coenen, 2008). Ships are technically highly 
complex products. This is especially true for the Dutch shipbuilding industry, which in order 
to stay ahead of foreign competition has to focus on the building of technically complex 
vessels that are difficult to copy by low-wage countries. Consequently, these vessels consist 
of many advanced subsystems and components that need to be integrated. Such complex, high 
value products are also known as ‘CoPS’ (Hobday, 2000). Building these vessels also comes 
with a high level of organizational complexity. Seventy years ago shipyards used to perform 
all the work in-house, but the production process has been externalized over the past few 
decades (Levering et al., 2013). Shipyards nowadays do not have the capacity and knowledge 
to build complex vessels on their own, so they make use of specialized subcontractors (e.g., 
57 
 
electrical companies, painting companies, carpenters) and suppliers
9
. This means that the 
Dutch shipbuilding industry organizes its production in the form of interorganizational TOs. 
On an executive or a managerial level, shipyards and subcontractors structure their working 
relationships by formal contracts in which tasks, rights, and responsibilities are written down. 
On an operational level participants rely on planning instruments to coordinate 
interorganizational actions. But these initial plans often a) are incomplete because it is 
impossible to foresee and write down every future aspect of work; or b) turn out to be 
infeasible due to unforeseen contingencies in combination with the technical and 
organizational complexity of building ships. When initial plans no longer suffice, project 
participants are called upon to be flexible with regard to these plans to make sure the vessel is 
delivered on time. However, the Dutch shipbuilding industry recently acknowledged that the 
quality of collaboration between shipyards and subcontractors, including the flexibility 
between them, is often suboptimal (Levering et al., 2013). The importance of flexibility in 
shipbuilding in combination with the perceived suboptimal level of flexibility within 
shipbuilding projects, make this industry a suitable research context. For this study we 
investigate the building of a complex, special purpose vessel in the Netherlands. 
3.3.2 Characteristics of the TO under study 
The hull of the TO studied – a yacht-like vessel which we for confidentiality reasons will call 
‘ZeroOne’ from here on – arrived in the Netherlands in the autumn of 2011. ZeroOne was 
delivered to the end customer at the end of the summer 2012. ZeroOne was of a one-off 
nature: the shipyard had not produced a similar type of vessel before, nor a vessel of this size. 
Consequently, the shipyard needed to obtain expertise from various subcontractors, including 
subcontractors with whom they had not collaborated before. In addition, ZeroOne participants 
were often called upon to be flexible because the environment of ZeroOne was hardly stable 
and predictable. This was due to the newness of ZeroOne, changing customer preferences 
during ZeroOne, the high level of interdependence between participants, and the impossibility 
and impracticality of writing down all tasks and activities beforehand. The high level of 
interdependence between ZeroOne participants involved for example that a delay of one party 
                                                   
9
 Please note that there is a difference between subcontractors (who execute various specialized tasks 
on board) and suppliers (who ‘merely’ deliver materials and components). Our focus is on the 
collaboration between shipyard and subcontractors and between subcontractors themselves. The role 
of suppliers is not taken into account. 
58 
 
seriously affected the work of other parties. On ZeroOne, one shipyard, eight subcontractors 
and over a hundred suppliers were involved. As is usual in shipbuilding once the start of a 
project approaches, participating organizations began staffing the project with their 
employees. From a shipyard’s perspective, this meant selecting engineers for calculation and 
drawings, selecting a project manager who acted as the overall coordinator, and selecting staff 
to carry out the actual work on the vessel, including a production manager to supervise the 
staff. Next to that, the shipyard picked the subcontractors to perform parts of the work. These 
interorganizational relations and the exchanges taking place within them were initially 
structured by means of formal contracts. On ZeroOne these formal contracts came in the form 
of more or less standardized documents that specified what a subcontractor would be 
delivering and against what price. Subcontractors, once they had been selected for the vessel, 
appointed a project manager who mainly dealt with financial control. They also selected a 
production manager to supervise the staff carrying out the work on board of ZeroOne. 
Depending on their role, subcontractors sometimes also carried out engineering tasks. All 
these individual managers and employees acted as boundary spanners between the 
organizations involved in the project, and they acted as our informants, even if sometimes the 
flexibility request or response originated from higher managerial levels in their organizations. 
Figure 3.1 displays a simplified visualization of the project organization of ZeroOne. Note 




















3.3.3 Research design 
Our limited knowledge of operational flexibility within TOs and how this is influenced by 
time, calls for an explorative, longitudinal, and in-depth analysis which we undertake via a 
qualitative single case study design (Yin, 2003). Such a design is particularly well-suited 
when little is known about the dynamics of the phenomenon of interest, and aids in building 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), in our case on flexibility and time within temporary organizations. 
An a priori specification of the central constructs helps to shape the initial design and aids in 
interpreting the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). We focus on flexibility requests (interorganizational 
partner requests concerning operational issues), responses to these requests (the way and the 
extent to which partners comply with each other’s requests) and the drivers behind these 
responses, with a specific focus on the impact of time. Rather than presenting a-priori 
conjectures regarding the relationships between these three sets of concepts, we aim to 
Shipyard 


















M = Managerial level employees; O = Operational level employees; E = Engineers 
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contribute to a theory on operational flexibility and time in TOs on the basis of our empirical 
exploration (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989).  
In doing case study research, preferably the selection of a case rests on theoretical groundings 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In our situation, ZeroOne was considered to provide us with the 
best insights into the phenomenon we wanted to explore due to the uniqueness, complexity 
and length of the project and the large number of subcontractors involved. So we meet the 
recommendation to examine ‘revelatory’ cases in which the process of interest is 
transparently observable (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 2003). 
3.3.4 Data collection and analysis 
Following Eisenhardt (1989) our empirical evidence results from the analyses of a 
combination of data collection methods, specifically semi-structured interviews and 
observations, which are triangulated to provide stronger substantiation of constructs and 
relations. The data collection process started with observations of ZeroOne participants’ 
behavior in weekly project meetings, which had an average length of 75 minutes. During 
these meetings, shipyard personnel (typically the project manager, the assistant project 
manager, the production supervisor, and the lead engineer) and subcontractor personnel 
(typically the production supervisor of each subcontractor) sat together to discuss operational 
issues. Because the project meetings focus solely on operational issues, they are considered 
appropriate settings for observing flexibility requests and responses to these requests. We 
assume that the responses to requests given during the project meetings were reflecting actual 
practice on board. Important arrangements were written down in meeting minutes, which 
were distributed to the participants afterwards. Also, the presence of other organizations likely 
functioned as a social control mechanism, making it less likely that participants made false 
promises. To capture the findings of our observations, we used an observation protocol (see 
Appendix B). The protocol was divided into two rows. In the left row we wrote down what 
we actually observed, and in the right row we wrote down – both during the project meetings 
and afterwards – what we perceived to be going on using more theoretical concepts. This 
procedure allowed us to show how we arrived at more generalized theoretical claims on how 
flexibility plays out within this specific temporary interorganizational collaboration setting. In 
total 22 project meetings were attended during the period October 2011 – June 2012. This 
period covers the production phase of the vessel. The production of the hull (before this 
period) and the commissioning of the vessel (after this period) are not covered. However, the 
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interviews do provide some information on collaboration and flexibility during the latter 
period. 
After the first project meetings, observations were used to design and adjust an interview 
protocol. In this way we could improve the questions in terms of reflecting participants’ 
experiences (cf. Harris & Sutton, 1986). Interviews were held with nearly all the project 
meeting participants, who we considered the ideal informants because of their daily 
engagement with operational issues. The semi-structured interviews contained questions on 
among others the types of requests made and received by participants, responses to these 
requests, and drivers behind these responses. We also discussed other interorganizational 
collaboration practices, either brought up by the interviewer based on earlier observations 
during project meetings, or indicated by the interviewee as being important aspects of the 
collaboration process. This additional information enabled us to critically evaluate our 
findings on flexibility and to place the findings in their context. Next to the interviews with 
these – mainly operational-level – participants, we conducted interviews with the project 
managers of the various subcontractors. These project managers did not or only seldom attend 
the project meetings but from the earlier interviews they appeared to have some influence on 
flexibility at the operational level. We further performed interviews with some other 
informants, for example the shipyard’s purchasing manager. These individuals were included 
because their importance in terms of their influence on and experience with flexibility became 
clear during the data collection (cf. Burgelman, 1983). Finally, we gathered background 
information by means of personal notes during site visits, informal conversations with project 
participants, and by means of presentations and discussions during external meetings with 
shipbuilding executives and consultants. 
Data analysis followed an iterative process in which data collection and data analysis 
frequently overlapped and influenced each other (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). The data obtained from both the interviews and observations were analyzed using ‘the 
Gioia method’ (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2004), meaning that the analysis started with open 
coding. Open coding uses first order codes, i.e. language used by the respondents or – in the 
absence thereof – a simple descriptive phrase (van Maanen, 1979). Then we searched for 
linkages between these codes (axial coding), which enabled us to assemble them into higher-
order themes. Finally, similar themes were gathered into overarching dimensions. While 
constructing the so-called first-order concepts, second-order themes, and aggregate 
dimensions, we continuously compared the emergent constructs and relations between them 
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with the data (cf. Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This enabled us to come up with valid theoretical 
contributions which were closely linked to the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
A critical aspect of case study research is presenting the empirical evidence (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). To present the results in a systematic manner, the results section starts with 
our overall data structure (cf. Corley & Gioia, 2004), which links the various constructs to 
each other. The data structure provides an upfront general overview of our central findings. 
Appendices C, D and E provide additional information on how the first order codes have been 
grouped into second-order themes. The reliability of the presented results heavily depends on 
how candid the respondents were. Especially from a subcontractor’s point of view, fear of 
putting themselves in a bad light vis-à-vis the shipyard could induce answers that are socially 
desirable. We have tried to overcome this by emphasizing the anonymity of answers given 
and by focusing not only on self-proclaimed drivers but also on ‘attributed’ drivers, why 
participants think other parties behave in a flexible or inflexible manner. The trustworthiness 
of the presented results is further secured by combining interview data with the observation of 
actual behavior of participants during project meetings. Also, the results have been presented 
to and discussed with both project participants as well as shipbuilding executives from other 
shipyards and subcontractors. 
3.4 Results 
The data structure on the next two pages summarizes the main findings of our analysis. In the 
following we discuss the findings in more detail, showing how the first order concepts, 
second order themes and aggregate dimensions are related. We successively discuss the types 
of flexibility requests made by ZeroOne participants, the responses to these requests, and the 






 Upgrade of entertainment 
systems 
 Adjustment of clips 
 Fix a scaffold 
 Put on six layers of paint 
again 














 Put more people on the job 
 Put in overtime 
 Give priority to a room or task 
 Information on how to handle 
a special unit 
 Distribution of cable lists 
 Quality handbook 
 Keep working area clean 
 Inform others before 
conducting certain activities 
 When they ask me to pull an 
extra cable, I do it 
 When something is damaged, 
I simply repair it 
 Writing down additional 
hours and materials and send 
it to the office 
 That is going to weigh in for 
the budget 
 I would want to go faster but 
it is technically not possible 
 I really do not have the time 
to do that 
 I need to bring up the issue of 
cleaning on board again 











Scope of work 











Data structure (continued)  
 It helps to meet deadlines 
 Building the vessel goes much 
better 














 This shipyard is known for its 
flexibility 
 Flexibility is who we are and 
what we have always been 
doing 
 Subcontractors are eager to 
get selected for subsequent 
projects 
 If we would behave rigidly, 
the shipyard would soon kick 
us out 
 We have many employees 
walking on the other projects 
at this production site 
 This shipyard works mostly 
with relatively small firms 
 I do not have extra personnel 
queued in line 
 If things get pressured up, 
people focus on self-interests 
 I do not have the time to 
answer everyone 




Aggregate dimensions 1st-order concepts 
Flexibility as 
implicit norm 




Shadow of the past 
Shadow of the future 




3.4.1 Types of flexibility requests 
During the production period of ZeroOne, shipyard and subcontractors on a regular basis 
made requests to one another. During the project meetings, the majority of requests were 
directed from shipyard (usually the project manager or the production supervisor) to 
subcontractor (usually the production supervisor). Requests from shipyard to subcontractor 
were made continuously during the project. This is not surprising since the shipyard acts as 
the lead organization and has the task to coordinate and monitor overall progress as well as 
the progress of individual subcontractors. During the project meetings, requests from 
subcontractor to shipyard and between subcontractors occurred less frequently. Figure 3.3 
provides an overview of the directions of requests and the number of times they occurred, as 
observed during the project meetings. For example, during the first project meeting, we 
observed two flexibility requests from the shipyard to subcontractors, and one request from a 
subcontractor to the shipyard. It should be noted that these numbers do not pertain to the total 
number of requests on ZeroOne. Respondents indicated that the process of requesting and 
responding was an ongoing process and was certainly not confined to the project meetings. 
The numbers presented in the following figures are based on what we explicitly could observe 
during the project meetings and give an indication of the patterns of requests and responses. 
 
FIGURE 3.3 





















We identified four different types of requests: requests concerning the scope of work, requests 
concerning pace and timing of activities, requests for information, and procedural requests. 
Requests concerning the scope of work can be divided into requests for additional work and 
requests for rework. These requests are considered flexibility requests because they increase 
the number and type of activities that have to be performed by the requested party. Requests 
for additional work usually came from the shipyard and were directed to the various 
subcontractors. For example, the end customer desired several upgrades of the entertainment 
system on board, and the shipyard passed on this request to the responsible subcontractor. 
This involved a request for additional work because the initial agreement between end 
customer and shipyard (and subsequently shipyard and subcontractor) on the requirements 
and specifications of the entertainment system did not suffice anymore due to changing 
customer preferences. Smaller requests also occurred. For example, sometimes the interior 
painter asked the shipyard to arrange a scaffold so that the painter could do his work 
effectively. Such requests were not born out of incomplete plans or unforeseen contingencies. 
Rather these requests were made to facilitate the building process. These requests can be 
considered flexibility requests because they require, although limited, time investments and 
slightly changed behavior from the requested party. Concerning requests for rework, one of 
the subcontractors was asked by the shipyard to adjust the clips used to attach television sets 
to the walls, because the original clips of the subcontractor did not fit. This request, the result 
of an unforeseen contingency, involves a request for rework because the clips had already 
been assembled. Requests for rework were also made when finished work had been damaged. 
It occurred regularly that the interior painter had finished his work in one room and that later 
on another subcontractor or shipyard personnel, during their operations in that same room, 
damaged the work of the painter. The recovery of damaged work was considered part of the 
daily routine by the interior painter, but nonetheless required additional investments in time 
and resources, or the flexible arrangement thereof. 
Requests concerning pace and timing of activities were among others the result of participants 
falling or expecting to fall behind schedule, and served also to align the actions of all parties 
working aboard. These are considered flexibility requests because they require additional 
investments in time or changing the planned sequence of activities. The project had one fixed, 
major deadline, being the delivery of the vessel to the end customer. But there were many in-
between deadlines like the completion of major technical rooms such as the engine room, or 
the launching of the vessel into the water. When participants expressed their concerns about 
67 
 
whether they were going to be able to meet the planning, the shipyard asked subcontractors to 
put more people on the job or to put in overtime. These requests involved pace because 
requested parties had to speed up their working processes. It required flexibility because, 
taking into account upcoming milestones, the current way or pace of working did not suffice 
anymore. Related requests are requests concerning the timing (or sequencing) of activities. 
Interdependence between participants created situations in which one subcontractor could 
only proceed with a task when another subcontractor had finished his. For example, the 
painter had to finish the thruster room before the isolator could start isolating. In situations 
like these, the isolator requested the painter to complete that specific room before moving on 
to another room. 
From the interviews and observations we derived a third category of requests, namely 
requests for information. Shipyard and subcontractors were dependent on each other’s 
information in order to be able to conduct their work properly and timely. This information 
provided participants with input for one’s own activities. The pipefitter for example was 
dependent on information from the shipyard’s engineering department on how to handle a 
special unit that was placed on deck by the shipyard. Subcontractors were also dependent on 
other subcontractors’ information. The electrician for example asked for cable lists which had 
to be provided by the navigational equipment subcontractor. These information requests were 
not trivial matters as they involved quite some man-hours for the ‘sending’ party. Information 
sharing required flexibility from the requested parties in the sense that they had to spend time 
to sort things out and that during this time they could not give attention to other tasks. In 
addition, sometimes requesting parties could not continue their work until specific 
information from another party was available, resulting in waiting hours and an increase in 
costs. 
The fourth identified type of request concerns general procedures. These requests were 
typically made by the shipyard and they were not directed to one specific subcontractor, but 
rather to the collective of parties who were involved with the actual production of the vessel. 
For example, before the start of the project the shipyard composed a quality handbook with 
guidelines and principles on how to produce high-quality work on board and how to protect 
finished work. In addition to that, during project meetings the shipyard’s project manager on a 
regular basis requested participants to keep their working area clean. He motivated project 
participants to clean the ship every Thursday afternoon and underlined that this was not a 
request without obligation. Similar requests were – on a less frequent basis – also made by 
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subcontractors. The isolator for example asked everyone in the case of foreseen damages to 
isolation, to first come to the isolator instead of taking the isolation away on their own. 
Requests concerning general procedures required flexibility because most parties, including 
shipyard personnel, were used to build ‘work vessels’. During the building of work vessels, 
cleaning requirements during the building phase are less strict and important than during the 
building of the yacht-like vessel under study. This means that participants could not rely on 
their standard working routines but that they had to adjust their working practices to meet the 
new standards. 
Requests concerning pace and timing of activities as well as procedural requests occurred 
more frequently than the other two types of requests (see Figure 3.4). Requests concerning 
pace and timing of activities occurred in nearly all project meetings. Requests concerning 
additional work and rework were most prevalent halfway the building phase. This is probably 
because in the beginning initial plans were followed but as the project progressed, plans 
turned out to be incomplete or wrong. Information requests follow more or less the same 
pattern. Here also, participants relied on initial plans but required additional information when 
these plans turned out to be incorrect or incomplete. Somewhat surprising is the observation 
that procedural requests continued to occur regularly, even until the building phase was nearly 
at its end. It suggests that procedural requests were insufficiently met in previous stages of 
ZeroOne and that repeating those requests did not change behavior concerning procedures. 
We come back to this observation in the next section, in which we take a closer look at the 






Distribution of types of requests 
 
 
3.4.2 Responses to flexibility requests 
From the interviews and observations we derive four types of responses to flexibility requests 
during the project. The requested party a) carried out the request without payment, b) carried 
out the request under the condition of financial compensation, c) refused the request and 
openly communicated this to the requestor, or d) did not carry out the request and concealed 
this from the requestor. We label these responses ‘acquiescence’, ‘compromise’, ‘defiance’, 
and ‘avoidance’ respectively (cf. Lui & Ngo, 2005)
10
. We consider acquiescence and 
compromise to be flexible responses as in both cases participants comply with the request. 
The difference between the two responses is that in the latter case requested parties bill the 
requestor for the additional man hours or material needed to carry out the request, or at least 
intend to do so. Compared to acquiescence and compromise, we consider defiance and 
avoidance inflexible responses because in these cases requests are not carried out. The 
difference between these two responses is whether the non-compliance is openly 
communicated to the party making the request (defiance) or not (avoidance). In the latter case, 
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 Lui and Ngo’s (2005) framework mentions a fifth type of response, namely ‘manipulation’. Manipulation in 
our context would involve trying to change the request. However, we have found no empirical support for this 




















requested parties conceal their non-cooperation and try to reduce their contact with the 
requestor on the issue at hand. 
Looking at the distribution of observed responses during production phase, we see that 
acquiescence, defiance, and avoidance were dominant responses in comparison to 
compromise (see Figure 3.5). The absence of compromising responses during the project 
meetings can be explained by the fact that financial issues were being dealt with at higher 
managerial levels. These were handled by the shipyard’s project manager and the 
subcontractors’ project managers, of which the latter group did not attend the project 
meetings. Acquiescence was found throughout the entire process and was the dominant 
response, suggesting that in general ZeroOne participants behaved in a flexible manner. Yet 
the number of inflexible responses (defiance and avoidance) was slightly higher than the 
number of flexible responses. Interestingly, when the end of the production phase was 
approaching, defiance became an equally frequent response as acquiescence. The 
observations during the project meetings suggest that this was not the consequence of end-
game behavior, i.e. the intentional pursuit of short-term self-interest as the end of the project 
approaches. Rather, participants experienced severe levels of time pressure so that they could 
not comply with all the requests, but instead had to carry out some remaining tasks after the 





Distribution of responses to requests 
 
 
When combining the types of requests and responses, some interesting patterns show up (see 
Table 3.1). Typically, participants complied with requests concerning scope of work. During 
the project meetings we observed fourteen explicit requests of this type, and all but two were 
complied with. Thus, ZeroOne participants were flexible with regard to these types of 
requests. In contrast, concerning procedural requests, participants tended to be inflexible. 
Participants showed a tendency to neglect requests for cleaning on board, following safety 
regulations, and other working procedures that were generally addressed (24 out of 25 
requests). This tendency was repeatedly brought up by the shipyard during project meetings, 
indicating that non-compliance was observed. As subcontractors seldom communicated this 
non-compliance to the shipyard, their behavior in this respect can be classified as avoiding. In 
only one occasion the project manager did commend the parties for keeping their working 
space clean. Compared to scope of work requests and procedural requests, responses to 
requests concerning information and the pace and timing of activities were more diverse. In 
some instances ZeroOne participants complied with these types of requests, in other instances 
they did not. For example, participants showed compliance when delivering requested 
information completely and on time to the relevant parties, or when successfully placing 
additional personnel on the project to increase pace. They showed non-compliance when they 




















counted 39 explicit requests concerning pace and timing of activities: flexible (20) and 
inflexible (19) responses were distributed equally over these requests. From the eleven 
explicitly observed requests for information, eight received a positive response (acquiescence) 
while the other three received inflexible responses. In the next section we try to explain these 
patterns in the relationship between requests and responses and their occurrence by zooming 
in on the conditions under which ZeroOne participants did or did not comply with requests. 
 
TABLE 3.1 
Relations between types of requests and responses 
 
Type of response 
 
Acquiescence Defiance Avoidance Sum 
Type of 
request 
Scope of work 12 2 0 14 
Pace and 
timing 
20 19 0 39 
Information 8 2 1 11 
Procedures 1 1 23 25 
 
Sum 41 24 24 89 
  
 
3.4.3 Drivers of responses to flexibility requests 
As discussed, acquiescence was a dominant response to requests concerning scope of work 
and pace and timing. The respondents mentioned several factors that in their opinion made 
them comply with partner requests without asking financial compensation. First, participants 
indicated that flexibility was necessary in order to complete the building process in time. The 
participants created and experienced an atmosphere in which problems were being solved 
without unnecessary delays by quickly taking up small issues (responding positively to scope 
of work requests), by moving to another part of the ship to carry out work (requests 
concerning timing of activities), or by providing each other timely with sufficient information 
(information requests). Second, according to most participants – on the side of both shipyard 
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and subcontractors – flexibility was one of the core values of their organization, and as such 
part of their organizational culture. Flexibility then was not a specific behavior geared to other 
ZeroOne participants, but a general way of working developed over previous projects and 
applied more or less automatically to present projects. Third, participants and especially the 
subcontractors indicated that being flexible was somewhat obligatory in order to keep the 
shipyard satisfied. They believed that inflexibility would result in the shipyard selecting other 
organizations to do their work in future projects. Flexibility then was considered a 
precondition to be selected on subsequent projects. In addition to that, the shipyard had the 
tendency to select the same set of subcontractors for the execution of their projects. Thus, as 
far as partner selection is concerned the shipyard had a long-term orientation as well. These 
expectations of future interaction gave the collaboration between shipyard and subcontractors 
a more permanent character. These expectations made it less likely that participants displayed 
end-game behavior, i.e. self-interested behavior when, and because, the end of the project was 
approaching. Fourth and finally, participants indicated that being flexible, specifically 
concerning pace and timing, was conditional upon whether one had the opportunity to comply 
with requests in terms of available resources. For example, some of the subcontractors were 
working not only on this project but also on other projects at the same production site. This 
enabled them to quickly pull resources from one project to another if the situation (usually the 
shipyard) asked for that. From this we conclude that a flexible co-located resource pool was 
another driver of flexible behavior during ZeroOne. 
Compromise was a response that occurred when requests concerned additional work or 
rework. ZeroOne participants came up with one major driver to this response, namely the 
scale of a request. They asked for compensation only when complying with a request required 
substantial investments in resources like time and man-hours. However, compensation was 
handled by higher management and therefore seldom discussed during the project meetings. 
Next to the flexible responses of acquiescence, inflexible responses like defiance and 
avoidance also occurred. Defiance was predominantly a response to requests concerning pace 
and timing of activities, and to requests for information. Respondents brought up two reasons 
for defiance: the absence of a flexible resource pool, and time pressure. First, in the absence 
of a flexible resource pool, some participants were forced to deny requests, simply because 
they did not have personnel available at that time and thus were unable to comply with 
requests. This finding is in line with the earlier mentioned positive effect of having a flexible 
resource pool on acquiescence. Second, experienced time pressure was considered a logical 
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explanation why sometimes requests for information were not being met. So although the 
limited amount of time on the one hand increased flexibility because participants considered 
flexibility necessary to meet deadlines, time limitations also led to inflexibility when 
participants experienced not having enough time to adequately respond to requests.  
The final type of response encountered – especially during our observations – was avoidance, 
where participants did not carry out procedural requests but concealed their non-compliance 
by not openly communicating this to the shipyard. It was difficult to discover the drivers 
behind this behavior because during both the interviews and observations participants hardly 
mentioned this issue. One subcontractor’s production supervisor told during a project meeting 
that he could not continuously check up on his personnel and that he could only talk with his 
people about their conduct. It seems then that parties did not follow procedures strictly 
because they were able to get away with it due to lack of supervision. Avoidance was 
collective behavior and less observable compared to the other types of responses. In addition 
to that, procedural requests seemed less crucial for delivering the vessel on time than the other 
requests so that participants may have considered flexibility on this aspect less important. 
3.4.4 Flexibility and the influence of time 
Generally, our findings point out that several dimensions of time played a central role during 
ZeroOne. The reported drivers of acquiescence suggest that flexibility was an implicit norm 
for many participants, which was not specific to ZeroOne but which had developed over past 
projects. This argument is underlined by the observation that the orientation towards 
acquiescence (i.e., flexibility) was displayed already in the beginning of ZeroOne, and did not 
need to be developed during ZeroOne. Participants behaved flexibly because that is how they 
were used to behave based on experiences developed in the past. Because the majority of 
ZeroOne participants worked together in previous TOs, an institutional collaboration 
framework had emerged in which flexibility was prominently present. 
Furthermore, flexibility was driven by a clear time and task focus, i.e. a motivation to deliver 
ZeroOne on time to the end customer. Participants considered flexibility imperative to 
accelerate the production process in order to meet the deadlines. In other words, the limited 
duration of ZeroOne created a sense of urgency among participants and a focus on the 
present. One can ask why flexibility was the norm instead of inflexibility, because sticking 
rigidly to plans and time schedules (i.e., inflexibility) can also be a strategy to meet deadlines. 
Then again, sticking to original plans can only work out well when the environment of a 
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project is sufficiently stable and predictable. This was not the case with ZeroOne as 
participants had to deal with unforeseen contingencies like changing customer preferences 
and incorrect initial plans. On some occasions, the limited duration of ZeroOne also had a 
negative effect on flexibility, namely when participants experienced severe time pressure and 
were because of that unable to comply with requests. Thus, time limits can on the one hand 
increase flexibility because of a focus on task completion, but on the other hand it can 
decrease flexibility when participants face high levels of time pressure.  
Finally, ZeroOne participants behaved flexibly because of their long-term orientation, i.e. an 
orientation on the time after project completion. From the point of view of the subcontractors, 
behaving flexibly was imperative to increase the chance of being selected for upcoming 
projects. Subcontractors become more attractive partners if they behave in a flexible manner, 
complying with requests from the shipyard and other subcontractors. They become more 
attractive because flexibility improves the chance that the overall project goal is realized, i.e. 
delivering the vessel to the end customer on time and according to specifications. For 
subcontractors repeated assignments generate a more or less continuous income, which 
positively affects the continuity of the organization. This induces subcontractors to be flexible 
not only towards the shipyard, but also towards the other subcontractors. After all, if one 
subcontractor slows down the process of other subcontractors by behaving inflexibly, the 
shipyard feels the consequences as well because of the highly interdependent nature of jointly 
producing vessels. From the shipyard’s perspective, long-term orientation is reflected by their 
tendency to work time after time (i.e., TO after TO) with the same set of subcontractors. 
According to ZeroOne participants, this makes collaboration in general more efficient because 
parties know each other’s strengths and weaknesses and are able to act on them. 
From the above we conclude that ZeroOne participants displayed different ‘time orientations’ 
simultaneously, all of which positively impacted flexibility: a past-time orientation (i.e., we 
are being flexible because we have always been doing it this way), a present-time orientation 
(i.e., we need to be flexible in order to finish the task), and a future-time orientation (i.e., we 
are behaving flexibly in order to be selected on future projects). However, experienced time 
pressure, which we consider also part of a present-time orientation, hampered flexibility (i.e., 
sometimes we are not being flexible because we do not have the time to comply with 
requests). In addition to the different time orientations of ZeroOne participants, we did not 
find any evidence for changing behavior over the course of the project, like end-game 
behavior: the distribution of responses over the course of ZeroOne shows that flexible and 
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inflexible responses were more or less equally frequent across the different stages of 
production. We observed only a slight increase of defiance towards the end, but we blame this 
on experienced time pressure instead of on the intentional pursuit of self-interests as the end 
of ZeroOne was approaching. This suggests that a possible negative effect of limited duration 
on operational flexibility – in the form of end-game behavior – was neutralized by shadows of 
the past and future. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
Across TOs, lead organizations can adapt to changing external demands like changing 
customers by relying on different configurations of partner organizations (Bechky, 2006; 
Hobday, 2000). Building on this idea of flexibility across TOs, we provide insights into the 
relatively underexplored territory of operational flexibility within TOs, advancing our 
knowledge of the dynamics of collaboration within this specific type of interorganizational 
collaboration. We show that next to TOs’ ex ante defined termination point, these dynamics 
are influenced by factors relating to the period before and after TO existence: temporary 
organizations are no islands (cf. Engwall, 2003; Manning & Sydow, 2011). Instead, TO 
participants carry with them shadows of the past while also taking into account shadows of 
the future. Also, we show that operational flexibility is a multi-dimensional construct 
encompassing various types of requests (scope of work, pace and timing, information, and 
general procedures) and responses (acquiescence, compromise, defiance, avoidance). These 




















The identified drivers of operational flexibility have several important implications for 
theorizing on the influence of time on flexibility behaviors within TOs. Conventional project 
management literature treats time as linear and objectively given (Clark, 1994). This is 
reflected in TO participants’ present-time orientation and in their primary focus on 
completing tasks on time (Atkinson, 1999; Bakker & Janowicz-Panjaitan, 2009). Our findings 
contrast and enrich this literature, showing that time is not merely a boundary condition but a 
much more complex, subjective, and socially constructed phenomenon (cf. Blount & Janicik, 
2001; Chan, 2012; Cunha, 2004; Orlikowski & Yates, 2002). It is complex, because TO 
participants turn out to have multiple time orientations, all of which affect flexibility 
behaviors in their own way. First, a past-time orientation positively impacts operational 
flexibility if participants because of previous TOs have become used to act flexibly and more 
or less automatically continue this behavior in the present TO. As such, participants’ (shared) 
experiences in previous TOs create structured role systems, converging expectations, and 
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orientation, i.e. an orientation towards the time remaining until TO completion, positively 
impacts operational flexibility if participants consider flexibility imperative to finish the job. 
This suggests that TO participants develop a clear task-focus because of TOs’ limited duration 
(cf. Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). Yet, a present-time orientation can 
also lead to inflexibility if participants experience time pressure and cannot find the time to 
reply (adequately) to partner requests (cf. Nordqvist, Hovmark, & Zika-Viktorsson, 2004). 
Third, a future-time orientation positively impacts operational flexibility if participants 
consider flexibility in the current TO a condition for future collaboration (cf. Ivens, 2005). 
This is consistent with earlier work on the positive effects of a shadow of the future on 
cooperation, flexibility, and trustworthy behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Bó, 2005; Heide & Miner, 
1992). A future-time orientation differs from a past-time orientation in that it rests on 
calculative grounds. TO participants purposefully act flexibly because of a shadow of the 
future. A past-time orientation contains non-calculative elements: flexibility behavior is the 
consequence of taken-for-granted norms. A present-time orientation seems again calculus-
based: flexibility is displayed because of its perceived importance for finishing the task at 
hand.  
Time is also subjective and socially constructed, as TO participants show variety in their 
orientations towards the same time. How TO participants value shadows of the past and future 
is intimately shaped by the social and organizational context in which they operate (cf. Blount 
& Janicik, 2001). These shadows are given meaning among others through the process of 
collaboration. TO participants will for instance attach less value to a shadow of the past and 
adjust their behavior accordingly if, despite a shared history, their current partners display 
inflexibility during collaboration in the present TO. In addition to that, recent work on 
temporal perspectives of organizational responses to climate change (Slawinski & Bansal, 
2012) shows that some organizations tend to focus more on the immediate present, while 
other organizations also take into the account the past and the long-term future. 
TO participants can carry with them experiences from previous TOs, expect future 
collaboration with current participants, and focus on meeting the current deadline(s) all at the 
same time. This contradicts early work on time orientations which states that when 
participants focus on the present, they automatically neglect shadows of the past and future: 
“a person [participating in a TO] lives more in the psychological present, coping with 
immediate demands and simultaneously forgetting the past and neglecting plans for the 
future” (Miles, 1964, p. 457-458). Instead, we posit that past-, present-, and future-time 
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orientations can occur simultaneously. A present-time orientation will be more or less 
automatically present among TO participants. After all, every TO from the beginning has a 
goal which has to be achieved in a limited amount of time, creating some sense of urgency 
and some level of time pressure for all participants. This cannot be said for shadows of the 
past and future. Given their demonstrated importance for flexibility behaviors within TOs – 
and the implicit presence of a present-time orientation – in the following we suggest a 
configuration of TOs based on the presence or absence of shadows of the past and future. This 
demarcation results in four possible configurations. Below we discuss these configurations 
and the expected level of operational flexibility within these configurations. 
In configuration I, participants have never or seldom worked together before and expect no 
future collaboration, making the TO the ‘organizational equivalent of a one-night stand’ 
(Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). On the other extreme, in configuration II, all or most 
participants share a long history of collaboration and expect to continue working together in 
upcoming TOs, as is often the case in for example the construction industry (Jones & 
Lichtenstein, 2008). This would give collaboration a more permanent character, despite the 
temporary nature of each single TO. Building on our findings, we suggest that in the second 
configuration (sharing a past and a future) TO participants are more likely to display 
flexibility than in the first configuration (no past, no future). In the remaining configurations 
either a shadow of the past or a shadow of the future is dominantly present. In configuration 
III, participating organizations share no or only a short history of collaboration but do expect 
to continue collaboration in future TOs. Here, TO participants will be oriented more towards 
the future than the past. One may wonder if TO participants are more likely to display 
flexibility in this configuration than in configuration IV, where a shadow of the past is more 
prevalent than a shadow of the future. Poppo et al. (2008) found that a shadow of the future 
was more important for the development of trust between parties – which is closely linked to 
flexibility – than a shadow of the past. Following this line of reasoning, we expect that a 
shadow of the future can compensate for an absence of a shadow of the past, and thus that a 
shadow of the future is more important in explaining flexibility behaviors than a shadow of 
the past. Consequently, in configuration III, the level of operational flexibility will be higher 
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As final theoretical implication our findings reject the idea that relational norms like 
flexibility do not develop within TOs because of their short or limited duration (Meyerson et 
al., 1996). Rather, we posit that driven by shadows of the past and future, relational norms can 
be present in TOs, despite their ex ante determined end point (cf. Engwall, 2003; Starkey, 
Barnatt, & Tempest, 2000; Sydow & Staber, 2002). Flexibility then does not necessarily 
develop within a TO (e.g., Ness & Haugland, 2005), but across a number of subsequent TOs. 
Therefore, we suggest a reconsideration of the influence and importance of what is generally 
regarded as the central characteristic of TOs, their ex ante defined termination point, by taking 
into account shadows of the past and future. 
The findings suggest several practical implications. If flexibility within projects is of high 
importance, lead organizations should try to work with a stable set of partners. Although this 
carries the danger of lock-in effects, they can benefit from repeated collaboration because it 
facilitates coordination due to learning effects. It can create a collaboration culture in which 
all participants are focused on finishing the task and are looking beyond their self-interests. If 
partners work with each other on multiple projects simultaneously this also helps to create 
flexibility because personnel can be shifted from one project to another. TO participants can 
further facilitate flexibility by maintaining a flexible resource pool so they can increase or 
lower pace when the situation requires that. Still, one important limitation of flexibility is that 
it runs counter to operational efficiency (Olsson, 2006). Flexibility implies deviation from 
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original plans, so that when original plans are correct and adequate, there is less need to make 
an appeal to flexibility. However, due to the complexity of TOs in terms of the products 
delivered and the organization required, it is practically impossible to foresee and write down 
all future aspects of work. Flexibility thus remains important and may best be described as a 
necessary evil. Future research could focus specifically on the consequences of flexibility, in 
order to get a more informed discussion on when flexibility is a good or a bad thing. 
There are some limitations to this study which may be addressed in future research as well. 
Due to the qualitative nature of this study, generalization of results to a broader context is an 
issue. Interorganizational interaction processes in the specific context of yacht-like vessels 
may well differ from collaboration processes during the building of work vessels. They may 
also differ from collaboration in other industries, or in other types of TOs, for example in TOs 
without a lead organization and where power differences are differently distributed (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008). Nonetheless, our findings may be applicable to other settings in which multiple 
organizations work on a complex product in a limited time period (e.g., construction). Future 
research could also compare collaboration processes within TOs with collaboration processes 
in other interorganizational collaboration types like alliances. A dominant view in the TO 
literature is that these organizational forms, because of their impending termination, are 
unique and trigger different social processes compared to other interorganizational 
collaboration settings like alliances (Kenis et al., 2009). However, repeated alliances between 
the same partners are not an exception (e.g., Goerzen, 2007). Consequently, alliance partners 
may have past-, present-, and future-time orientations as well. So although from a theoretical 
point of view there may be various reasons to treat temporary and non-temporary 
organizations differently, in practice they may be more similar than is commonly assumed.  
Such research could shed light on the uniqueness of TOs compared to other 
interorganizational collaboration types as well as on the assumed importance of TOs’ ex ante 
defined termination point. 
Another interesting research venue pertains to the determinants and consequences of various 
time orientations. Under which conditions do TO participants rely more on the past, and when 
more on the present or future? What is the influence of time orientations on other relational 
mechanisms like trust (Gulati & Sytch, 2008)? Furthermore, can we identify conditions under 
which these orientations improve collaboration? It has been shown that for example shadows 
of the past can also have negative consequences for collaboration (Katz, 1982; Uzzi, 1997). 
Finally, large-scale, quantitative inquiries could improve and generalize knowledge on 
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flexibility in temporary organizations, including insights on the relative importance and 
interaction between time orientations. 
In conclusion, this chapter set out to explore flexibility behaviors of participants in a 
temporary organization and how aspects of time partly explain these behaviors. We show that 
operational flexibility is a multi-dimensional construct by empirically distinguishing different 
types of flexibility requests and responses. Operational flexibility within TOs is fueled by a 
combination of participants’ past-, present-, and future-time orientations. The presence of 
these orientations implies that collaboration dynamics within TOs are at least partially 
influenced by forces outside of TOs. It also explains why relational norms within TOs do 
develop, despite TOs’ limited duration. We suggest a reconsideration of the influence and 
importance of what is generally regarded as the central characteristic of TOs, their ex ante 
defined termination point, by taking into account shadows of the past and future. Because of 




4. Better understanding TO amnesia and its cure: A multi-process analysis of 
learning across temporary organizations 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Organizations often participate in a stream of TOs (Lampel, Scarbrough, & Macmillan, 2008). 
Consequently, they could benefit from learning across TOs, e.g. by transferring lessons 
learned from one temporary organization to another (Brady & Davies, 2004). Generally, 
learning is considered essential for the development of organizational capabilities and for 
bringing competitive advantage (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Learning across TOs, defined here 
as the extent to which organizations and individuals realize change across two subsequent 
TOs (cf. Albino, Garavelli, & Schiuma, 1998; Bartsch, Ebers, & Maurer, 2013), improves 
practices and products, and prevents organizations from making the same mistakes (Kasvi, 
Vartiainen, & Hailikari, 2003; Lampel et al., 2008; Prusak, 1997). 
To accomplish cross-TO learning, organizations can rely on a combination of learning 
mechanisms, specifically experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge 
codification (Prencipe & Tell, 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Experience accumulation 
involves individuals taking their accumulated experiences with them from one temporary 
organization to the next one. It is a semi-automatic process
11
 allowing for efficient 
specialization and coordination. Knowledge articulation concerns two or more individuals 
figuring out what works or what does not work by means of discussion, and taking this 
knowledge with them to subsequent TOs. In comparison to experience accumulation, 
knowledge articulation is a more deliberate process in which opinions and beliefs are verbally 
expressed and shared. Knowledge codification involves making acquired knowledge explicit 
which can then be retrieved in subsequent TOs, also by individuals who have not participated 
in the codification process. Knowledge codification can be seen as an extension of knowledge 
articulation, and occurs through the use of for example manuals and databases. 
Despite the use of these mechanisms, practice shows that organizations find it difficult to 
learn across TOs (Newell et al., 2006). The successful transition from acquiring knowledge 
during one TO – either through experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, knowledge 
                                                   
11
 We interchangeably use the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘process’ as we consider accumulation, 
articulation, and codification to be both learning activities as well as facilitators of learning. 
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codification, or any combination of the three – and applying this knowledge during a 
subsequent TO is not automatically or easily achieved. Development of solutions to 
encountered problems generates the knowledge to achieve cross-TO learning (Lampel et al., 
2008), especially in TOs that accomplish unique tasks where it is difficult to rely on past 
routines (Hobday, 2000). But experiencing problems (experience accumulation), discussing 
them (knowledge articulation), and writing down solutions (knowledge codification) during 
collaboration in a TO does not necessarily mean that these problems are fixed or that solutions 
found are applied in a subsequent TO. In fact, often organizations find themselves reinventing 
the wheel and making the same mistakes time after time rather than improving practices and 
products (Cacciatori, Tamoschus, & Grabher, 2012; Prusak, 1997). This ‘TO amnesia’ – 
organizations’ seeming inability to put into use what is learned across TOs – can result among 
other things in higher production costs and longer production times, both of which undermine 
the competitive position of organizations (Levering et al., 2013). It becomes important then to 
identify not only the factors that determine when or why a learning process is activated, but 
especially the conditions that hamper or strengthen the effectiveness of these processes, i.e., 
the conditions under which these mechanisms lead to actual change across TOs. 
TO amnesia seems to be an example of what has been labeled the learning paradox (Bakker et 
al., 2011b; Cacciatori, 2008; Hobday, 2000; Scarbrough et al., 2004): the involvement of 
multiple organizations in a TO provides ample learning opportunities, but the created 
knowledge is likely to dissipate when the TO comes to an end and participants disband, 
thereby impeding effective experience accumulation. Knowledge articulation and codification 
are also problematic in a TO context due to the organizations’ primary emphasis on finishing 
TOs on time and within budget (Grabher, 2002a; Perminova, Gustafsson, & Wikström, 2008). 
This makes it less likely that time and efforts will be spent to articulate and document lessons 
learned. In line with these ideas, the limited duration of TOs and the time pressure 
experienced by their members have been both theoretically and empirically identified as 
major barriers to learning across TOs (Grabher, 2004a). In addition, TOs are usually formed 
for the accomplishment of complex and unique tasks (Hobday, 2000), which can lower the 
value of transferring often highly specific knowledge to subsequent TOs. 
As discussed, previous studies on barriers to cross-TO learning have emphasized explanations 
based on the limited duration and time pressure prevalent in TOs. However, we propose that 
this perspective does not fully take into account the complex multi-process and multi-actor 
nature of learning that comes into play with learning across TOs. First, the barriers to cross-
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TO learning are likely to differ between the learning mechanisms distinguished. Time 
pressure indeed can put a hold on knowledge articulation and codification activities. But it 
seems fair to assume this is only of minor importance when subsequent TOs are comprised of 
the same set of experienced organizations and individuals who function as a project memory 
(Grabher, 2004b). Similarly, the limited duration of TOs becomes less relevant once 
knowledge is codified (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Codified knowledge can be transferred to, 
assessed and used in subsequent TOs by organizations and individuals that did not participate 
in the codification process. Second, time pressure and limited duration predominantly explain 
why learning in a TO does not occur in the first place. But these factors fail to give insight 
into the conditions under which learning in a TO also leads to learning across TOs. For 
example, articulating and codifying knowledge within one TO does not automatically lead to 
the use of that knowledge in a subsequent TO. Third and finally, pointing at time pressure and 
limited duration as the two central barriers to cross-TO learning suggests a rather 
deterministic perspective, namely that learning can hardly ever take place in this context. 
After all, every TO is by its very nature of limited duration, and this automatically imposes 
some level of time pressure on participants. But there are studies that do report actual learning 
despite these boundary conditions, pointing for example at the importance of continuity in the 
set of organizations and individuals across TOs (Bartsch et al., 2013; Swan, Scarbrough, & 
Newell, 2010). 
Because of these considerations on the current literature on cross-TO learning, we believe 
there is an opportunity to further deepen our knowledge of the subject (cf. Kenis et al., 2009). 
To better understand why learning across TOs fails or succeeds, and to provide project 
managers with suggestions for better tools to enhance the impact of such learning, we conduct 
a systematic longitudinal case study of two subsequent interorganizational projects in the 
Dutch shipbuilding industry. We empirically explore under which conditions learning 
mechanisms adopted in the first TO result in actual changes (e.g., in products or practices) in 
the second TO. These TOs accomplish similar tasks (i.e., the production of a complex yacht 
support vessel), creating a suitable context for the examination of learning effects. Our 
empirical exploration sheds light on the complexity of learning across TOs by taking a multi-
process perspective (cf. Sydow et al., 2004). We answer the following research question: 
Under what conditions do multiple learning mechanisms – experience accumulation, 
knowledge articulation, and knowledge codification – lead to effective learning across 
temporary organizations? To foreshadow our findings, the analysis reveals two central, 
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related conditions under which cross-TO learning fails or succeeds: locus of change 
responsibility and alignment of change incentives. In case of an external change responsibility 
(i.e., the person experiencing a problem is not the same person in the position to tackle this 
problem) in combination with unaligned change incentives, learning across TOs is less likely 
to take place compared to when change incentives are aligned or when there is an internal 
change responsibility. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Next we discuss the theoretical 
background of our study, zooming in on the three learning mechanisms and the factors that 
enhance or inhibit cross-TO learning as identified in previous research. Then we discuss the 
methods used in our empirical study, followed by a presentation of the results. After the 
discussion of the results, we take a look at the theoretical and practical implications of our 
findings and draw our final conclusions. 
4.2 Theoretical background 
4.2.1 Learning across temporary organizations 
It is proposed that organizational learning literature rests on four basic assumptions 
(Holmqvist, 2003). First, learning of organizations is mainly experiential. Organizational rules 
and practices change over time as a result of organizational experiences. Second, learning 
relatively permanently alters organizations’ behavior. It changes the range of organizations’ 
potential actions. Third, organizational learning is a social process. Organizations are 
comprised of groups of interacting individuals trying to make sense of their daily complex 
reality. And fourth, learning is reflected in organizations’ standard operating procedures, 
practices, and other formal and informal organizational rules. Based on these assumptions, 
organizational learning can be defined as “the social production of organizational rules based 
on experience that leads to a changed organizational behavior” (Holmqvist, 2003, p. 98). In 
line with this definition, this chapter makes the assumption that learning implies change 
(Argote & Ophir, 2005). Organizations may be considered to have learned when the 
acquisition of new knowledge changes the range of potential behaviors (Huber, 1991), but it 
is the application and use of this knowledge that ultimately represents organizational learning 
(Albino et al., 1998; Bartsch et al., 2013). In other words, there is a difference between 
cognitive learning and behavioral learning (Crossan et al., 1995). Cognitive learning concerns 
changes in how organizations and their members interpret information and give meaning to 
situations, while behavioral learning represents actual change in organizations’ actions. These 
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changes are reflected for instance in improved products and changed routines (Dodgson, 
1993; Kasvi et al., 2003). The distinction between cognitive and behavioral learning is 
important because not only are they two different phenomena, also one is not necessarily an 
accurate reflection of the other (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). 
Learning across TOs represents a specific type of organizational learning. Because of the 
involvement of multiple organizations, cross-TO learning can be characterized as multi-party 
and interorganizational (Holmqvist, 2003). Multi-party involvement provides TOs with access 
to a wider set of skills and ideas (Lampel et al., 2008). Organizations can learn about, with, 
and from other participants (Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Inkpen & Tsang, 2007; Leufkens & 
Noorderhaven, 2011). Learning about a partner organization for example can make 
collaboration more efficient as during collaboration participants become familiar with each 
other’s complementary contributions and weaknesses. Learning with a partner occurs when 
two or more parties jointly enter a new business, while learning from a partner involves the 
transfer of knowledge from one organization to another. Yet learning across TOs can be of an 
intraorganizational nature as well, for instance when organizations reconsider – in relative 
isolation – the management of internal operations (Holmqvist, 2003). In addition, learning can 
take place at the individual, group, organizational or TO level (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; 
Grabher, 2002b). All this implies that learning across TOs takes place at multiple levels of 
analysis and can take different forms. 
The generation of knowledge within TOs can be either a direct deliverable for the TO, or it 
can emerge spontaneously during the project as TO participants develop solutions to the 
problems they encounter (Lampel et al., 2008). The application of product knowledge can 
lead to technical improvements in delivered products, including their parts and technologies 
(Kasvi et al., 2003), while the experience of inefficient practices helps organizations 
reconsidering existing routines (Dodgson, 1993). Regardless of whether changes are product-
oriented or practice-oriented and whether they are interorganizational or intraorganizational in 
nature, they are commonly assumed to be driven by a combination of three learning 
mechanisms: experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge codification 
(Prencipe & Tell, 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Following the above, we define cross-TO 
learning as observed changes in products or practices within a focal TO, resulting from a 
combination of experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge codification 
processes activated in previous TOs. 
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4.2.2 Learning mechanisms 
Experience accumulation refers to the process by which operating routines emerge based on 
the repeated execution of tasks (Argote, 1999). It reflects wisdom acquired through trial-and-
error learning (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), or learning-by-doing (Arrow, 1962). Knowledge 
acquired through experience accumulation resides in the memory of individuals and as such is 
tacit (Singh & Zollo, 1998). This implies that learning across TOs via experience 
accumulation requires individuals using their accumulated experiences from previous TOs to 
change products or practices in subsequent TOs (Senge, 1990). Additionally, organizations 
can improve their understanding of what is needed to increase performance on subsequent 
TOs by critically discussing and reflecting on current practices and products (Prencipe & Tell, 
2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002). This knowledge articulation involves deliberately figuring out 
what works and what does not work. It is a process in which tacit knowledge is verbally 
articulated through collective discussions and performance evaluation processes. The sharing 
of individual experiences can improve understanding of why practices are (in)effective and 
can result in adjustments. Knowledge articulation resembles learning-by-reflection, or 
learning-by-evaluation (Scarbrough et al., 2004). Thus, learning across TOs via knowledge 
articulation requires knowledge sharing between participants in one TO and the transfer and 
application of this knowledge in other TOs. Knowledge codification, a step beyond 
knowledge articulation, involves capturing lessons learned in manuals, databases, or software 
(Cacciatori et al., 2012). It creates a TO memory (Kasvi et al., 2003) and assists in making 
existing knowledge accessible to others (Nonaka, 1994). This systematic retention of 
experiences enables organizations to document effective problem solving mechanisms, while 
the documentation of mistakes or potential pitfalls helps reducing failure costs (Schindler & 
Eppler, 2003). Thus, learning across TOs via knowledge codification involves TO participants 
making use of codified information stemming from previous TOs. 
4.2.3 Barriers to cross-TO learning 
Relying on experience accumulation can be detrimental for learning across TOs if it is 
uncertain whether knowledgeable individuals will be involved in future TOs where the 
knowledge is needed, or whether they are willing to share their knowledge (Dodgson, 1993; 
Zollo & Winter, 2002). When configurations of organizations and individuals change across 
TOs, knowledge is likely to dissipate. However, having the same organizations and 
individuals involved in subsequent TOs can also be problematic. The current behavior of TO 
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participants is constrained by past behavior, suggesting that as organizations and individuals 
work together time after time, collaboration routines emerge which can be difficult to alter 
(Porter, 1990). There is thus a potential dark side to relying excessively or exclusively on 
experience accumulation. Reliance on the same set of organizations and individuals can create 
stagnation and inertia rather than change (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Uzzi, 1997), which 
occurs when participants become stuck in their routines, stop searching for alternative ways of 
doing their work, and do not look for improved ways of collaboration. Thus, both having the 
same and different organizations and individuals involved across TOs can frustrate cross-TO 
learning. 
Uncertainty about future collaboration with current TO partners can discourage knowledge 
articulation activities (Schwab & Miner, 2011). To the extent that benefits from what is 
learned materialize only in future collaboration with the same partner it becomes less 
attractive to invest time and efforts to obtain and share such knowledge. Thus, similar to 
experience accumulation, learning across TOs through knowledge articulation is hampered 
when over time different configurations of organizations and individuals are involved. In 
addition, time pressure, fear of opportunism or asymmetric learning intentions can also be 
barriers to knowledge articulation (Hamel, 1991; Keegan & Turner, 2001; Larsson et al., 
1998).  
Compared to experience accumulation and knowledge articulation, knowledge codification 
seems at first glance the least dependent on changes in TO staffing and organizational 
composition. Time pressure and budget constraints are considered major barriers to learning 
across TOs via knowledge codification (Keegan & Turner, 2001; Lampel et al., 2008; 
Lindkvist, Söderlund, & Tell, 1998; Swan et al., 2010). These boundary conditions diminish 
the chance that codification occurs at all. Once it does occur, the codified knowledge may not 
be applied if TO participants lack awareness that there is knowledge which could be helpful in 
improving their practices and products (Newell et al., 2006). In addition, they may lack the 
time to search for relevant information (Keegan & Turner, 2001), or lack the absorptive 
capacity to understand and apply codified material (Tsai, 2001). Thus, barriers to learning 
across TOs through knowledge codification include time pressure, lack of awareness and lack 
of absorptive capacity. 
While the majority of the learning literature focuses on learning barriers, there is also research 
devoted to the factors that make learning successful. Without exception these factors relate to 
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the mechanism of experience accumulation. Some studies point to the importance of prior 
collaborations between organizations and the subsequent development of trust, and to long-
term orientation (Larsson et al., 1998; Makhija & Ganesh, 1997). Others point to the 
importance of reliance on project-governing permanent organizations, or project management 
office leaders, who translate accumulated experiences into routines that are used across 
multiple TOs (Julian, 2008; Schwab & Miner, 2011). Similarly, social capital, i.e. the 
structure and quality of TO participants’ ties, has been found to be a major contributor to 
cross-TO learning (Bartsch et al., 2013). Some studies even make the claim that effective 
learning can occur only through the accumulation of experiences amongst organizations and 
individuals (Swan et al., 2010). However, as we discussed, there are also limits to cross-TO 
learning via experience accumulation. 
The considerations discussed above make clear that learning in the context of temporary 
organizations is difficult. It also shows that the activation of the learning mechanisms (which 
we consider cognitive learning) does not necessarily result in change across TOs (which we 
consider behavioral learning). Informed by the literature, Table 4.1 provides an overview of 
the barriers to the various learning processes. However, on the basis of the existing studies we 
can only make some very general surmises regarding the factors that promote or hinder 
learning from one temporary organization to the next. That is problematic, given the 
importance of TOs in contemporary economic society, and the benefits learning can provide 
the organizations populating them. Given this state of affairs, our study was designed to 
deepen our insights into the conditions under which experience accumulation, knowledge 
articulation, and knowledge codification can nevertheless result in effective learning across 
TOs. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Research design and research context  
Because the goal of our study is to further deepen our limited knowledge of learning across 
TOs, we adopt a qualitative longitudinal case study design (Yin, 2003). A case-study 
approach is particularly useful to explore relatively unknown territory (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
while the longitudinal nature of our analysis allows for the detection of learning effects across 
TOs (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). This study examines two subsequent interorganizational TOs 
in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. To fully grasp the dynamics and complexity of learning 
across TOs, a multi-process perspective is taken (Sydow et al., 2004). We empirically explore 
91 
 
under what conditions experience accumulation, knowledge articulation and knowledge 
codification activities employed in the first TO lead to or hinder knowledge application (i.e., 
changes in practices and/or products) in the second TO. The three learning mechanisms 
represent cognitive learning as they increase the potential behaviors of TO participants, while 
the application of the acquired knowledge signifies behavioral learning. An a priori 
specification of the central learning processes shapes the initial research design and aids in 
interpreting the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Our empirical exploration of the conditions under 
which these processes lead to cross-TO learning contributes to extending theory on 
interorganizational learning in temporary contexts. 
 
TABLE 4.1 
Possible barriers to cross-TO learning 
Barriers to experience accumulation Source 
Changing configurations of organizations and 
individuals across TOs 
Dodgson, 1993 
Zollo & Winter, 2002 
Involvement of the same set of organizations 
and individuals across TOs 
Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000 
Uzzi, 1997 
Barriers to knowledge articulation Source 
Uncertainty about future collaboration with 
current partners 
Schwab & Miner, 2011 
Asymmetric learning intentions Hamel, 1991 
Fear of opportunism Larsson et al., 1998 
Time pressure Keegan & Turner, 2001 
Barriers to knowledge codification Source 
Time and money concerns 
Keegan & Turner, 2001 
Swan et al., 2010 
Lack of absorptive capacity 





Shipbuilding is a project-based industry, in which shipyards and subcontractors collaborate – 
creating a multitude of interorganizational linkages – on a temporary basis to produce 
complex vessels. Though these temporary undertakings are initially not driven by learning 
incentives as opposed to for example learning alliances (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998), 
learning is of high importance to bring down the costs of producing organizationally and 
technically complex vessels, to improve the quality of the end product, and generally to assure 
effective interorganizational collaboration and to fight (fierce and international) competition. 
However, the Dutch shipbuilding industry faces challenges with regard to lowering failure 
costs, which are among others the result of participating organizations making the same 
mistakes on more or less similar projects (Levering et al., 2013). The complex, temporary, 
and multi-organizational nature of shipbuilding projects in combination with the apparent 
difficulties to learn across projects make these projects a suitable research context. 
Moreover, the studied projects are considered revelatory cases, and thus appropriate for 
providing the best insights into the phenomenon of cross-TO learning (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 
2003). The phenomenon of interest is transparently observable because the first project – from 
here on referred to as ‘ZeroOne’ – contained ample learning opportunities. ZeroOne was a 
unique and complex project for the majority of participants in terms of size, vessel type, 
composition of the TO, quality requirements, and working procedures. First, most project 
participants had never before built a vessel of this size. This led to a relatively long production 
period, during which the shipyard had to coordinate and monitor many interdependent tasks 
carried out by a variety of parties. This in turn created a challenge for the planning and 
organization of ZeroOne. Second, the type of vessel produced was relatively new to the 
shipyard and most of the subcontractors in that they had not produced a similar vessel before. 
They were used to build ‘work vessels’, which are used by the owner first and foremost to 
make money (like for example dredging companies). The ZeroOne however was more of a 
luxury yacht than a working vessel. Its primary function was to bring the owner comfort and 
joy. Because of this unique vessel type, the shipyard had to rely on a number of 
subcontractors with specific expertise and experience with producing these types of vessels. 
These were subcontractors the shipyard had not collaborated with before. Also, the production 
of a luxury yacht came with several implications for quality demands and working procedure. 
Several respondents, both on the side of the shipyard and subcontractors, indicated that the 
quality and finishing requirements were much higher than what they were used to. 
Furthermore, there were strict working procedures during the building of the vessel. These 
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procedures pertained to among others protecting finished work and to keeping working areas 
clean. All this suggests that ZeroOne was receptive to the creation of new knowledge about 
both practices and products, which then could be put to use in the second project, from here 
on referred to as ‘ZeroTwo’. We focus on the problems encountered by participants on 
ZeroOne, because ZeroOne was a unique vessel for the parties involved. The development of 
solutions to encountered problems generates the knowledge that can be used to realize 
improvements (Lampel et al., 2008). To the extent that the problems encountered on ZeroOne 
resulted in improved practices on ZeroTwo, we consider that learning across the two projects 
actually took place. 
Although for many participants the ZeroOne was a unique type of vessel, they certainly did 
not enter the project completely unprepared. The majority of the participants selected to 
produce ZeroOne shared a long history of collaboration on other vessel types. These parties 
were not familiar with the production of luxury yachts, but they were familiar with each other 
as collaborating partners and had developed close personal relationships over time as well as 
collaboration routines. Only two of the eight subcontractors selected for ZeroOne were 
relative strangers, sharing no history of collaboration with the shipyard and no or limited 
previous collaboration with the other subcontractors. These two subcontractors – carpentry 
and exterior painting – were selected for their expertise on and experience with producing 
luxury yachts. The other subcontractors also carried with them their experiences which they 
could rely on. The subcontractor for heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning for example 
explained that on ZeroOne they used installations which they had used before on other vessels 
as well. Similarly, the interior painter told that their paining techniques had not evolved 
dramatically over the past thirty years. Thus, ZeroOne contained both unique as well as 
familiar challenges for its participants. 
The ZeroTwo was, although a similar type of vessel, quite different from the ZeroOne. This 
was a consequence of the involvement of a new end customer, who brought along his own 
preferences. Also, the shipyard made some major changes to the outfitting of the ship, for 
example by selecting a different type of engine in order to make ZeroTwo faster than its 
predecessor. The shipyard’s lead engineer explained that it took the engineering departments 
16,000 hours to adjust the drawings from ZeroOne, and that 16,000 hours is normally enough 
time to develop a completely new ship type. Yet in some other respects the ZeroTwo was 
similar to the ZeroOne. Most importantly, the same organizations were involved, and also for 
most part the same individuals. This made ZeroTwo a suited project for its members to 
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implement what they had learned on ZeroOne. By selecting the same subcontractors, the 
shipyard made it possible to rely on their experiences accumulated during ZeroOne. The 
importance of experience accumulation for learning across the two vessels was underlined by 
the shipyard’s production supervisor. He told that the production workers from a specific 
subcontractor got poor back-up from their office and that this frustrated the process. He also 
said that this would probably not improve on ZeroTwo. But still he wanted to keep the 
subcontractor on board because the production workers now had the experience from the 
ZeroOne. This shows that from a shipyard perspective, relying on a subcontractor’s relevant 
experiences is highly important. It is so important that even when a subcontractor was not 
performing according expectations, the shipyard still selected them for similar vessels. 
4.3.2 Data collection and analysis 
The empirical data comes from two data collection methods: observations and semi-structured 
interviews. There were two separate rounds of data collection, one during ZeroOne and one 
during ZeroTwo. The data are triangulated, allowing for more confident interpretations of 
what we observed and what we heard from the respondents (Eisenhardt, 1989). The data 
collection process started with observing the behavior of ZeroOne participants during the 
production phase in weekly project meetings. These meetings were attended by shipyard 
employees (typically the project manager, assistant project manager, and production 
supervisor) and the production supervisors of the various subcontractors. In these meetings, 
each lasting on average 75 minutes, mainly operational issues were discussed. Observing the 
behavior of the meeting attendants offered the opportunity to acquire a view of the patterns of 
collaboration independently of what respondents chose to reveal in interviews. For the 
observations, we made use of an observation protocol. This protocol consisted of two rows: in 
the left row we noted what we factually observed or heard (e.g., a remark by the shipyard 
project’s manager that a particular issue had to be taken into account for the next vessel), in 
the right row we wrote down what we perceived to be going on in more theoretical wordings 
(e.g. an intention to accommodate cross-TO learning). This procedure enables us to 
demonstrate how we derived more generalized theoretical explanations from in vivo language 
(van Maanen, 1979). The observations during ZeroOne were used to design an initial 
interview protocol. Halfway and at the end of ZeroOne the first round of interviews was 
conducted. We interviewed practically all project meeting participants, asking them what in 
their opinion could or should be improved on ZeroTwo. During ZeroOne we gathered about 
1,000 observations in 22 project meetings, and conducted 28 interviews, which lasted on 
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average 50 minutes. The data collected during ZeroOne were used to adjust the interview 
protocol and to narrow down our observations for ZeroTwo (cf. Harris & Sutton, 1986). The 
observations of project participants during the project meetings on ZeroTwo, which were also 
held weekly and lasted on average 60 minutes, gave a first indication of what had improved 
and what had not in comparison to ZeroOne. Here we also made use of an observation 
protocol (for an example, see Appendix F). Changes in for example work practices – either 
observed or articulated by project meeting attendants – suggested that learning had taken 
place. During ZeroTwo we gathered about 700 observations during 20 project meetings. To 
get an understanding of why learning did or did not occur, additionally we conducted 
interviews with the attendants. This second round of interviews was conducted halfway 
ZeroTwo. The interviews contained questions about whether, how, and why practices or 
products had changed, product quality had increased, and mistakes were repeated, among 
others. During ZeroTwo we conducted 13 interviews which had an average length of 40 
minutes. In addition, during the whole data collection process, background information was 
gathered by means of informal conversations with project participants, personal notes during 
site visits, and presentations of preliminary findings to project participants as well as 




Data analysis was executed following an iterative approach in which the obtained data was 
continuously analyzed and refined (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To identify 
how and why learning from ZeroOne to ZeroTwo succeeded or failed, the first step involved 
determining if practices or products on ZeroTwo had changed or had not changed in 
comparison to ZeroOne. Understanding how this change had come about gave information on 
whether experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, knowledge codification or a 
combination of the three formed the basis of the changes in products or practices. Learning 
during ZeroOne in some instances led to the adjustment of practices during ZeroTwo. In these 
scenarios, we relied on our respondents to give insight in why learning succeeded. In other 
instances the adjustment failed. In these scenarios, we relied on our respondent to give insight 
in why learning failed. The conditions under which learning did or did not occur were 
                                                   
12
 As a limitation to our data collection, it should be noted that when the data collection ended – due to 
time restrictions – ZeroTwo had not yet come to an end. However, production was finished for about 
70%, and over the course of ZeroTwo, participants had already observed some significant changes and 
stabilities.    
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retrieved through open coding (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2004). Open coding starts with language 
used by the respondents, so-called first-order concepts (van Maanen, 1979). Then we looked 
for relations between the codes and grouped them into higher-order themes. Then, related 
themes were clustered into overarching dimensions. For example, verbal expressions by 
respondents that there are parties not seeing the bigger picture and focusing only on their own 
tasks (first-order concepts) can be labeled ‘diverging interests’ (second-order theme). 
Expressions that parties are willing to help each other out (first-order concepts) indicate 
converging interests (second-order theme). Combined, diverging and converging interests 
suggest that interest alignment (third-order dimension) plays an important role in cross-TO 
learning. A continuous comparison of concepts, themes, and dimensions with newly collected 
data permitted us to increase the validity of our theoretical claims (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990). In the next section we present an overview of our results using a data 
structure (Corley & Gioia, 2004), showing how we combined the various concepts, themes, 
and dimensions that emerged from our data (Figure 4.1). 
4.4 Results 
In this section we first take a look at the learning mechanisms activated during ZeroOne, as 
well as the absence of learning activities where these would be expected. The latter provides 
insight in the conditions under which TO participants did not engage in certain learning 
activities. Then we discuss the changes in ZeroTwo observed or mentioned by our 
respondents (the learning successes) and the things that did not change on ZeroTwo, despite 
experienced problems on ZeroOne (the learning failures). As we will demonstrate, the 
analysis of the learning successes and failures reveals two major barriers to the effectiveness 
of the three learning mechanisms: locus of change responsibility, and alignment of change 
incentives. Representative quotations to back up our interpretations can be found in Appendix 
G. 
4.4.1 ZeroOne 
ZeroOne participants gained experience through the execution of their work. A general, major 
issue on ZeroOne was that while the project was running all participants found out (i.e., 
experience accumulation) that they had heavily underestimated the amount of work, which 
was a direct consequence of the newness of the project. Participants had to put in extra time 
and effort to find out on board what the vessel was going to look like. The drawings provided 
by the shipyard’s engineering department were not always detailed enough, while in other 
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occasions what was drawn turned out to be technically impossible. Also, changes made by the 
end customer during production led to additional work, or rework of what already had been 
finished. As ZeroOne progressed, the amount of work turned out to be much higher than was 
originally assumed. Consequently, all parties exceeded their planned amount of hours. This 
problem was discussed occasionally during the project meetings, but without referring to how 
this should be handled on a next vessel. Instead, the focus during these meetings was on how 
to deal with the current situation on ZeroOne, without making practically any explicit 
reference to the future. 
Next to these experiences based on execution of the job, the shipyard also engaged in the 
more deliberate learning process of knowledge articulation. For instance, the shipyard 
arranged several internal meetings during ZeroOne, attended by the project manager, 
production supervisor, lead engineer, and head purchasing. They discussed encountered 
problems on ZeroOne and made preparations for ZeroTwo, for example by already ordering 
major components for ZeroTwo which were delivered relatively late on ZeroOne. Next to 
these structured meetings, shipyard’s production personnel also reported technical problems 
and difficulties to the shipyard’s engineering department. These processes occurred at an 
intraorganizational level, as only shipyard employees were involved. However, 
interorganizational learning processes also took place. This consisted mainly of the shipyard’s 
assistant project manager talking on an informal basis to the production supervisors of each 
subcontractor. He asked them among other things how they experienced the production 
process and how they thought the process could be improved on a next vessel. Thus, during 
ZeroOne the shipyard engaged in both experience accumulation and knowledge articulation 
activities. 
The subcontractors also engaged in experience accumulation and knowledge articulation. The 
carpenter for example experienced serious delays of more than two months in the delivery of 
panels due to problems on the side of their supplier. When the first batch of panels finally 
arrived, they were delivered in the wrong order. As a consequence of this unforeseen 
contingency the carpenter could not start at the planned date and also not in the preferred 
areas. This was disastrous for the efficiency of the building process, not only for the carpenter 
but for the other parties on board as well due to their high level of interdependence. In 
response to the delays on the side of the carpenter, all parties had to adjust their pacing and 
sequencing of activities. At the end of ZeroOne, the carpenter arranged an internal evaluation 
with among others the CEO of the company and the employees directly involved in ZeroOne. 
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During this evaluation the issue with the delivery of the panels was discussed as well as other 
issues that could be improved on next vessels, resulting in a list of improvements. In addition, 
the carpenter kept a list on which incorrect drawings were reported. At the end of ZeroOne, 
this list was distributed to their own engineering department. Other subcontractors – who also 
had their own engineering department, like for example the electrician – followed similar 
procedures of reporting technical issues to their offices. For some subcontractors this was a 
continuous process, while others kept lists and documents and handed them over to their 







 We know what is coming and 
can adjust our planning 
accordingly 
 We anticipate problems in 
advance and make sure they 
never grow to real problems 














 I told him that things had to 
change 
 Arrange a meeting with the 
defecting party 
 Responsibility for early start 
lies with top management 
 He understood and agreed that 
this had been very inefficient 
 Things need to go better or we 
will lose a lot of money again 
 Not seeing the bigger picture 
 Focus on own task 
 It is easier not to 
communicate 
 Adjusting drawings is 
expensive and time-
consuming 
 Subcontractors are selected 
anyhow, so there is no 
incentive to change 
 They are engaged in other, for 
them more important 
activities 
 Early production is part of 




Aggregate dimensions 1st-order concepts 
















Knowledge codification activities were predominantly undertaken by the parties that engaged 
in engineering (i.e., the shipyard, carpenter, electrician, and navigational equipment installer). 
This involved adjusting the drawings based on problems reported by production personnel. 
Sometimes drawings were not detailed enough so that production personnel did not know 
what a room exactly would look like, while other times what was on the drawings turned out 
technically not feasible.  
Based on the above findings, we conclude that all ZeroOne participants engaged to some 
extent in processes of experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge 
codification. Still, sometimes a learning process did not occur or was not ‘finished’. There 
was for instance no group evaluation (involving both shipyard and subcontractors) at the end 
of ZeroOne. According to the shipyard’s assistant project manager and production supervisor, 
such an evaluation was not undertaken because it would be useless. He explained that 
subcontractors were too much focused on their own tasks, without taking into account the 
broader picture. As a consequence, subcontractors would only talk about their own specific 
problems and solutions to these problems, instead of looking at solutions from which the 
entire project could benefit. We interpret this as unaligned change incentives between 
shipyard and subcontractors which impede knowledge articulation activities. 
There were also limits to knowledge codification. The shipyard experienced that 
subcontractors did not always report technical issues encountered on board to the shipyard’s 
engineering. When subcontractors experienced these issues, often it was easier and faster for 
them to quickly solve the issue right away without investing time to communicate this to the 
shipyard. Although this accelerated the building process at that moment, the shipyard’s 
engineering was unaware of the error. Consequently, the incorrect drawings could not be 
changed, so that on a next vessel the same mistake was likely to occur. In some occasions 
errors were reported – also by subcontractors – but they were not processed by shipyard’s 
engineering in terms of adjusting the drawings. Economic considerations played a major role 
in the decision not to make these so-called as-built drawings. The updating of drawings costs 
a lot of time, and thus money. And because a next vessel will practically never be an exact 
copy, it is possible that a lot of the redrawing is useless. We interpret these situations also as 
change incentives of two parties – production personnel and engineering – that are not 
aligned, which hamper knowledge articulation and codification activities. 
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These findings further suggest that the three learning mechanisms are interwoven, with 
experience accumulation being the starting mechanism. During the execution of their work, 
ZeroOne participants discovered problems, which they then did or did not articulate to others. 
The articulation of experiences in turn was a prerequisite for knowledge codification to take 
place. This applied especially to ZeroOne, because the parties responsible for codification (the 
engineers) were not the parties experiencing and thus in the position to discuss encountered 
problems (production personnel).  
Additionally we looked at the occurrence of references to learning during the project meetings 
(see Table 4.2). We counted the number of times project meeting participants referred to 
ZeroTwo during the construction of ZeroOne, and how many times they referred to previous 
vessels. We see that there is very little reference to previous vessels. During the 22 project 
meetings, only five times did a party refer explicitly to earlier projects and how they handled 
certain issues on these projects. This then gave an idea on how they could tackle current 
problems. The limited reference to previous vessels indicates the uniqueness of ZeroOne, and 
suggests it was difficult or even useless for ZeroOne participants to draw from past 
experiences. The same pattern applies to references to ZeroTwo. Only six explicit references 
to ZeroTwo were made during the project meetings. These references consisted of things that 
had gone terribly wrong on ZeroOne, and which therefore should be taken into account for the 
next vessel. The limited reference to subsequent vessels can be explained by the fact that the 
project meetings were first and foremost meant to solve current problems and to meet current 
deadlines, and not to see what could be improved on next vessels. Furthermore, as the start of 
ZeroTwo approached – and as ZeroOne came to an end – we saw no increase in the references 
to ZeroTwo. This also suggests that the focus was more on delivering ZeroOne on time than 
on making preparations for ZeroTwo. As we have discussed, articulation and codification of 
what could be improved took place predominantly outside of the project meetings, in other 







Learning references during project meetings ZeroOne 
Meeting number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Explicit reference to 
earlier vessels 
    1    1    
Explicit reference to 
next vessels 
      1 3     
By whom     SY  SY 
SY 
SC 
SY    
 
Meeting number 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Explicit reference to 
earlier vessels 
   1    1 1  
Explicit reference to 
next vessels 
     1 1    
By whom    SC  SC SY SY SY  
 
SY = shipyard 
SC = subcontractor 
 
4.4.2 ZeroTwo 
During the project meetings on ZeroTwo more than 80 explicit references to ZeroOne were 
made. Both shipyard and subcontractors continuously talked about how they handled 
situations on ZeroOne. The reference to future vessels however was – again – limited. Only 
four times did a meeting participant – in all cases the shipyard’s lead engineer – talk about 
modifications and solutions that had to be taken into account on what would be ‘ZeroThree’ 
(see Table 4.3). This suggests the importance of experience accumulation and relying on the 
same set of organizations and individuals for realizing cross-TO learning. 
During the interviews on ZeroTwo, respondents came up with three major changes which 
they considered improvements in comparison to ZeroOne. We refer to these changes as 
learning successes. The identified successes were: an increase in the shipyard’s coordination 
capacity; improved planning; and a more efficient production process. For each success we 
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discuss what the change entailed, how it came about, i.e., via which learning mechanisms, and 
the conditions which made these learning mechanisms successful. 
 
TABLE 4.3 
Learning references during project meetings ZeroTwo 
Meeting number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Number of explicit 
references to ZeroOne 
5 5 4 3 6 6 6 6  5 3 5 
Explicit reference to 
next vessel(s) 
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Number of explicit 
references to ZeroOne 
3 5 3 8 3 2  3 
Explicit reference to 
next vessel(s) 
1       1 














SY = Shipyard 
SC = Subcontractor 
 
 
Learning success #1: Increase in shipyard’s coordination capacity 
The shipyard managed to improve both inter- and intra-organizational coordination on 
ZeroTwo by increasing coordination capacity (see Table 4.4). On ZeroOne, the shipyard’s 
project manager dealt with communication to the end customer – which was very time-
consuming – but he also led the project meetings with the subcontractors. On ZeroTwo, the 
project manager dealt solely with the end customer, which gave him more time to efficiently 
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deal with (changing) customer preferences. Also, the shipyard’s assistant project manager on 
ZeroOne became the second project manager on ZeroTwo. In this new role he led the project 
meetings, building on his experiences on ZeroOne. These experiences enabled him to better 
monitor and coordinate the actions of the various subcontractors. Furthermore, the shipyard’s 
person dealing with material coordination on ZeroOne became the project management 
assistant on ZeroTwo. Finally, the number of shipyard production supervisors increased from 
one supervisor on ZeroOne to two supervisors on ZeroTwo, while an additional purchasing 
employee was placed on ZeroTwo to support the production supervisors as well. Because of 
all these changes, the number of people involved in coordination activities increased, enabling 
the shipyard to better monitor the end customer, the subcontractors and shipyard’s own 
production personnel.  
 
TABLE 4.4 
Changes in shipyard’s coordination capacity 
ZeroOne ZeroTwo 
Project manager Project manager 1 
Assistant project manager Project Manager 2 
Production supervisor Assistant project manager 
Material coordination Production supervisor 1 
 Production supervisor 2 
 Material coordination 
 Additional purchaser 







The increase in coordination capacity was initially driven by the experiences of the 
coordinators on ZeroOne, especially of the production supervisor and the project manager. 
They experienced severe levels of time pressure during ZeroOne:  
“I used to leave work every day at 5 o’clock, have dinner, and be busy with our children until 
they slept at around 7.30 PM. Then I would spend the rest of the evening preparing work for 
the next day. When you come to think of it, that was complete madness. So at the end of 
ZeroOne I went to our production director and told him that if things on ZeroTwo would be 
the same, he could start looking for another production supervisor.” [Production supervisor 
Shipyard] 
The shipyard’s production supervisor and project manager discussed their concerns with each 
other during ZeroOne in informal bilateral discussions and internal meetings, and also with 
the shipyard’s production director. Thus, their accumulated experiences were accompanied by 
knowledge articulation activities as well. Still however, the decision to increase coordination 
capacity was not theirs to make. That decision was in the hands of the production director. 
The production director was only indirectly involved with the project. The production director 
gave permission to increase coordination capacity because he believed it would be worth the 
size of the investment. The shipyard lost a lot of money on ZeroOne. Increasing coordination 
capacity would initially increase costs, but a more efficient distribution of coordination tasks 
could lead to a more efficient production process and hence decrease overall costs. 
In this example, persons directly experiencing the problem (i.e., project manager, production 
supervisor) were not the persons in the position to do something about it (i.e., production 
supervisor). Although that could have made actual change difficult, change did occur because 
the two parties both had an incentive to change. Both parties wanted – although for somewhat 
different reasons (work overload and profitability) – to increase coordination capacity. It 
seems then that because the change incentives of the two parties were aligned, change did 
come about. 
Learning success #2: Improved planning 
Many parties, both on the side of the shipyard and on the side of the subcontractors, indicated 
that compared to ZeroOne, the overall planning on ZeroTwo – as monitored and 
communicated by the shipyard – improved significantly on ZeroTwo. During ZeroOne, there 
was only little time between the finishing of major compartments. There were hardly 
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opportunities to adjust planning if a major compartment like the engine room was not finished 
according to schedule, because the following major compartment was already waiting in line. 
As a consequence, ZeroOne participants experienced high levels of time pressure. This 
created high stress levels among them. On ZeroTwo, the planning had changed in a way that 
there was more time between completions of major parts of the ship. A related improvement 
concerned the communication about the planning to the subcontractors, which was considered 
much clearer. Now everyone was better aware of which parts of the ship had to be finished 
when. The improved planning on ZeroTwo was driven initially and for an important part by 
the experiences of the shipyard on ZeroOne: 
“Compared to ZeroOne, planning is a major improvement on ZeroTwo. It is now much 
clearer for everyone on board when things need to be ready. Also, we try to look ahead better, 
and this is possible because we know more or less what is coming.” [Project manager 
Shipyard] 
During ZeroOne, shipyard personnel discussed planning issues via informal discussions. 
Planning was also discussed, and considered a major point of improvement, during the 
shipyard’s internal meetings. Some subcontractors also shared their concerns with the 
planning with the shipyard’s (assistant) project manager, via informal conversations or during 
the project meetings. Comparable to the first example, this second example then shows a 
combination of experience accumulation and knowledge articulation processes. The shipyard 
wanted to improve planning in order to reach a more efficient production process in terms of 
for example fewer waiting hours and less rework. Waiting hours represent time in which 
project members cannot continue their work because they have to wait on others. Rework 
concerns destroying or disassembling finished work in a room because other disciplines need 
to carry out a task in that same room, and then reproducing or reassembling the work. 
Repairing was needed for example when the shipyard needed to execute welding activities in 
a finished room. The reworked part then needed to be isolated and painted again. 
The important difference with the first example was that, at least from a shipyard perspective, 
the people experiencing the problems were the same people in the position to do something 
about it. The responsibility for change did not lie with ‘external’ parties, making change more 
likely to occur. Thus, experience accumulation and knowledge articulation led to cross-TO 
learning and adapted planning and production processes (or, change) because the persons 
experiencing the problem on ZeroOne were also the persons in the position to do something 
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about that problem on ZeroTwo. The situation was slightly different for subcontractors. From 
a subcontractor’s perspective, there was an external party (i.e., the shipyard) responsible for 
changing the planning. In this example, the change incentives of the subcontractors and the 
shipyard were aligned: all parties pursue an improved planning as it eases the organizing of 
their work. So from a subcontractor’s point of view, cross-TO learning occurred because their 
change incentives were in line with the shipyard’s change incentives. 
Learning success #3: More efficient interorganizational coordination of production 
Most participants indicated that, compared to ZeroOne, the production process was much 
more efficient. This efficiency is different from the improved planning in the previous 
example, and is not merely a consequence of the first two learning successes. The improved 
planning was solely a shipyard matter, concerning especially the planning of compartments. 
The efficiency referred to in this example is about the efficiency of individual subcontractors 
and shipyard employees, about how they organize their work given the overall planning. 
Participants indicated that they recognized in advance situations that had gone wrong on 
ZeroOne, enabling them to tackle problems beforehand, before they actually surfaced. This 
accelerated the production process because they knew what was coming, making it possible to 
organize work more efficiently, for example by changing the sequencing of activities. As a 
consequence, participants faced less waiting hours and needed to carry out less rework. The 
more efficient production process was a direct consequence of the experiences of the 
subcontractors on ZeroOne: 
“Because of our experiences on ZeroOne, we know what the showstoppers were. And now 
you recognize the showstoppers in advance and you know how you tackled that on ZeroOne, 
so that saves you a lot of time.” [Production supervisor Piping subcontractor] 
This third example shows the importance of having the same organizations (and the same 
individuals as well) involved in subsequent TOs. It enabled subcontractors to take their 
experiences with them from ZeroOne to ZeroTwo. Similar to the second example, the people 
experiencing the problems and the people in the position to do something about them were the 
same. What is different here though is that the shift from experience accumulation during 
ZeroOne to the application of these experiences during ZeroTwo did not require activation of 
additional learning mechanisms like knowledge articulation. The change occurred more or 
less automatically. This suggests that under the right conditions experience accumulation in 
itself can be a sufficient mechanism to bring about change across TOs. 
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The previous shows that in some instances learning between ZeroOne and ZeroTwo did take 
place. However, ZeroTwo participants indicated that in other instances learning between the 
two projects did not occur. They experienced two major problems on ZeroTwo that had 
already been problems on ZeroOne: one subcontractor failed to improve its intra-
organizational collaboration process, and generally parties witnessed an increase in repair 
work. We discuss for each failure separately what the failure entailed, which learning 
mechanisms were involved, and the conditions which made these learning mechanisms 
ineffective. 
Learning failure #1: Failure to improve intraorganizational collaboration process 
One of the subcontractors’ production supervisors experienced on both projects serious 
problems concerning internal collaboration. He felt he did not get any support from ‘the 
office’, i.e., his engineering department and executives. According to the production 
supervisor, the engineers were always late with providing information and delivering 
materials. He needed that information in order to properly plan and execute the work on 
board. Also, he felt no back-up from his executives when facing difficult decisions. Because 
information and materials were delivered late, the production supervisor could not continue 
work on board at the desired pace, and this had consequences for the other parties working on 
board as well. The shipyard’s assistant project manager on ZeroTwo concurred with the 
production supervisor and explained that the internal problems on the side of this 
subcontractor were among one of the most important causes for delay on ZeroTwo. The 
production supervisor explained that this has been a problem for several years, and that this 
was not only a problem on ZeroOne and ZeroTwo but on other vessels as well.  
At the end of ZeroOne and before the start of ZeroTwo, in an attempt to change this, the 
production supervisor arranged a meeting with his engineering department to discuss their 
issues. During that meeting the engineers explained that they were re-structuring internal 
processes. This restructuring took a lot of time, and because of this back-up had not always 
been sufficient. They said to understand the problems of production personnel and promised 
to change things. Yet, during ZeroTwo, the same problems arose, indicating that although 
processes of experience accumulation and knowledge articulation took place, learning across 
the projects did not. 
Respondents came up with various explanations why change did not occur. The 
subcontractor, by order of the shipyard, also sent containers with material packages to foreign 
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production sites. The subcontractor’s production supervisor claimed that his company earned 
much more money with those activities than with doing work on regular vessels. 
Consequently, they would put more effort in delivering containers on time to foreign 
countries than in providing information and materials timely to their production personnel. 
According to the shipyard’s assistant project manager, a former employee of the 
subcontractor, their behavior did not change because they were not punished for it by the 
shipyard. He explained that as preferred and relatively cheap subcontractor, they would be 
selected on upcoming projects anyhow. This expectation of future interaction was also fueled 
by the fact that the shipyard and subcontractor had been doing business together for a very 
long time. 
Similar to the learning success of increased coordination capacity, in this example the 
responsibility to change lay with an actor external to the project, namely the subcontractor’s 
office. The explanations given suggest that an important reason why change did not occur was 
the absence of change incentives on the side of this office. Whether driven by the expectancy 
of future assignments no matter what, or by a primary focus on other activities such as 
sending material packages or restructuring internal processes, the office was unmotivated to 
improve collaboration with its production personnel. Thus, despite the activation of 
experience accumulation and knowledge articulation, cross-TO learning did not occur because 
the learning incentives of internal and external actors were not aligned. 
Learning failure #2: Increase of repair work 
A recurring problem on ZeroOne and ZeroTwo was that participants needed to do a lot of 
repair work. This finding seems in conflict with the second learning success, where the case is 
made that repair work decreased because the production process was more efficient. Indeed, 
on the one hand parties knew what was coming, so that they made fewer mistakes and less 
rework was needed. However, on the other hand ZeroTwo participants indicated that they 
were facing more repairing work than on ZeroOne. ZeroTwo participants expressed that the 
latter outweighed the former, so that altogether repair work on ZeroTwo increased in 
comparison to ZeroOne. The accumulation of experiences from ZeroOne apparently was not 
sufficient to facilitate learning across the projects. This shows that, comparable to the first 
learning failure, parties’ learning experiences during one TO do not necessarily result in 
improvements on the next TO. 
110 
 
This apparent inability to learn turned out to be caused by the late involvement of the end 
customer on ZeroTwo. Respondents explained that on ZeroOne, the end customer already was 
known when production started. On ZeroTwo, production already started before the end 
customer was known, and before engineering had started with the detailed drawings. The 
decision to start production in advance was made by the shipyard’s higher management. It 
enabled the shipyard to deliver ZeroTwo on relatively short notice, which was an important 
element of the shipyard’s sales strategy. For customers who can afford it to buy luxury yachts, 
money is not that much of a problem. Short delivery time can then become an important 
factor in selecting a shipyard. Because of the decision to start production early, many 
adjustments had to be made with the entrance of the customer, who requested changes so that 
the end product would meet his preferences. This resulted in a lot of rework for all 
participants. 
In this example too, the people experiencing the problems were not in the position to do 
something about it. Responsibility for change lay with shipyard’s higher management, who 
could have decided not to start production until the end customer was known and until 
customer preferences were mapped. Financial interests made them decide otherwise, so that 
production personnel had no option but to deal with the situation. Also similar to the first 
learning failure then, the unaligned change incentives of internal and external actors frustrated 
cross-TO learning. 
4.4.3 Integration of findings 
If we now analyze the learning successes and failures from a theoretical point of view, we 
propose that there are two interacting conditions under which learning across TOs succeeds or 
fails: locus of change responsibility and alignment of change incentives. Locus of change 
responsibility refers to the actor who is responsible or able to make change happen. When an 
actor experiencing problems during one TO is also in the position to apply what he has 
learned during a subsequent TO, we speak of an internal change responsibility. In this case, an 
actor is not dependent on others to implement what he has learned. If an actor who is 
experiencing problems is dependent on other actors to prevent these problems from happening 
in a future TO, we speak of an external change responsibility. An external change 
responsibility increases the complexity of cross-TO learning because multiple actors are 
involved with the implementation of what has been learned. We suggest that in such cases, the 
alignment of change incentives of the actor experiencing the problems and of the actor in the 
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position to do something about these problems becomes important as well. Alignment of 
change incentives refers to the extent to which these actors are equally motivated to 
implement change. The larger the difference between these motivations, the less aligned are 
the actors’ change incentives, and the less likely it becomes that change across TOs actually 
occurs. 
The effectiveness of experience accumulation and knowledge articulation is, therefore, 
contingent upon the conditions of locus of change responsibility and alignment of change 
incentives. These learning mechanisms are unlikely to result in change across TOs when there 
is an external change responsibility in combination with unaligned change incentives. These 
two conditions also have direct negative effects on knowledge articulation and codification: 
they lower the chance that articulation and codification occur in the first place.  
The discussed learning successes and learning failures are mainly driven by two learning 
mechanisms, i.e. experience accumulation and knowledge articulation. Knowledge 
codification occurred relatively infrequently. The shipyard’s engineering department preferred 
that production personnel built according to the drawings, something which was also 
communicated by engineering. The only things that were ‘drawn-as-built’ were drawings 
which had not been worked out in detail because of time or money constraints. This had the 
consequence that the shipyard spent only little time in codification activities. On the side of 
the carpenter, more time was spent on the updating of drawings. The carpenter’s production 
supervisor explained that he benefitted from these codification activities while working on 
ZeroTwo. Importantly, he expressed this was efficient because for them many compartments 
were the same. In line with this, the shipyard’s project manager told that codification in the 
form of updated drawings was only effective once subsequent vessels were more or less the 
same. This suggests that the effectiveness of codification increases to the extent that 
subsequent TOs are similar in terms of the characteristics of the task. A schematic overview 
of the central findings can be found in the figure on the next page, which will be further 



















4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Our findings suggest several theoretical contributions. First, we contribute to the ongoing 
learning debate by suggesting two major conditions under which cross-TO learning fails or 
succeeds: locus of change responsibility in combination with alignment of change incentives. 
When taking into account these conditions, we can reconsider what has been labeled the 
learning paradox (Bakker et al., 2011b). This paradox accentuates the dispersion of 
knowledge when TOs come to an end and participants disband. It considers limited duration 
and subsequent time pressure as the most important barriers to cross-TO learning. But limited 
duration is less relevant for learning when the same organizations and individuals are 
involved across TOs, because knowledge does not disperse. These shadows of the past and 
future open up the possibility of effective experience accumulation so that any negative effect 
of TOs’ limited duration is mitigated (Larsson et al., 1998; Makhija & Ganesh, 1997; Swan et 
Locus of change 
responsibility 








Alignment of  
change incentives 





al., 2010). Experience accumulation also tackles the possible problem of lack of absorptive 
capacity of participants (Tsai, 2001) and decreases the time needed to search for relevant 
information (Bartsch et al., 2013). Therefore we suggest a reconceptualization of the learning 
paradox: the involvement of multiple organizations provides ample (cognitive) learning 
opportunities, but the same multi-party involvement decreases the probability that actual 
(behavioral) learning will occur when participants have unaligned change incentives (Medlin, 
2006), even if across TOs the same organizations and individuals are involved. In addition, 
our findings imply that unaligned change incentives do not only apply to interorganizational 
levels of analysis, but also to intraorganizational levels. The interorganizational learning 
literature points mainly at the problem of having to integrate the needs of the various 
organizations, but bringing together the needs of various internal departments within one 
organization can be equally troublesome. 
Second, we extend the notion of incentive alignment to the area of cross-TO learning. 
Literature on multi-organizational collaboration addresses the complexity of having multiple 
organizations involved which can have different incentives (e.g. Medlin, 2006; Sommer & 
Loch, 2004). In intraorganizational settings, incentive alignment is described as the extent to 
which individuals are motivated to behave in line with organizational goals (Gottschalg & 
Zollo, 2007). Literature on alignment of incentives in the context of interorganizational 
collaboration that we have come across does not specifically focus on learning across TOs. 
For instance, in the context of buyer-supplier relations incentive alignment has been described 
as the extent to which parties share costs, risks, and benefits (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). 
Incentive alignment is considered to increase the chance that organizations or individuals 
focus not solely on pursuing their own interests but also consider the interests of others 
(Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). It is portrayed as an important condition for the transfer of 
knowledge between organizations, for the prevention of opportunism, and for realizing 
competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998: Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000, Tosi, Katz, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1997). Complementing these ideas, we show that incentive alignment not only 
facilitates cognitive learning in the form of knowledge sharing, but also actual change across 
TOs, or behavioral learning. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on organizational ability and willingness. Ability and 
willingness have been identified as major predictors of knowledge sharing between 
organizations (e.g., Reagans & McEvily, 2003), but to a much lesser extent as predictors of 
actual cross-TO learning. Locus of change responsibility refers to an actor’s ability to 
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implement changes. Ability is often connoted with cognitive aspects, for example in terms of 
absorptive capacity (Tsai, 2001). We show that ability also relates to a different, behavioral 
type of ability. Alignment of change incentives influences an actor’s willingness to bring 
about change. The identification of willingness as an important enabler to cross-TO learning 
suggests a need to consider motivational aspects of temporary interorganizational 
collaboration (cf. Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007). 
Theoretically we can explore four scenarios based on the extent to which the two identified 
conditions are present. We propose that the probability of cross-TO learning differs per 
scenario (see Table 4.5). First we discuss the two scenarios in which there is an internal 
change responsibility. This means that the actor who experiences the problems – who 
cognitively learns something during one TO – can independently tackle these problems and 
implement what he has learned during subsequent TOs. Because there is an internal change 
responsibility, the actor is able to implement the change, making the willingness of others to 
implement the change less relevant. Still there can be a difference in the extent to which other 
TO participants agree or disagree with the implemented change, or the extent to which they 
are positively or negatively affected by it. In Scenario 1, change incentives are aligned, 
meaning that other parties are not negatively affected by the implementation. In Scenario 2, 
these incentives are not aligned. We assume that TO participants because of their 
interdependence will not solely pursue self-interests but also act to achieve the common goal. 
Based on this assumption, we propose that in the first scenario (internal change responsibility 
in combination with aligned change incentives) the probability of cross-TO learning is higher 
than in the second scenario (internal change responsibility in combination with unaligned 
change incentives). 
In contrast, TO participants can face an external change responsibility. Here, TO participants 
are dependent on others to implement what they have learned during previous TOs. In the 
case of external change responsibility, alignment of change incentives becomes more 
important than in the first two scenarios. These incentives can be aligned (Scenario 3) or 
misaligned (Scenario 4). When the change incentives of the internal and external actors are 
aligned, for the most part the change objectives and intentions are similar. This increases the 
probability that change will be implemented because both parties share a willingness to 
change. Still, we believe that the probability on cross-TO learning in this scenario is slightly 
lower than in the first scenario because of the necessary involvement of an external actor 
which can lead to among others coordination problems. At the same time we believe the 
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probability to be higher than in the second scenario. That is because we believe that the 
alignment of change incentives is more important in enabling cross-TO learning than whether 
there is an internal or an external change responsibility. In the fourth scenario, change 
incentives of the two different types of actors are not or only weakly aligned. Here, the 
probability of implementation of what has been learned previously will be lowest in 
comparison to the other three scenarios. After all, actors are dependent on others to implement 
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As final theoretical contribution we suggest rethinking the importance of experience 
accumulation for cross-TO learning. In line with other research, we show that experience 
accumulation is a, if not the most, dominant mechanism for the implementation of changes 
(Bartsch et al., 2013; Swan et al., 2010). This means that having the same organizations and 
individuals involved across TOs facilitates cross-TO learning. However, there is also a dark 
side to reliance on the same actors (Uzzi, 1997), which becomes visible when actors 
repeatedly fail to implement desired changes across TOs. As actors experience time after time 
that these desired changes are not implemented, they can arrive at a point where they no 
longer search for improvements, but accept the situation as is: 
“We know upfront that when we start a vessel with subcontractor X, materials will be late 
which will frustrate the process. And we know that we will have battles, and that the 
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executives have to come in to settle the conflict. But we have to put up with it, because on a 
next vessel they will be selected again anyhow.” [Project management assistant Shipyard] 
The above is an example of a situation where, despite cognitive learning, actors no longer 
search for opportunities to implement what they have learned but instead accept the situation 
as is. We believe this ‘learning resignation’ is a consequence of the repeated experiencing of 
failure to implement change. Thus, on the one hand experience accumulation can be an 
important mechanism to facilitate cross-TO learning. But it can also frustrate cross-TO 
learning, which will occur especially when TO participants repeatedly face external change 
responsibility in combination with unaligned change incentives. 
Following the theoretical implications, the most evident practical implication is that 
organizations participating in TOs should try to align their change incentives. That is also 
because in a multi-organizational context, the implementation of changes often is dependent 
on multiple actors, meaning that an external change responsibility will be more frequently 
present than an internal change responsibility. Incentives can be aligned formally, for instance 
by the use of equity arrangements (Kogut, 1988). However, it is stressed in the literature that 
it can be also effective to rely on personal trust or reputation mechanisms (Uzzi, 1997). Lead 
organizations – being in the position to select their partners – therefore seem to do wise to rely 
on the same set of partner organizations. This opens up the possibility of the transfer of 
valuable, tacit experiences across TOs so that knowledge is unlikely to dissipate. As a 
consequence, this increases the probability that changes across TOs are actually implemented. 
However, a possible downside of this strategy could be that partner organizations put less 
effort in being an optimal collaboration partner when they know they will be selected on 
upcoming projects anyhow. Similarly, partner organizations – who are no lead organizations – 
may wonder if they want to take assignments from the same lead organization over and over 
again. This makes them highly dependent on one or a few lead organizations and may result 
in continuous suboptimal collaboration, especially when the change incentives of partners are 
and remain diverging. 
There are a number of limitations to this study which may be addressed in future research. Of 
course, the generalizability of the results is limited. We study the specific context of 
shipbuilding and that of yachting vessels. Yet we expect the findings to apply to similar 
project-based industries like construction. In construction too, a lead organization and several 
subcontractors act together to produce a tangible product in a limited amount of time, and 
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learning is not the main objective. It would be interesting to address in future research 
whether our findings also apply to settings which are non-temporary, learning-driven, which 
produce intangible services and/or which are comprised of only two instead of three or more 
organizations. Generalizability is further limited because our one-case examination (we 
consider ZeroOne and ZeroTwo to be one case of cross-TO learning) does not allow for cross-
case comparison. The majority of participants were involved in both ZeroOne and ZeroTwo, 
making it difficult to disentangle a possible effect of varying configuration of individuals (i.e., 
not having the same participants across the two projects). Future research could 
simultaneously examine and compare multiple cases in order to make stronger claims about 
the factors that facilitate or hamper cross-TO learning. 
Another limitation concerns the possibility of interpretation bias on the side of the researchers 
concerning the results from the observations and interviews. Both data collection methods run 
the risk that the interpretation of what is heard or observed does not adequately reflect the 
perceptions and interpretations of the project participants. We have tried to overcome this 
problem by triangulation of the data and results and by discussing our findings with the 
respondents. Then there is a possible recall bias on the side of the respondents, where they 
could be more willing to share success stories and hide their failures. However, as the results 
show, also learning failures have been expressed and identified, suggesting that this bias 
probably is limited. 
Content-wise a limitation is that the learning mechanisms are not equally represented in the 
analysis. The participants predominantly engaged in experience accumulation and knowledge 
articulation, while knowledge codification activities were limited. This makes it difficult to 
say something about under which conditions codification can facilitate cross-TO learning. 
Zollo and Winter (2002) argue that the effectiveness of codification gets higher as the 
heterogeneity or uniqueness of the task increases. However, we think this largely depends on 
the type of knowledge that is codified. In the TOs under study, codification in terms of the 
updating of technical drawings was very limited, because ZeroTwo differed significantly from 
ZeroOne. So, contrary to Zollo & Winter’s argument, we can make the case that task 
uniqueness lowers the value of knowledge codification. Future research could explicitly 
address the conditions that make codification effective, which may be different than locus of 
change responsibility and alignment of change incentives, and also which may be dependent 
on the type of knowledge codified. 
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Finally, we look at learning from the perspective of problem-based learning: TO participants 
experience problems and discuss them during one TO, which then can or cannot result in the 
implementation of solutions to these problems in a subsequent TO. This reflects 
predominantly learning-by-doing and learning-by-discussion, but there are other types of 
learning as well like learning-by-absorption, or superstitious learning (Levinthal & March, 
1993; Zollo, 2009). Future research may address other learning perspectives when defining 
and identifying learning across TOs to see if the identified conditions of this study still hold. 
In conclusion, this study set out to enrich the (inter)organizational learning literature in the 
context of temporary organizing. Our exploration of the conditions under which learning 
across TOs fails or succeeds, gives us a better view of TO amnesia, organizations seeming 
inability to implement change across TOs. It turns out that the failure to implement change 
across TOs is not a matter of amnesia. After all, TO participants do not ‘forget’ what they 
have learned during previous TOs, either via experience accumulation, knowledge 
articulation, or knowledge codification. They know what needs to be changed to come to 
improvements, but they are not in the position to make these changes (external change 
responsibility), while the ones who are in this position do not have the willingness to change 
(unaligned change incentives). All this underlines the difficulty and complexity of learning 
across TOs in which multiple organizations and individuals are involved, which therefore 




5. Disentangling interorganizational and interpersonal ties and their effect on 
coordination and safeguarding: A theoretical exploration 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The temporary involvement of multiple organizations creates challenges with regard to 
coordination and opportunism, due to among others managerial complexity and the possibility 
of self-interest seeking organizations (Glückler & Armbrüster, 2003; Jones et al., 1997; 
Medlin, 2006). To deal with these challenges organizations can strive for repeated 
collaboration with the same partners (Jones et al., 1997). There is consensus in the literature 
that prior ties (i.e., shadows of the past) and expected future ties (i.e., shadows of the future) 
facilitate coordination and prevent opportunism in a current TO (Eccles, 1981; Grabher, 
2002b; Parkhe, 1993). However, this literature largely ignores the distinction between ties 
between organizations on the one hand and ties between individuals (as members of these 
organizations) on the other hand (Schilke & Cook, 2013; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). 
This is problematic to the extent that interorganizational and interpersonal ties are different 
(Rousseau, 1985) and therefore vary in their effects on coordination and opportunism. For 
example, it can be argued that when a group of individuals has a history of collaboration but 
the organizations they represent have not, coordination is influenced in a different way or to a 
different degree than when these individuals have not collaborated before but the represented 
organizations have. Still, our knowledge on this matter is limited. How combinations of 
interorganizational and interpersonal ties play out in temporary interorganizational 
collaboration still remains an open question (Barden & Mitchell, 2007). This theoretical 
chapter addresses this question by systematically disentangling the effects of prior and future 
ties at the interorganizational and interpersonal level on coordination and opportunism in a 
current TO. 
By taking into account interorganizational and interpersonal levels of analysis simultaneously 
we contribute to the TO literature by providing a more comprehensive view of the complexity 
of interorganizational collaboration (Hitt et al., 2007; Klein, Tosi, & Cannella, 1999; Schilke 
& Cook, 2013). We do this by adding a temporal dimension to the debate on the difference 
between interorganizational and interpersonal ties. Specifically, we propose that when it 
comes to enhancing coordination in a current TO, interpersonal prior ties are more influential 
than interorganizational prior ties. When it comes to preventing opportunism in a current TO 
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however, we propose that interorganizational future ties have a more decisive effect than 
interpersonal future ties. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First we elaborate on the temporariness of TOs, making 
the case that TOs also have features that transcend their temporariness, for example in the 
form of shadows of the past and future. Next, we discuss the coordination and opportunism 
challenges in TOs, and how shadows of the past and future can deal with these challenges. 
Then we show the shortcomings of current literature in disentangling interorganizational and 
interpersonal prior and future ties and their effects on coordination and opportunism. In trying 
to overcome these shortcomings we propose definitions for interorganizational and 
interpersonal prior and future ties. Based on these definitions, we develop a typology of 
temporary organizations based on the presence or absence of interorganizational and 
interpersonal ties and discuss the implications for coordination and opportunism in each TO 
type. 
5.2 Temporary and permanent features of temporary organizations 
In temporary organizations, the duration of collaboration is “explicitly and ex ante fixed either 
by a specific date or by the accomplishment of a predefined task or condition” (Janowicz-
Panjaitan et al., p. 2). This temporary nature is a unique feature that sets TOs apart from more 
commonly researched interorganizational collaboration types such as joint ventures or 
alliances, which are ‘built to last’ (Greve et al., 2010). TOs are fixed in time by a given 
starting point, which decouples the TO from past activities (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). This 
is the so-called left-bracket of TOs. TOs also have a right-bracket as they have no future 
beyond their ex ante specified ending point (Bakker & Janowicz-Panjaitan, 2009). The 
activities in TOs take place between these temporal limits (Sydow & Staber, 2002). 
However, TO participants often collaborate repeatedly with the same partners (Jones & 
Lichtenstein, 2008; Skilton & Dooley, 2010). In industries like architecture and construction 
repeated collaboration is the norm instead of the exception (Eccles, 1981; Levering et al., 
2013). When organizations collaborate repeatedly with the same partners, relations become 
socially embedded and transaction costs are lowered (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Granovetter, 1985). 
These relationships form what have been called latent networks: “forms of organization that 
bind together configurations of key actors in ongoing relationships that become 
active/manifest as and when new projects [or TOs] demand” (Starkey et al., 2000, p. 299). In 
the context of TOs, repeated collaboration consists of two elements: participants may have 
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collaborated before in previous TOs and they may expect to work together again in future 
TOs. Prior ties between TO participants indicate social embeddedness, i.e. a shadow of the 
past (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Poppo et al., 2008). Expectations of future interaction 
suggest a shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984), which has also been referred to as long-term 
orientation or the extendedness of relations (Ganesan, 1994; Poppo et al., 2008; Rokkan, 
Heide, & Wathne, 2003). Recurring relations among TO participants run counter to the ideal-
typical view that temporary organizations are one-off, unique and discontinuous (Edmondson 
& Nembhard, 2009; Gann & Salter, 2000; Prencipe & Tell, 2001) and that TO participants 
only “cope with immediate demands and simultaneously forget the past and neglect plans for 
the future” (Miles, 1964, p. 130). Instead, by taking into account shadows of the past and 
future, temporary collaboration is building on a more permanent set of relationships, which 
might have implications for the behavior of TO participants. 
5.3 Coordination and opportunism challenges in temporary organizations 
The coordination and opportunism challenges in TOs stem from the temporary involvement 
of multiple, legally independent but functionally interdependent organizations (Sydow & 
Staber, 2002). The coordination challenge concerns the integration of complex, 
interdependent tasks executed by a group of specialists (Alter, 1990; Jones et al., 1997). These 
specialists are dependent on each other because they are simultaneously involved in the 
project and often one cannot proceed until others are finished (Eccles, 1981). Next to this 
sequential interdependence, there can be reciprocal interdependence, meaning that 
participants need to interact on a continuous basis, receiving input from and providing output 
to each other, to accomplish their tasks (Thompson, 1967). Due to the interdependent nature 
of jointly producing products and services, multi-party involvement creates managerial 
complexity as well as uncertainty (Glückler & Armbrüster, 2003; Parkhe, 1993). The 
challenge of opportunism basically refers to balancing private and collective interests 
(Medlin, 2006), and to dealing with the possibility of working with others who are seeking 
self-interest with guile by engaging in or refraining from particular actions (Medlin, 2006; 
Wathne & Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1979). This possibility of participants engaging in free-
riding and engaging in behaviors at the expense of others further increases the complexity of 
interorganizational temporary collaboration (Das & Teng, 2002; Kogut, 1988; Provan, 1993; 
Santoro & McGill, 2005). Next to the involvement of multiple organizations, the temporary 
nature of TOs can have consequences for coordination and opportunism (Raab et al., 2009; 
Turner & Müller, 2003). Limited TO duration may for example hinder the stabilization of 
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social interaction, thereby increasing the need for coordination efforts (Raab et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, limited duration can imply that TO participants will not collaborate in the future, 
thereby increasing the rewards of – and thus the chance on – opportunism in the present 
(Turner & Müller, 2003). 
Dealing with the challenges of coordination and opportunism is necessary to ensure that 
participants engage in collective and mutually supportive action, that conflicts are addressed, 
and resources are acquired and utilized efficiently (Mayer, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008; 
Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Working relationships in TOs are initially structured by means of 
formal contracts (Sobrero & Schrader, 1998; Weber & Mayer, 2011). Formal contracts 
specify organizations’ promises and obligations to perform particular actions in the future 
(Macneil, 1980) and contain procedures for monitoring and conflict resolution (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). Through these properties, contracts can facilitate coordination and function as 
a safeguarding instrument against opportunism. However, the influence of contracts on 
collaboration in TOs is limited, among other things because contracts are always incomplete, 
and because often contracts are used only as a last resort to resolve problems and conflicts 
(Macaulay, 1963). In the light of these shortcomings, it has been argued that coordination and 
opportunism in TOs are predominantly influenced by the recurrence of relations among TO 
participants (Jones et al., 1997). Although TOs are fixed in time by a given starting-point and 
an ex ante defined termination point (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995), relations tend to recur and 
endure across TOs (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Recurring relations can take the form of 
prior collaboration or expectations of future interaction, creating shadows of the past and 
future (Poppo et al., (2008). A vast amount of empirical research shows that as TO 
participants repeatedly work together they come to know and understand each other’s roles, 
procedures, and preferences, which smoothens coordination (Eccles, 1981; Grabher, 2002b; 
Gulati, 1995; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Pisano, Russo, & Teece, 1988; Reuer & Ariño, 
2007; Sydow & Staber, 2002; Uzzi, 1997). Repeated ties between TO participants also allow 
for the development of communication methods and other routines for working together more 
effectively (Bryman et al., 1987). In addition, when TO participants expect to collaborate 
repeatedly in the foreseeable future they are more inclined to refrain from opportunism than 
when these expectations are absent (Jones et al., 1997). Ongoing relationships generate a 
sense of obligation between TO participants which motivates them to behave in a trustworthy 
manner (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). Thus, shadows of the past and future among TO 
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participants ease coordination and help preventing opportunism (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; 
Skilton & Dooley, 2010). 
Despite their valuable contributions, previous studies on recurring ties and their effect on 
coordination and opportunism largely overlook the distinction between ties between 
organizations on the one hand and ties between individuals on the other hand (for exceptions, 
see Barden & Mitchell, 2007; Schilke & Cook, 2013; Zaheer et al., 1998). By ignoring the 
difference between interorganizational and interpersonal ties, these studies do not fully take 
into account the complex, multi-level nature of interorganizational collaboration. 
5.4 A closer examination of the literature on repeated ties 
In the following we demonstrate these shortcomings by a closer examination of the literature 
on repeated collaboration in an attempt to identify coordination-enhancing and opportunism-
preventing mechanisms at interorganizational and interpersonal levels of analysis (for a 
schematic overview, see Table 5.1).  
Interorganizational prior ties are argued to lead to shared understandings among organizations 
(Grabher, 2002b) as organizations become aware of each other’s procedures and preferences. 
For example, organizations come to know about partners’ operating procedures, technical 
skills, and managerial philosophies (Pisano et al., 1988). Also, through repeated collaboration 
organizations learn to work together as they develop communication protocols and other 
collaboration routines (Bryman et al., 1987; Eccles, 1981). This development of shared 
understandings and collaboration routines facilitates coordination (Grabher, 2002b; Pisano et 
al., 1988). Furthermore, prior collaboration facilitates the development of interorganizational 
trust, which in turn lowers the chance that organizations act opportunistically (Gulati, 1995). 
When two organizations also repeatedly collaborate with the same third parties over time, 
relations are not only relationally but also structurally embedded (Jones & Lichtenstein, 
2008). This paves the way for the development of a macro culture, which is an accumulation 
of common values, norms and beliefs among multiple organizations (Jones et al., 1997). Such 
a macro culture enhances not only coordination but also prevents opportunism because of 
reputation effects (Das & Teng, 2002; Jones et al., 1997). In sum, interorganizational prior 
ties enhance coordination through familiarity, the development of collaboration routines, and 
– if relations are not only relationally but also socially embedded – the development of a 
macro culture. Interorganizational prior ties further lower the chance on opportunism through 
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the development of interorganizational trust and also through the development of a macro 
culture. 
The literature on interpersonal prior ties seems to rest on similar arguments. Through prior 
interpersonal collaboration individuals share ideas across organizations and get familiar with 
each other, both of which facilitate coordination (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). Prior 
interpersonal ties further facilitate coordination by increasing the willingness of individuals to 
share sensitive information (Zaheer et al., 1998). Next to its effect on coordination, repeated 
interpersonal collaboration lowers the chance on opportunism. Interpersonal prior ties tend to 
result in a trusting relationship between individuals (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). 
Interpersonal trust facilitates problem solving, courtesy and consideration (Currall & Judge, 
1995; Williamson, 1975). It reduces the intensity of rivalry and instead promotes collective 
action (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). All this makes it less likely that parties seek narrow 
advantage. Thus, interpersonal prior ties facilitate coordination through information sharing 
and familiarity. Interpersonal prior ties also make opportunism less likely through the 
development of interpersonal trust and because individuals are more inclined to take into 
account each other’s interests. 
Scholars ascribe more or less the same effects to prior interorganizational and prior 
interpersonal ties, like familiarity and trust development. That suggests, in line with our 
earlier comments, that the distinction between interorganizational and interpersonal ties is 
difficult to make. This difficulty seems a consequence of the inherently multilevel nature of 
interorganizational relationships (Brass et al., 2004): TO participants are individuals 
representing organizations (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Barden and Mitchell (2007) 
note that scholars “have either constrained analyses to the interorganizational level without 
considering the roles of interpersonal ties (e.g., Gulati, 1995) or relied heavily on data 
provided by organizational leaders in a context in which individual-level and organization-
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Also, while theorizing on the effects of interorganizational ties scholars often take the effects 
of interpersonal ties as point of departure. This leads to confusion and conflation (Barden & 
Mitchell, 2007). For example, the often-cited article by Gulati (1995) stresses that familiarity 
among exchange partners leads to trust in each other. Based on this premise and explicitly 
referring to the article, some scholars put forward that interpersonal prior ties lead to trust 
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(e.g., Petruzelli, 2011), while others claim that the development of trust comes from 
interorganizational prior ties (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998). Thus, when it comes to theorizing 
on the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal prior ties on coordination and 
opportunism, there is ample room for improvement. 
This room for improvement also applies to theorizing on interorganizational and interpersonal 
future ties. While prior ties have an influence on both coordination and opportunism, it seems 
that expectations of future interaction only influence opportunism. The expectation of future 
collaboration can induce TO participants to develop coordination routines, but the expectation 
of future ties in itself cannot enhance coordination of current interdependent tasks. In 
theorizing on the effects of future ties on opportunism, scholars rarely attempt to disentangle 
the interorganizational and the interpersonal level. Similar to theorizing on the effects of prior 
ties, scholars take the expectations of individuals as the point of departure, and extend these 
ideas to the level of organizations. Still, there seems to be consensus in the literature that the 
expectation to work together in the future lowers the chance on opportunism in the present 
(Axelrod, 1984; Parkhe, 1993; Telser, 1980). Future collaboration allows for reciprocal 
behavior: once future collaboration is expected, opportunism is a less attractive option 
because the damaged actor can ‘return the favor’. The ongoing interaction allows for 
rewarding and punishing each other’s behavior (Parkhe, 1993; Rokkan et al., 2003). Next to 
direct reciprocity, in a TO context – where multiple organizations collaborate – there is also 
generalized reciprocity (Das & Teng, 2002). This means that experiences are shared among 
multiple organizations, which in turn has an important influence on the reputation of these 
organizations (Eccles, 1981; Provan, 1993). To the extent that organizations care for their 
reputation, they will be eager not to be perceived as opportunistically, and take a collaborative 
stance. Thus, expectations of future ties lower the chance on opportunism through the 
mechanisms of reciprocity and reputation. 
This short review of the literature on repeated collaboration might induce one to propose that 
there are no differences between interorganizational and interpersonal ties. However, we 
argue that this is not the case. The differences can best be illustrated by an example. Consider 
a current TO in which a focal group of individuals (representing different organizations) are 
working together to accomplish a task. This focal group shares no history of collaboration, but 
the organizations the group represents do. In this case, there are no interpersonal prior ties 
among the focal group, but there are interorganizational prior ties. These interorganizational 
prior ties in fact represent interpersonal prior ties other than those of the focal group. 
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Following this example, we define interorganizational prior ties as the collective of prior 
collaborative relations among the organizations which the individuals in the focal group 
represent, excluding the relations between the individuals in the focal group themselves (cf. 
Barden & Mitchell, 2007). Thus, in our perspective, these interorganizational prior ties are 
interpersonal relations between members of the collaboration organizations who are not 
members of the focal group. Furthermore, we define interpersonal prior ties as the collective 
of prior relations among the focal group in a current TO. 
We apply the same principle to defining interorganizational and interpersonal future ties. 
Consider a current TO in which a focal group of individuals (representing different 
organizations) are collaborating with each other to accomplish the objectives of the TO. This 
focal group shares no expectations of future interaction with each other, but they do expect 
their organizations to collaborate in the future. In this case, there are no expected 
interpersonal ties, but there are expectations of interorganizational future collaboration. In line 
with this example, we define interorganizational future ties as the expectations of the 
individuals in the focal group that the organizations they represent will collaborate with each 
other in the future, but that they will not necessarily collaborate with the same individuals in 
the focal group. We define interpersonal future ties as the expectation of the individuals in the 
focal group to collaborate with each other in the future. Based on these definitions, in the next 
section we develop a typology of temporary organizations based on the presence or absence 
of interorganizational and interpersonal ties. 
5.5 A tie-based typology of temporary organizations 
To keep complexity within bounds we discuss one typology of TOs based on prior ties and 
another typology of TOs based on future ties.
13
 This choice is further motivated by our 
assumption that prior ties predominantly influence coordination while future ties 
predominantly have an effect on opportunism. Table 5.1 suggests that future ties do not 
influence coordination in a current TO. Expected future collaboration could inspire TO 
participants to develop coordination routines which then can be put to use in the future. But 
the expectation to work together in the future in itself cannot enhance coordination of current 
interdependent tasks. This suggests that with regard to improving coordination, prior ties are 
probably more influential than future ties. With regard to preventing opportunism, the 
                                                   
13
 One typology based on prior and future ties at interorganizational and interpersonal levels would 
comprise no less than sixteen different TO types.  
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demarcation is more arbitrary because both prior and future ties may affect opportunism. 
However, recently it was suggested that future ties are more important for the development of 
trust than prior ties (Poppo et al., 2008). That is because prior ties promote interorganizational 
stability as parties develop collaboration routines, which in turn increases expectations of 
continuity. Since trustworthy behavior can be considered the opposite of opportunism (Sako 
& Helper, 1998), we argue that future ties are more important for the prevention of 
opportunism than are prior ties. 
Furthermore, in each typology we discuss a different type of focal group based on the type of 
boundary spanners involved. Interorganizational relationships in TOs are actively managed 
and dealt with by individual boundary spanners (Katz & Kahn, 1966). We can distinguish 
between corporate-level boundary spanners and operational-level boundary spanners 
(Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009). Operational-level boundary spanners have close 
and intense interaction with their organizational counterparts. The coordination of interrelated 
tasks therefore seems especially relevant at an operational level. Because of this, we discuss 
the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal prior ties on coordination at the level of the 
operational boundary spanners. These operational-level boundary spanners do not decide on 
possible future collaboration. That task is dealt with by corporate-level boundary spanners. As 
corporate-level boundary spanners decide on future collaboration, they are probably more 
affected by expectations of future interaction than operational-level boundary spanners. 
Because of this, we discuss the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal future ties on 
opportunism at the level of the strategic boundary spanners. Another important reason for this 
demarcation is that we – as we will discuss – argue that the relative importance of 
interorganizational and interpersonal ties varies with the type of boundary spanners 
considered.  
First we develop a typology of TOs based on the presence of interorganizational and 
interpersonal prior ties (for a schematic overview, see Figure 5.1). This typology enables us to 
further explore the differences between the individual and organizational level of analysis. We 
explore four ideal-typical TOs. In each TO type we are interested in the ease with which the 
focal group (consisting of operational-level boundary spanners) coordinates its activities. This 
exploration provides possible answers to some important theoretical questions. For example, 
when will coordination be easier: when the focal group shares no history of collaboration but 
the organizations they represent do, or when the opposite is true? And how easy or difficult is 
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In temporary organization type I, the focal group has collaborated with each other before, and 
so have the organizations represented by the focal group. That is, the focal group is linked 
through interpersonal prior ties, in addition to the presence of interorganizational prior ties. 
Situations like this are likely to occur in relatively small professional communities where 
there is little room to switch among TO partners, and where the organizations are relatively 
small in size. That makes it likely that when organizations repeatedly collaborate, also the 
same individuals are involved. Based on the earlier identified mechanisms, the presence of 
interorganizational and interpersonal prior ties will improve coordination for the focal group 
in a number of ways. The individuals in the focal group are likely to have developed trust 
relationships, which in turn should have led to information sharing and the development of 
collaboration routines. The interorganizational prior ties can create a macro culture which 
further facilitates coordination. We expect the mechanisms activated by the 
interorganizational and interpersonal prior ties to reinforce each other, so that coordination in 
this combination is most effective compared to the other three TO types. 
Type II 
While type I TOs are one extreme in the sense that both the focal group and the organizations 
they represent share a history of collaboration, type II TOs represent the other extreme. In this 
TO type, neither the individuals in the focal group nor the represented organizations share a 
history of collaboration. This situation would represent one side of the ideal-typical TO, 
where there are hardly any shadows of the past (Goodman & Goodman, 1976; Miles, 1964). It 
would occur when organizations – in a search for the creation and transfer of new knowledge 
(Dodgson, 1993), the employment of innovative activities, or after dissatisfaction with 
previous partners – turn to organizations they have not collaborated with before. In this 
situation it is likely that the individuals also share no history of collaboration. In this TO type 
the focal group has not had the chance to develop specific collaboration routines. Also, there 
are no interorganizational collaboration routines developed by others so they cannot rely on 
them either. The only basis for coordination is formed by the prior experiences of each 
individual member of the focal group with collaboration with other organizations and 
individuals. Because of this, coordination in this TO type is expected to be least effective 




Type III and type IV 
We discuss type-III and type-IV TOs simultaneously because they can be considered 
opposites. In type III, the individuals in the focal group share a history of collaboration, but 
the organizations they currently represent do not. One could imagine this to happen when 
professionals that carry a certain expertise change repeatedly among employers, and 
collaborate with professionals that follow the same strategy. In type IV, the opposite applies: 
the individuals in the focal group have no collaboration history, but the organizations they 
represent have. This would occur in TOs where the involved organizations are large and have 
many employees. That makes it possible that even when in recurrent TOs the same 
organizations are involved, individuals rarely collaborate with each other repeatedly.  
Both types miss out on certain coordination-enhancing mechanisms, because of the absence of 
either interorganizational prior ties or interpersonal prior ties. In order to assess in which type 
coordination will be more effective, we have to say something about the relative importance 
of interorganizational compared to interpersonal prior ties when it comes to enhancing 
coordination. A consideration of the boundary-spanning roles hints at a direction (Janowicz-
Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009). The coordination of tasks in a TO takes place 
predominantly at the operational level, where the actual working together takes place. It has 
been argued that at this operational level, boundary spanners’ behavior is predominantly 
influenced by personal prior ties (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009). Following this 
line of reasoning, when it comes to enhancing coordination at an operational level, prior 
interpersonal ties will have a bigger effect than prior interorganizational ties. Therefore we 
expect that coordination is more effective in type-III TOs (where the individuals in the focal 
group share a history of collaboration) than in type-IV TOs. 
Next we explore four ideal-typical TOs based on the presence or absence of 
interorganizational and interpersonal future ties (for a schematic overview, see Figure 5.2). In 
each TO type we explore the relative extent to which there is a chance that the individuals in 
the focal group (consisting of strategic boundary spanners) behave opportunistically. This 
exploration also searches for answers to various theoretical questions. For example, how 
likely is it that the focal group behaves opportunistically towards each other when they expect 
no future collaboration with each other, but do expect future encounters with the 
organizations the others represent? And what happens when the situation is reversed, where 
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the focal group expects future collaboration with each other but not with the organizations 
they currently represent? 
Type V 
In type-V TOs, the individuals in the focal group expect to work with each other in the 
foreseeable future. In addition, they expect their organizations to collaborate in the future. 
That is, the focal group is linked through interpersonal future ties as well as 
interorganizational future ties. Similar to type-I TOs, this situation is likely to occur in small 
professional communities, where the chance on repeated collaboration between the same 
organizations and the same individuals is higher. Furthermore we expect the expectation of 
future collaboration to be fueled for a large part by prior interaction: if individuals have 
worked repeatedly with the same set of organizations and individuals before, the chance is 
high that they will expect future collaboration with them as well. The focal group’s 
expectations of future collaboration with each other trigger mechanisms of reciprocity and 
reputation. In other words, they are likely to believe that they will be punished if they behave 
opportunistically, either directly by other individuals in the focal group, or indirectly by 
getting a bad reputation not only in the focal group but outside the group as well. Because this 
shadow of the future plays out on the interpersonal as well as on the interorganizational level, 
we expect the chance that the individuals in the focal group will show opportunism to be 
lowest in comparison to the other three TO types. 
Type VI 
In type VI, the individuals in the focal group expect no future collaboration with each other, 
nor do they expect future collaboration among their organizations. This situation can occur 
when organizations select new partners but find out during collaboration that these new 
partners do not live up to their expectations. When this occurs during collaboration, corporate-
level boundary spanners may already have decided not to continue collaboration in future 
TOs. In this situation concerns for reciprocity or reputation are likely to be absent. Because 
the chance that opportunistic behavior is punished in the future is low, we posit that the 
chance on opportunistic behavior in the focal group is highest in type-VI TOs when compared 































Type VII and Type VIII 
Similar to the first typology, we discuss type VII and type VIII simultaneously. In type VII, 
the individuals in the focal group expect future collaboration with each other (i.e., presence of 
interpersonal future ties), but they do not expect their organizations to do so (i.e., absence of 
interorganizational future ties). While this is an unlikely scenario, it does happen. It is 
possible when professionals swiftly move from one employer to the next. For instance, some 
regions in Italy show these patterns due to intra-regional, inter-firm mobility (Capello, 1999). 
In this scenario, reciprocity and reputation come into play, increasing the chance that the 
individuals in the focal group will refrain from opportunism. The interesting question is 
whether the chance on opportunism in type-VII TOs is higher or lower than in type-VIII TOs. 
In type-VIII, the individuals in the focal group expect no future collaboration with each other 
(i.e., absence of interpersonal future ties), but they do expect future collaboration among their 
organizations (i.e., presence of interorganizational future ties). In contrast to our reasoning 
with respect to coordination, we expect that interorganizational ties are more important in 
preventing opportunism than interpersonal ties. We have two reasons to make this claim. 
First, in a study on interorganizational and interpersonal trust (Zaheer et al., 1998) it was 
found that interorganizational trust is more critical for exchange than trust between the 
individuals who manage the relationship. And second, similarly, it has been argued that at a 
strategic level, personal ties are of less influence on decisions concerning future 
interorganizational collaboration because these decisions are based primarily on rational-
strategic instead of personal grounds (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009). These 
studies suggest that opportunism is more likely to be influenced by expectations of 
interorganizational future ties than by expectations of interpersonal future ties. Thus, in type 
VII, where interorganizational future ties are absent, the individuals in the focal group will be 
more inclined to behave opportunistically than in type VIII. 
5.6 Discussion 
The major theoretical contribution of this chapter lies in our attempt to disentangle 
interorganizational and interpersonal ties and their effect on coordination and opportunism. 
We propose that there are important differences between these ties and that the two levels 
should be regarded both empirically and analytically as distinct constructs (cf. Barden & 
Mitchell, 2007; Rousseau, 1985; Schilke & Cook, 2013; Zaheer et al., 1998). This distinction 
allows us to isolate the effects of prior and future ties on coordination and opportunism at 
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different levels of analysis. Specifically, when it comes to improving coordination we propose 
that prior ties at the individual level exert more influence than prior ties at the organizational 
level. Concerning the prevention of opportunism, we propose that expectations of future ties 
at the organizational level are more important than future ties at the individual level. Our 
proposition that interorganizational and interpersonal ties are qualitatively different from each 
other in combination with the observation that in the literature the two are often considered 
the same or are conflated, suggests that there is important research to do in the area of 
(temporary) interorganizational collaboration. We specifically relate interorganizational and 
interpersonal ties to coordination and opportunism, but to the extent that the differences 
between the two levels are indeed important, our propositions can be extended to other 
aspects of interorganizational collaboration as well. 
Although this chapter is primarily driven by theoretical motives, our theorizing on the effect 
of interorganizational and interpersonal ties on coordination and opportunism in TOs may 
have practical implications as well. For example, to the extent that our ideas regarding 
coordination hold, organizations should try to keep the same operational-level employees tied 
together across TOs. This means that if operational-level employees switch employers, it 
could be wise for organizations to switch accordingly. The importance of repeated 
collaboration between individuals is argued to be less relevant at a strategic level, suggesting 
that organizations can relatively safely change strategic-level boundary spanners without 
running the risk of facing opportunistic partners.  
To illustrate our typologies, we now apply them to the shipbuilding projects discussed in 
chapter three and four of this dissertation. Across these projects for most part the same 
organizations and individuals were involved, signaling the presence of recurring 
interorganizational and interpersonal ties, in the form of prior ties and expectations of future 
interaction. Therefore these projects would be classified as type-I and type-V TOs. As 
suggested, in these TO types coordination should be efficient and participants would refrain 
from opportunism. These predictions seem to coincide with our observations. Project 
participants indicated how relatively easy coordination was because most parties knew each 
other from previous collaboration. In addition to that, it turned out that there were some start-
up problems concerning the coordination of the parties that entered ZeroOne as new parties. 
There were also some problems with the few parties that entered ZeroTwo as new parties as 
they did not have the experience of working together with the others on ZeroOne. This 
strengthens our belief that, at an operational-level, interpersonal prior ties have a considerable, 
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positive influence on coordination. With regard to opportunism, we came across an interesting 
example which showed that indeed the expectations of future interorganizational ties can 
prevent opportunism. On ZeroOne, one of the subcontractors made a loss among others 
because the costs turned out to be much higher than originally budgeted. At the end of the 
project, higher management of the subcontractor sat together with the head of the shipyard’s 
purchasing department, and the shipyard decided to compensate the subcontractor’s loss. 
They did that explicitly because they expected future collaboration with that subcontractor, 
and because they believed that the subcontractor would otherwise in subsequent projects try to 
cover its loss, for example by claiming more rework. In line with our ideas, this example 
suggests that at the organizational level, expectations of future interaction can prevent 
opportunistic partner behavior. 
In trying to find answers to questions like what happens when interorganizational ties are not 
supported by interpersonal ties and vice versa, many more questions have risen. For example, 
what happens when interpersonal collaboration routines developed during prior TOs strongly 
deviate from the collaboration routines in other parts of the organizations? Under which 
conditions do the interpersonal collaboration routines take over characteristics of the other 
routines, and when do they persevere? Future research may explore these questions, which is 
believed to give important insights in the institutionalization of collaboration routines (e.g., 
Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Zaheer et al., 1998), or the development of a 
macroculture (e.g., Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). Also, to reduce complexity we explored 
one typology based on prior ties, and another one based on future ties. However, TO 
participants will simultaneously take into account prior collaboration and expectations of 
future interaction. Future research may address more complex typologies to do more justice to 
the complexity of interorganizational life. Furthermore, our TO typologies constitute a fairly 
static approach in the sense that they do not encompass the experiences gained by the focal 
group during a current TO. One can argue that during collaboration – apart from prior ties and 
expectations of future interaction – behaviors by individuals are also influenced by their 
experiences in that specific TO. It has been argued for instance that during collaboration, 
firsthand experiences of TO participants can outweigh their initial assessments of other 
participants (Schilke & Cook, 2013). Future research then could benefit from taking into 
account multiple time elements, i.e. not only the time before TO initiation and after TO 
termination, but also the period between these two time brackets.  
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The ideas developed in this chapter call for empirical investigation. Although empirical 
examination of the proposed ideas will be quite a challenge, we believe the pay-off can be 
substantially. It can provide new theoretical insights in the area of temporary 
interorganizational collaboration, and it can provide company executives with interesting new 








6. Conclusion and discussion 
 
6.1 General conclusion 
This dissertation set out to explore collaboration practices in and across interorganizational 
temporary organizations (TOs) and to contribute to the isolation-embeddedness discussion in 
the TO literature. In this final chapter we answer the research questions formulated in Chapter 
1 and discuss our contributions. The overall research question was fairly broad: 
Which factors are critical to our understanding of collaboration practices in and across 
interorganizational temporary organizations? 
To answer this question we first formulate answers to the related sub-questions addressed in 
the empirical chapters. These questions were: 
 Which factors explain collaboration inertia in a TO-based industry over time? 
 Which factors explain (in)flexibility in social interaction in TOs? 
 Why does learning across two specific, subsequent TOs fail or succeed? 
With regard to the first sub-question, we have shown that history plays an important role in 
explaining collaboration inertia through mechanisms of path dependency. Over time, 
collaboration practices are produced and reproduced, creating a situation in which these 
practices become taken for granted by the collaboration actors. Concerning the second sub-
question, we have shown that next to a present-time orientation, which in this context means 
TO participants’ focus on the time remaining until TO termination, the past and future 
influence flexibility and inflexibility in TOs. The past reflects prior collaboration between TO 
participants, while the future is reflected in terms of a shadow of expected future interactions. 
Regarding the third sub-question, we have shown that learning failures occur when TO 
participants face external change responsibility in combination with unaligned change 
incentives. Learning successes are likely to take place when TO participants have internal 
change responsibility, or when in the case of external learning responsibility, change 
incentives are aligned. 
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These answers build up to an answer to the overall research question, resulting in the general 
conclusion of this dissertation: time and the alignment of change incentives are critical 
factors in explaining collaboration practices in and across temporary organizations. 
We posit that aspects of time are central factors in explaining the functioning and the 
outcomes of TOs but not exactly in the way one would expect on the basis of the TO 
literature. This literature emphasizes the importance of TOs’ ex ante defined termination point 
in determining behavior of its participants. It stresses that the impending termination of TOs 
makes participants oriented towards the time remaining for task completion until TO 
termination. Consequently TO participants would develop a strong focus on the task at hand, 
without thinking much of what happened before TO initiation or about the period after TO 
termination. It also puts forward however that this present-time orientation inclines 
participants to pursue self-interests at the cost of the overall TO interest. The impending 
termination of TOs can thus facilitate or hamper effective collaboration and joint goal 
accomplishment. In Chapter 3 we find support for the collaboration-enhancing argument that 
due to TOs’ impending termination TO participants develop a focus on the task at hand. But, 
based on our findings, we do conclude that the effect of the ex-ante defined termination point 
is mitigated by shadows of the past and future. First, a shadow of the past is an important 
predictor of the present-time behavior of TO participants. This may not be surprising since 
generally people are creatures of habit. They behave according to how they are used to 
behave. In the multi-organizational context of TOs a shadow of the past can lead to a 
collaboration culture that is very difficult to alter. That at least partially explains why 
collaboration in the Dutch shipbuilding industry is characterized as suboptimal. Shipyards and 
subcontractors are used to a certain way of working, which they more or less automatically 
adhere to (see Chapter 3) even when collaboration demands have changed over time, making 
their practices less efficient (see Chapter 2). Second, a shadow of the future also influences 
the current behavior of TO participants. A shadow of the future restricts the range of possible 
behaviors. The expectation and/or willingness to work together with the same organizations 
and individuals inclines TO participants more strongly to take into account the interests of 
others beyond their self-interests. This is reflected for example in flexible behavior during the 
execution of shipbuilding projects (see Chapter 3), and could explain why we found no 
evidence for the possible negative effect of TOs’ impending termination on collaboration. 
Thus, by working together time after time, shadows of the past can mitigate the possible 
influence of TOs’ ex ante defined termination on end-game behavior by the transfer of 
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collaborative behaviors from one temporary organization to another. Shadows of the future 
can mitigate this influence by lowering the incentives to behave opportunistically (see also 
Chapter 5). 
Apart from the importance of shadows of the past and future we need to take into account 
another major factor for explaining the functioning and outcomes of TOs, which is not related 
to time. Especially with regard to learning across TOs – or preventing that ineffective 
practices occur time after time – alignment of change incentives of TO participants seems to 
be critical (see Chapter 4). The involvement of multiple, legally independent but functionally 
interdependent organizations creates some level of conflicting interests, of which change 
incentives are but one example. Current TO literature acknowledges the difficulty of aligning 
incentives. What we show is that this condition can play a dominant role in the functioning of 
TOs, making them less effective than when incentives would be aligned. 
6.2 Theoretical implications 
The central theoretical problem as discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation concerns 
the discussion in the TO literature regarding isolation or embeddedness. Basically there is one 
stream of literature that considers TOs to be unique and isolated from their environment, and 
another stream that emphasizes the importance of the context or environment of TOs for their 
functioning (e.g., Engwall, 2003; Löwendahl, 1995). Our findings strongly support the latter 
viewpoint. This is in line with an increasing belief that the study of TOs shifts from the 
traditional focus on management ‘within’ TOs to a focus on the context and embeddedness of 
TOs (Morris, Pinto, & Söderlund, 2011). Accordingly, we make the claim that TOs, at least in 
the context we studied, are not one-off, closed systems. Instead, we view TOs as open systems 
embedded in multiple ways, in particular by prior relations between TO participants and 
expectations of future interactions among them, at both the organizational and individual 
level. Adopting this viewpoint has several implications for theorizing on the functioning of 
TOs. One of the early and influential contributions to theorizing on TOs comes from Lundin 
& Söderholm (1995), who depicted time, task, team, and transition as four central elements of 
temporary organizing. More recently Bakker (2010) revisited these elements and proposed to 
discard the transition concept in favor of ‘embeddedness’. In this dissertation embeddedness 
appears as a central element as well. Therefore in the following we discuss the implications of 
viewing TOs as open systems for the functioning of TOs by zooming in on the elements of 
embeddedness, time, team, and task, respectively. 
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6.2.1 The effects of embeddedness on collaboration practices in and across TOs 
Increasingly it is suggested that the functioning of TOs cannot be considered without taking 
into account the context in which they operate (Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 2002b; Sydow & 
Staber, 2004). The chapters in this dissertation reconfirm this viewpoint, at least for the 
empirical context studied. Aspects of embeddedness can both facilitate and hamper 
collaboration practices in and across TOs. On the positive side, embeddedness in the form of 
shadows of the past and future creates familiarity among TO participants which improves 
coordination and lowers the chance on opportunism. On the negative side, shadows of the past 
make it difficult for TO participants to break away from ineffective collaboration practices. A 
remaining gap in the literature concerns the conditions under which prior relations between 
TO participants improve, rather than impede, the functioning and performance of TOs 
(Schwab & Miner, 2008). We propose that a major factor in this respect is the alignment of 
change incentives of TO participants (see Chapter 4). If these incentives are not aligned, it 
will be difficult to make fundamental changes across TOs, creating suboptimal levels of 
collaboration and thus suboptimal performance. If these incentives are aligned, change is 
more likely to come about, which in turn can increase performance. In addition to these 
findings, we contribute to the embeddedness theme by also taking into account future ties. 
When discussing repeated ties, most studies stick to history of interactions (e.g., Sorenson & 
Waguespack, 2006), without taking into account expectations of future interaction. As future 
ties have been proposed to sometimes influence TO behavior more than prior ties (e.g., Poppo 
et al., 2008), a simultaneous comparison of shadows of the past and future is advisable. We 
have undertaken such an attempt in this dissertation (see Chapter 5), and tried to take it to the 
next level by not only distinguishing between prior and future ties, but also between ties at the 
interorganizational and the interpersonal level of analysis. 
6.2.2 The effects of time on collaboration practices in and across TOs 
In the context of TOs, time has been depicted as short or limited, but at least different in its 
influence from that on other, non-temporary organizations (Bakker, 2010). Yet the most 
important gap in the literature is considered to be empirical studies of the effect of 
temporariness on the functioning of TOs, because most of the work on this topic is of a 
conceptual nature. We have shown that time is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Within TOs time 
is limited which creates a sense of urgency among TO participants (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). 
Based on our analyses, we agree that time limits result in a strong orientation towards the task 
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at hand. But we challenge the idea that these time limits form the unique influence of time on 
the functioning of TOs. We posit that apart from these time limits, the influence of the time 
before TO initiation and the period after TO termination on project participants has 
considerable explanatory power as well. Collaboration practices in TOs, then, are influenced 
not only by specific TO characteristics such as the ex-ante defined termination point which 
creates a present-time and task orientation of TO participants. Instead, collaboration practices 
in TOs are also dependent on forces outside of the TO such as shadows of the past and the 
future. 
A second identified gap in the literature on TOs concerns how TOs develop over time 
(Bakker, 2010). This development can relate either to the changes in collaboration practices in 
a single TO (Packendorff, 1995) or to changes across multiple TOs (Bakker, 2010). 
Concerning changes within a TO, the inevitably approaching deadline of TOs has been 
considered to change the patterns of collaboration (Ness & Haugland, 2005). However, we 
have shown (see Chapter 3) that in the projects we studied collaboration practices hardly 
changed during TO life cycles. This suggests that TO participants have developed certain 
practices during previous TOs, take these practices with them to subsequent TOs, and do not 
change them much as a result of for instance impending deadlines. Again, this supports the 
view that TOs are not isolated phenomena and that collaboration practices are influenced not 
only by specific TO characteristics but by external forces that operate outside TOs as well. It 
also shows that the temporariness of a given TO may not be as influential on the participants’ 
behavior as assumed in much of the literature. These external forces can also help explain 
why learning across TOs that often necessitates changing collaboration practices is difficult to 
achieve. TO participants are used to being in a working environment in which multiple 
organizations with multiple interests collaborate. That makes it difficult to implement changes 
across TOs and explains why – as these difficulties arise time after time – TO participants 
may resign from active attempts to bring about change (see Chapter 4). On a macro level, TO-
based industries can also have difficulties to change collaboration practices. We have shown 
that in this case too, the past plays an important role by creating collaboration inertia through 
mechanisms of path dependency (see Chapter 2).  
In sum, the various elements of time can both facilitate and frustrate collaboration in and 
across TOs. Past time can facilitate collaboration in TOs when successful practices are 
reproduced over time, but it frustrates collaboration when through a shadow of the past TO 
participants cannot break away from suboptimal collaboration practices. While past time can 
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have both positive and negative effects, it seems that expectations of future interactions 
predominantly facilitate collaboration through the mechanisms of reciprocity and reputation. 
TO participants’ orientation on the present time can both increase and decrease the quality of 
collaboration (see Chapter 3). 
6.2.3 The effects of team composition on collaboration practices in and across TOs 
With regard to the team aspect of interorganizational TOs, a major concern has been that 
because of TOs limited duration, TO participants lack the time to develop collaboration 
practices for instance by engaging in trust-building activities, which is considered important 
for effective collaboration in interorganizational settings (Meyerson et al., 1996). However, 
through the influence of shadows of the past and the future (see Chapters 3 and 5), this is less 
of an issue than might be expected because TO participants are likely to have collaborated 
before and expect future collaboration. This is in line with other work that accentuates the 
importance of lasting ties across TOs (e.g., Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Sydow & Staber, 
2002). The notion of ‘swift trust’ (Meyerson et al., 1996), which can be described as 
presumed trust rather than trust based on shared experiences, seems therefore only significant 
when shadows of the past and future are absent. 
Another concern has been that the involvement of multiple organizations with diverging 
interests in the project team creates frictions. We adhere to this viewpoint by showing that 
organizations participating in Dutch shipbuilding projects have to deal with conflicting 
interests as well. For example, shipyards seem unwilling to give up their dominant position 
and to grant more influence on the production process to the subcontractors, even though 
these subcontractors increasingly have knowledge that is central to the process. On the other 
hand, a distribution of decision-making power would also involve a distribution of the 
financial risks, which are currently carried predominantly by the shipyards. It seems that 
subcontractors are not that eager to take on parts of this risk. This combination of unaligned 
incentives seems to create a status-quo situation that may be suboptimal, but which triggers 
none of the involved parties to actively strive for (fundamental) change (see Chapter 2).  
In sum, team composition can facilitate and hamper collaboration practices in and across TOs. 
The inevitably diverging interests which are a consequence of the involvement of multiple 
organizations can lead to ineffective collaboration when TO participants try to maximize their 
own profits at the expense of others. However, having the same organizations involved across 
TOs can mitigate this effect through mechanisms of reciprocity and reputation. 
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6.2.4 The effects of the nature of the task on collaboration practices in and across TOs 
Tasks justify the very existence of TOs (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). These tasks often are 
complex (Brady & Davies, 2004), which is why the inputs of and collaboration between 
multiple expert organizations are required. While tasks in the context of TOs first were 
portrayed as relatively unique (Goodman & Goodman, 1976), more recently it has been 
suggested that TOs can also execute similar tasks across subsequent TOs (Brady & Davies, 
2004). To a certain extent the tasks performed in the Dutch shipbuilding industry can be 
considered routine tasks as they all concern producing (similar types of) vessels. This 
routinization of tasks has been argued to facilitate collaboration for instance by lowering 
learning barriers (Scarbrough et al., 2004). In line with this we found that collaboration can 
become more efficient when tasks executed in subsequent TOs are similar (see Chapter 4). 
Yet, with task routinization comes the routinization of practices and this can equally well 
hamper collaboration if these practices are suboptimal. To the extent that TO participants are 
used to a dominant way of carrying out and accomplishing tasks, they will find it difficult to 
change their practices (see Chapters 2 and 4). Thus, we propose that the execution of routine 
tasks can both facilitate and hamper collaboration in and across TOs. 
6.3 Practical recommendations 
Our findings suggest some practical recommendations on how to improve interorganizational 
collaboration practices in and across TOs in general and in and across shipbuilding projects in 
particular. An important recommendation would be to strive for repeated collaboration with 
the same set of organizations and individuals. This paves the way for the development of 
collaboration routines and lowers the chance on opportunism. For example, we found out that 
during the projects under study a subcontractor was compensated for his loss by the shipyard 
as a way of looking after each other and backing each other up. However, there is a trade-off 
between the advantages of repeated collaboration between a given set of organizations and the 
advantages of competitive bidding, which was outside the focus of this dissertation but should 
be taken into account by practitioners. Moreover, repeated collaboration in itself is not a 
sufficient condition to improve collaboration. A critical step in coming to optimal 
collaboration between TO participants is aligning their interests. In the Dutch shipbuilding 
industry, the unaligned interests seem rooted in the past and taken-for-granted, making it 
extremely difficult to alter the situation. However, for the industry new ways of collaboration 
are considered key in achieving optimal interorganizational collaboration: 
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“It is absolutely clear that we still do not make the most of collaboration between shipyards 
and subcontractors. It is not catastrophical, and it does get better, but still there lies a major 
challenge. One of those challenges is the development of a business model in which 
subcontractors play a new role. Subcontractors need to become a partner, and share the risks 
accordingly. In that area there is still ample room for improvement.” [Retired shipyard 
executive] 
In the quote above a collaboration model is proposed, in which risks are shared among 
shipyard and subcontractors. Such collaborations are common practice in for instance the 
Japanese car industry (e.g., Okamuro, 2001) but are currently not present in the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry. This risk-sharing principle could be a way to align interests as it causes 
ineffectiveness (e.g., failure to learn across shipbuilding projects, inflexible behavior) to harm 
not only the shipyard but the subcontractors as well. That in turn should motivate all parties to 
behave not only according to their self-interests, but also to take into account the interest of 
others as well as the overall interest. It could be a way to deal with the complexity of 
temporary interorganizational collaboration and the inherently conflicting interests between 
the parties that are involved in the production of complex vessels. Furthermore, while 
technical innovations (state-of-the-art machinery, innovative software and methods) are vital 
to the competitiveness of project-based industries, the social component that is often 
neglected appears to us to be equally important in optimizing collaboration practices in and 
across TOs. 
6.4 Limitations and future research 
Above and beyond the limitations of the individual chapters in this dissertation, we next 
discuss some general limitations which can be addressed in future research. First of all, the 
explorative, case-study approach in this dissertation has served its purpose well: gaining 
detailed insights in a relatively underexplored phenomenon. However, it has been argued, and 
we concur, that now the time has come to integrate the findings of in-depth studies on 
temporary interorganizational collaboration to see what we have learned so far and what 
remains to be explored (Bakker, 2010). Future research should also incorporate large-scale, 
quantitative analysis. Such research can for example attempt to test the relative influences of 
past time, future time, and present time, and their possible interaction effects on collaboration 
in and across TOs. 
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Second, the focus of this dissertation has been solely on TOs, which are considered unique 
collaboration types because of their temporary nature. One may wonder to what extent TOs 
really are different from other interorganizational collaboration types like alliances and joint 
ventures. Future research could explicate the similarities and differences between the 
functioning and outcomes of TOs versus alliances versus joint ventures. This will shed light 
on the extent to which these various collaboration types indeed are unique. In addition, similar 
findings could be aggregated into what could form a meta-level theory of interorganizational 
collaboration. 
Third, this dissertation did not systematically examine the relation between TOs and parent 
organizations (POs). On the one hand these parent organizations are part of the environment 
of TOs and as such can have an impact on the functioning of TOs (Modig, 2007). On the 
other hand, it is argued that TOs can develop an endogenous logic of functioning that is 
different from established routines of parent organizations (Kenis et al., 2009). Our analysis in 
Chapter 3 is specifically focused on the relation TO-TO instead of TO-PO. The analysis 
suggests though that TOs indeed can develop collaboration routines that are not necessarily in 
line with PO routines. But they are in line with routines in previous TOs, signaling a bigger 
influence of the past on current collaboration in TOs than of parent organizations. Future 
research may take a closer look at the interrelationship between TOs and parent organizations 
and how this impacts TO functioning and outcomes. 
Fourth and finally, in comparison to intraorganizational TOs, interorganizational TOs are an 
understudied phenomenon (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). Future research could examine the 
differences and similarities between interorganizational and intraorganizational TOs. The 
main elements identified in this dissertation (past time, present time, future time, change 
incentives) may be applicable to intraorganizational TOs as well. Prior relations between 
members of different departments and expectations of future interaction among them are 
anything but unlikely, creating shadows of the past and future. In addition, the interests of the 
various departments may be strongly diverging, creating frictions between the departments 
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Appendix A: Data supporting interpretations of IO project practices and demands 
 
Theme Representative quotes 




Low interdependence / Few partners involved in the project: “The most 
important thing is that in that time the yard wanted to do everything on its 
own. They had their own painting companies, own electrical division. They 
controlled everything by themselves.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
“We employed everyone, our own painters, scaffold builders, and ship 
carpenters. (…) We outsourced very little.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
(Positive) Economic sensitivity / Long production cycles: “And my boss 
said to me ‘there’s a bunch of papers, good luck’. Those were all 
specifications for ships. In that period economy was doing so well that 
shipping companies stood in line for shipyards. We simply couldn’t find the 
time to handle all the customer requests.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
(Negative) Economic sensitivity: “In times of economic decline, one had to 
fire employees on a large scale to keep one’s head above water.” 




High time pressure: “The pressure of work is quite high. You’ve got a time-
limit that is just very tight. We work with schedules from which you know 
beforehand: well, I hope we’re going to make that.” [Technical manager 
Shipyard] 
High interdependence / High technical complexity: “Who is designing 
something? Who is delivering something? Who is connecting it? Who is 
commissioning it? And it was very clear from the start so every time we had a 
discussion, we just opened the demarcation: no, it is yours. You have to sort it 
out. And it saved a lot of discussions.” [Project manager Electric] 
Many external partners involved: “Subcontractors became more and more 
important because the entire functioning of the vessel is dependent on the 
performance and quality of the subparts. So their importance and influence 








Trust-based coordinating / Operating through informal networks: “There 
was only one supplier, for electrical installations, that was important. That is 
called subcontractor right? I don’t believe he cheated us. We had a very good 
relationship with him.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
“They saw each other often in the church on Sunday. Trust developed there. 
The contract is a document, you need to have it, but it is only for 
emergencies. You do not use it in every-day practice.” [Maritime researcher] 
Emphasis on common pride: “It [shipbuilding] used to be much more goal-
driven. Everybody was glowing with pride at the moment a ship sailed away 
for the first time. It has changed from a shared, common pride of that ship 
sailing away to how can I write my contracts in such a way that it is to my 
own advantage. It all has become less open.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
Operating through informal networks / Problems referred to higher 
hierarchical levels: “Whenever the board of directors of site X came over to 
talk to the board of directors of site Y, they always dropped by at our 
department and said: you guys work together, we’ll do the fighting at the top. 
You maintained good relations with those guys.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
“I think that between yard and subcontractor there were always informal 
arrangements, it’s always a matter of give and take. That one [project 
manager] says ‘ok, if you do this task for me then I won’t bother you about 
that thing’. It’s often the most efficient way to get a result.” [Retired 
shipbuilder] 
“It could be that the project manager had a row with the project manager of 
the subcontractor, for example, because he lagged behind on delivery times or 
quality. But because sooner or later you had to deal with each other again, the 
board of directors had to make sure the conflict didn't get out of hand.” 
[Retired shipbuilder] 
Emphasizing informal contracting: “The rivalry between the Dutch 
shipbuilders in those days was legendary. In the eyes of outsiders they were 
bitter rivals. Behind the written contrasts institutionalized cooperation was 







Emphasis on (financial) self-interest: “Everyone is fighting for his own 
purse. And that is not unhealthy, I think. But the atmosphere is quite 
different. Because the atmosphere is no longer about how we are going to 
solve it but more about: if you want me to do something it will cost you.” 
[Head project management Electric] 
“People are more and more looking up their own alley. This part is finished 
within the allocated hours so I am done with it. If I have to step it up to make 
it more efficient somewhere else, I will put in more hours and I am evaluated 
by that so I rather don't.” [Technical manager Shipyard] 
“The more product complexity increases, and the available time decreases, 
the more you have to move towards collaboration in which risks are shared. 
The same goes for financial risks. That is a learning process for both parties. 
It also means there has to be trust, you let them look behind the scenes, and 
people have to dare. And I have to admit it is laborious.” [Commercial 
director Shipyard] 
“I used to check all the drawings but eventually I thought: this is not my job, I 
don't get paid for this. So now we use more materials, it increases the cost 
price” [Contract manager Electric] 
Shipyard acting as lead organization / Less trust-based coordinating: 
“We are seen as the troublesome subcontractor, who tries to keep things 
covert, something we have to do because as soon as we tell something they 
take it to the competitor, and then we are left empty-handed. That just 
happens. Drawings are copied and given to the neighbors. What is your 
price? (…) Then you don’t put everything on drawing.” [Contract manager 
Electric] 
“When the yard's project manager and the subcontractor's project manager 
share the responsibility, you can get improvement. But that discussion never 
came to a good end. Nobody wanted to make concessions. Then it stops. As 
long as responsibility resides with one party, that party will take the 
decisions, because he is responsible for profit and loss.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
Emphasizing formal contracting / Emphasis on (financial) self-interest: 
“It is much easier if you can arrange things on the production floor, much and 
much easier. But today that is no longer possible. Today everything needs to 
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be confirmed by email and backed up with pictures. That is really a trend that 
has become visible over the past few years. You can make informal 
arrangements with a person but it can have major consequences when these 
commitments are not met. Because when the work is not done, it costs us 
time and money.” [Production supervisor Painting] 
“Currently, I see how lawyers get bogged down in contracts, that they are 
nitpicking each other. That is nothing but distraction from the real goal: to 
build a ship together.” [Retired shipbuilder] 
Shipyard acting as lead organization / degree of outsourcing / Emphasis 
on formal contracting: “The contracts between shipyard and subcontractor 
go pretty far, because they spell out in detail a subcontractor’s functionality 
and supply scope, but also a demarcation list with activities. And they do that 
for every subcontractor. And the structure of the contract and the purchasing 
conditions are written down in such a way that you as a subcontractor have 
no say in the overall picture. The shipyard outsources 70% of the entire 
vessel to subcontractors, but these subcontractors have no influence on the 
building process. (…) No matter for what reason, if there are problems with 
the planning that cause you to start your work later, can deliver later, and 
hence need to put more time and effort in your job, you cannot call the 






Appendix B: Example of observation protocol ZeroOne 
OBSERVATION PROTOCOL 
Observation Details  
Project meeting  
March 6, 2012  
11.00 hrs – 12.13 hrs 
Descriptive notes 
(factual observation, what do we SEE?) 
Reflective notes 
(reflection and opinion on what we see) 
Subcontractor: Often I see personnel from 
[subcontractor X] walking around the 
accommodations with pipes longer than two 
meters while the accommodations are 
finished. I thought that was not what we had 
agreed upon.  
Perceived rigidity concerning procedural 
requests. 
Subcontractor: One of our guys from the 
office is waiting for information. Production 
supervisor shipyard: I need to check that, and 
then I will come back to you. 
Request for information, positive response. 
Subcontractor: Do we have to paint that area 
or is that in the scope of [subcontractor X]?  
Flexibility concerning scope of work. 
Subcontractor: I come back in the evening to 
finish that job. 
Flexibility concerning time. 
Shipyard: This vessel cannot be handled as a 
standard vessel because it is twice the size. 
So everybody needs to increase pace. 
Flexibility request concerning increase of 
pace. 
Subcontractor: the coming days we will put 
in overtime to make up for the loss in time. 
Flexibility concerning pace. 
Subcontractor: Can we start today in the 
technical space? Shipyard: no that is not 
possible, the guy who is responsible for that 
room has been ill for a few days, and I have 
no one else to do that job.   
Defiance, rigidity concerning pace and 
timing of activities. 
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Appendix C: Data supporting interpretations of flexibility requests 
 
Theme Representative quotes Source 





“It had to be isolated, but it was not on the original isolation plan.” 
[Shipyard Engineer] 
Int. 
“We had to pull all the cables from two rooms and bring them back 
in again.” [Production supervisor Electric] 
Int. 
“Sometimes I need to put effort and time in adjusting someone else’s 
unit.” [Production supervisor HVAC] 
Int. 
“Then we have finished one room, but then we come back the next 
day and there are holes everywhere because extra clicks had to be 
assembled.” [Production supervisor Painting Interior] 
Int. 
“I know that this room has been isolated already, but I still need to 
do some things there. So I will make some damages that causes you 







“They tell me to make sure that I have got enough people for the 
job.” [Production supervisor HVAC] 
Int. 
“Usually they ask me if I can put more people on the job or if I can 
put in some overtime.” [Production supervisor Electric] 
Int. 
“Everyone has to crack it up a notch.” [Production supervisor 
Shipyard] 
Obs. 
“Then they ask us if we can paint their clips first, which is then 
usually at the earliest moment possible.” [Production supervisor 
Painting Interior] 
Int. 
“Between the subcontractors it goes continuously ‘can you do this 
now, can you do that now?’“ [Production supervisor Painting 
Interior] 
Int. 
“I perform that task in the evening, because then there is nobody 









“If you encounter things that are not on the drawings, please inform 
me so I can put it on paper.” [Engineering Shipyard] 
Obs. 







“We have agreed that every Thursday afternoon, all parties put some 
effort in cleaning the ship. This is not a request without obligation. 
We have a housekeeper on board, but he is only responsible for 
regular cleaning activities like emptying garbage cans.” [Project 
manager shipyard] 
Obs. 
“Is everybody cleaning their own mess on board? I don’t think so. I 




Int. = interviews 




Appendix D: Data supporting interpretations of responses to flexibility requests 
Theme Representative quotes Source 
 Responses to flexibility requests  
Acquiescence “Sometimes it is about just pulling one extra cable. Then of course I 
do it, and we do not charge them for it.” [Production supervisor 
Navigational Equipment] 
Int. 
“If something simple is damaged, we repair it without further 
consequences.” [Production supervisor Paining exterior] 
Int. 
“This flexibility is who we are, how our people work. We are 
flexible not only towards this shipyard, but towards everyone we 
work with.” [Project manager Isolation] 
Int. 
Compromise “If they have damaged our work, or we are asked to do additional 
work that differs from what was on the original drawings, then I take 
a note of that. I write down our additional hours and materials and 
that goes to the office.” [Production supervisor Isolation] 
Int. 
“That is going to weigh in for the budget.” [Production supervisor 
Navigational Equipment] 
Int. 
Defiance “Not every subcontractor is able to increase pace to the extent we 
wish for.” [Project manager Shipyard] 
Int. 
“I ask them a list which says which cables I need to pull. If I need to 
sort that out by myself, it costs me more than a day work. While 
they are sitting behind their desk and with a few mouse clicks they 
can generate such a list. But they just won’t do that.” [Production 
supervisor Electric] 
Int. 
“It happens that I cannot respond positively to information requests. 
Then I tell them I am sorry.” [Production supervisor Electric] 
Int. 
Avoidance “In the beginning of the project, we have decided that every 
Thursday afternoon everyone would help cleaning the mess on 
board. Currently this is not going to my satisfaction. Therefore I 
would like to request again to make sure that you leave the vessel 
only when you are finished cleaning the room where you have been 






Int. = interviews 
Obs. = observations 
 
  
“I have heard that there are people sandpapering the wheelhouse 





Appendix E: Data supporting interpretations of drivers of responses to flexibility 
requests 
 
Theme Representative quotes Source 
 Drivers of responses to flexibility requests  
Present-time 
orientation 
“If you take up these issues like a team, it builds much better.” 
[Production supervisor Navigational equipment] 
Int. 
“It is in no one’s interest to withhold information from one another.” 
[Production supervisor Piping] 
Int. 
“Between the parties on board it goes continuously ‘Can you do this 
for me now, can you do that for me then?’ Then we do not wait for 
the project meetings, we just take care of it, and it accelerates the 




“This flexibility is who we are, how our people work. We are 
flexible not only towards this shipyard, but towards everyone we 
work with.” [Project manager Isolation] 
Int. 
“Flexibility has been the credo of our company ever since the 
beginning. When I started working here 27 years ago, it was already 
like that. If something had to be done on Saturday, you were there. 
You would get a telephone call ‘we have had an accident, the oil 
tank is leaking’. You went there and fixed what had to be fixed.” 
[Project manager Painting Interior] 
Int. 
“Our CEO breathes flexibility. He used to work for a company 
where he could move five degrees left, five degrees right, but no 
further. And if he decided to go beyond that, he had to explain it to 
his bosses. At one moment he decided he didn’t want that anymore, 





“The subcontractors are eager to get selected for subsequent projects. 
So we can tell them ‘listen, more projects will follow, but then we do 
need you to put in some extra effort on this vessel’. That works very 





Int. = interviews 
Obs. = observations 
  
“If we would behave rigidly, the shipyard would soon kick us out. If 
our behavior costs them money, they will start looking for others to 
do the job. So they are pretty powerful.” [Project manager Electric] 
Int. 
“We cannot afford it to be inflexible with regard to these types of 
requests because I think that if I do so, soon I will be employed 
somewhere else.” [Production supervisor Painting Interior] 
Int. 
“If you behave rigidly your company will get a bad reputation. 
Consequently, you don’t get subsequent projects. So we are kind of 
trapped, if we stick to our guns they will look for others.” [Project 
manager Navigational Equipment] 
Int. 
Ability to be 
flexible 
“Not every subcontractor is able to increase pace to the extent we 
wish for. This yard is used to work with relatively small firms, while 
the current project is a very large vessel. And we give subcontractor 
X assignments that take up 110 or 120% percent of their capacity.” 
[Project manager Shipyard] 
Int. 
“Our company gives us complete freedom concerning the number of 
people we use, when we do the spraying, when we do this, when we 
do that, when we put in overtime. And we have so many of our 
employees walking on the projects at this shipyard, it is easy to pull 
a guy from one project to let him do some work on the other 




“It happens that I cannot respond positively to information requests. 
Then I tell them I am sorry, but I just do not have the time to do it. 
You see, the last couple of weeks eight hour working days are not 
sufficient for me to finish my job. So I work twelve hours a day. And 
I come back every Saturday morning. Just to finish the work that 




Appendix F: Example of observation protocol ZeroTwo 
Observation Details  
Project meeting  
January 29, 2013  
13.15 hrs – 14.21 hrs 
Descriptive notes 
(factual observation, what do we SEE?) 
Reflective notes 
(reflection and opinion on what we see) 
Shipyard engineer: We are still working on 
what the dive area is going to look like. 
Electrical subcontractor: How did they solve 
that on the previous vessel? 
Shipyard engineer: I am not sure, I need to 
check the drawings. 
Explicit reference to ZeroOne concerning 
what the vessel is going to look like: 
similarities between ZeroOne and ZeroTwo 
Carpenter: Can we sort out our panels on the 
large deck? 
Production supervisor Shipyard: I think it is 
best if we do it the same as last time. But we 
have to look at the situation once you begin 
with that. 
Explicit reference to ZeroOne concerning 
procedures: similarities between ZeroOne 
and ZeroTwo 
Carpenter: We need to make hatchways; the 
ceilings are going to be slightly different in 
comparison to the first vessel. So we need to 
put our heads together for that. 
Explicit reference to ZeroOne concerning 
what the vessel is going to look like: 
differences between ZeroOne and ZeroTwo 
Production supervisor Shipyard: On ZeroOne 
we walked around the entire vessel to make 
photos, I think that is a good idea to do on 
this vessel as well. 
Explicit reference to ZeroOne concerning 
procedures: similarities between ZeroOne 
and ZeroTwo 
 
Engineer shipyard: Last time this was drawn 
incorrect. Now we have made separate 
drawings. 
Explicit reference to ZeroOne concerning 






Appendix G: Data supporting interpretations of conditions influencing cross-TO 
learning 




Internal change responsibility  
“Now I have the experience from the previous vessel. I know what the 
showstoppers were, and now I recognize these things much earlier so it 
is easier for me to adjust things on time.” [Production supervisor 
Carpentry] 
Int. 
“Now my men know which situations brought troubles last time and 
how they handled those situations. And now they can act 
immediately.” [Production supervisor Piping] 
Int. 
External change responsibility  
“We received information fairly late from the shipyard, because they 
were still busy with the drawings. And if you don’t have the 
information, it is very hard to carry out your work. And if then you 
find out afterwards that a socket has changed, it is difficult if that 
already has been installed.” [Production supervisor Carpentry] 
Int. 
“There are always problems with getting materials delivered on time. 
And that is a consequence of the involvement of so many parties. Our 
engineering department can be late, but it can also be that the material 
coordination department waits too long, or that the purchasers are 








Aligned change incentives  
“I told the production director this was not going to work in the future. 
We were just overloaded with work so we needed additional capacity. 
The production director agreed on this and also felt something had to 
change. Then he asked me how I though the situation could be 
improved.” [Production supervisor Shipyard] 
Int. 
“I talked to our production supervisor and that of the subcontractors 
how they experienced planning on the first vessel. And then I 










everyone, and collaboration is much more efficient.” [Project manager 
Shipyard] 
Unaligned change incentives  
“Now we are stuck with the garbage store and the diving area, they 
need to be painted. But we received information on those 
compartments late, so we are not finished before the painting, although 
that was our intention. So that means we need to weld afterwards, and 
that will give damages. But that is something you cannot really escape 
from.” [Production supervisor Piping] 
Int. 
“I think group evaluations with all the subcontractors are rather 
pointless. What happens then is that every subcontractor starts 
complaining about what has frustrated them during the process. But 
that does not solve the overall problem.” [Production supervisor 
Shipyard] 
Int. 
“We have on this vessel more repair work in comparison to the 
previous vessel. That is I guess because the owner wants additional 
things, and then the shipyard passes on these requests.” [Production 
supervisor Painting Exterior] 
Int. 
